U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV45/A4-3
Serial: 082

AUG 9 1950

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commander SEVENTH Fleet
Via: Commander Carrier Division THREE

Subj: Report of Operations 16 July to 31 July 1950

Encl: (1) CVG-5 conf ltr ser 059-50 dtd 2 August 1950, Report of Operations 16 July to 31 July 1950
(2) Intelligence Summary for period of 16 - 31 July, 1950
(3) Tabulated Data

NARRATIVE

1. On 16 July 1950, the VALLEY FORGE, with Air Group FIVE embarked, left Buckner Bay, Okinawa, sortied with elements of the SEVENTH Fleet, and proceeded for the Sea of Japan to support United States Forces in South Korea in accordance with Commander SEVENTH Fleet Secret OpOrder 10-50. At dawn on 18 July after arriving 60 miles off the coast of Korea, northeast of Pohang, Target Combat Air Patrol and Air Group Support Missions were launched to support the amphibious landing of the First Cavalry Division at Pohang. In as much as no targets were available, the support group returned to the ship after jettisoning their loads at sea. However, Target Combat Air Patrol was provided over the Pohang area until dusk. Two group strikes were then launched against targets in the Wonsan area. On the morning of the 19th the air group was again launched at dawn to strike North Korean targets. Only propeller aircraft were launched for the afternoon strike. A four-plane Seafire Combat Air Patrol and two-plane Firefly Anti-Submarine Patrol by the H.M.S. TRIUMPH augmented by one ADW type from the VALLEY FORGE was maintained throughout the daylight hours of the 18th and 19th. Upon completion of flight operations, Typhoon Bill Condition I was set as directed by Commander SEVENTH Fleet. After setting Condition I, the Task Force cruised in the Sea of Japan until the afternoon of the 20th at which time a southward course was taken to pass through Tsushima Strait in order to take position for strikes on the west coast of Korea. Typhoon Condition I was secured during late afternoon of the 21st and preparations were made for operations on the 22nd. At dawn on the 22nd the Air Group was launched, the ADs and F4Us as close air support for the ground forces in South Korea and the jets for targets North of Seoul. The propeller aircraft were unable to contact the close air support controllers on the prescribed channels and attacked secondary targets in the Seoul area. Morning and afternoon strikes were launched with the task force staying in an area

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approximately 100 miles west of the Korean coast. A four-plane F4U Combat Air Patrol plus an Anti-Submarine Patrol consisting of one ADW type aircraft and one AD as investigator was maintained throughout the day. After recovery of the afternoon strike group about 1700, the task force headed southward to rendezvous with the NAVASOTA for the purpose of refueling aviation gasoline and fuel oil. The rendezvous with the NAVASOTA was effected about 1100, 30 miles northeast of Danjo-Gunto, on the 23rd. Upon completion of refueling operations, the task force headed for the Port of Sasebo, Japan, to rearm from the U.S.S. GRAINGER, arriving at Sasebo at 0900 on the 24th. After partially rearming, the task force left Sasebo about 2400 on the 24th in accordance with Commander SEVENTH Fleet Secret OpOrder 11-50 and proceeded to a position about 30 miles southeast of Pohang, Korea, where close air support missions were launched the 25th and 26th. Due to expected deterioration in weather conditions on the east coast of Korea, the task force spent the 27th refueling from the NAVASOTA and enroute to the west coast where close air support missions were launched from a position approximately 40 miles off the coast on the 28th and 29th. The TRIUMPH again furnished Combat Air Patrol and Anti-Submarine Patrol for the period 25 through 29 July augmented by one ADW type aircraft from the VALLEY FORGE. The task force departed on the evening of the 29th for Buckner Bay, Okinawa, to replenish and rearm. Enroute, the task force refueled from the NAVASOTA on the 30th and conducted AA firing at sleeves towed by JD type aircraft furnished by UTRON 7 detachment based at Kadena, Okinawa, on the morning of the 31st. The task force arrived at Buckner Bay, Okinawa, about 1500 the 31st of July.

2. Comments and recommendations:

A. NAVAL OPERATIONS

1. Air

a. Shipboard Plane Handling.

(1) During the first of the period, strikes were conducted by launching a 32 propeller plane strike first, then a 12 plane jet sweep followed by another 12 plane jet sweep, 30 minutes later. When launching this type of deck load, 26 jets were spotted on the after end of the flight deck with the propeller planes in front. After the propeller planes were launched, 2 jets were spotted on the catapults, 2 jets ready to taxi on the catapults, and another 2 jets staggered off the center line directly behind. The remaining six jets of the flight were spotted at a 45° angle along the port side aft of No. 2 elevator. The spares were spotted on

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the starboard side aft of the island structure. This method of spotting enabled the jets to turn up for pre-flight check prior to spotting on the catapults. When taxiing out the six planes on the port side, the after plane was taxied out first in order to reduce blast on personnel. The second jet sweep was brought up to the catapult in the same manner.

During the latter part of the period, strikes consisted of a 12 to 16 propeller plane strike, then an 8 plane jet sweep, 1½ hours later, followed by a 12 to 16 propeller plane strike 3 hours after the first propeller launch. The first jet sweep and the first propeller strike were landed after the second propeller strike was launched. The second jet sweep was launched 1½ hours after the second propeller strike. This type of schedule was continued throughout the day.

In setting up for the first launch of the next day, 8 jet planes for the second sweep were spotted on the after end of the flight deck with all available propeller planes in front. This type spot afforded room in the hangar for aircraft maintenance during the night. After launching the first propeller strike, 10 jets were brought up from the hangar for the first jet sweep and spotted on the catapult in the same manner as mentioned above. After the jet launch, the 2 spares, if available, were spotted on the catapult and additional jets were brought up from the hangar to maintain a 4 plane Condition 10 Jet CAP. The Condition 10 Jet CAP was broken 20 minutes prior to the next propeller launch which was followed by landing the first jet sweep and the first propeller strike. As the propeller planes landed, they were spotted forward with their wings spread. This facilitated the loading of rockets, 100 lb. bombs, and 20mm ammunition while other planes were landing, and during respot. It was felt that the latter schedule was much easier to accomplish from the standpoint of ship-board handling and ordnance because of the fewer number of planes to handle at one time and the loading of ordnance with the wings in the spread position.

(2) The method of towing the F9F backwards with the modified standard tow bar, discussed in previous phase reports, has proven to be very satisfactory.

b. Tactics.

(1) Because of the high fuel consumption of jet aircraft, their inability to carry external ammunition, and lack of enemy air opposition, their employment was kept to a minimum. When launched, they were in groups of eight to search for targets of opportunity. Support missions usually consisted of approximately half of the

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available propeller aircraft, 8 F4Us and 8 ADs launched at 3 hour intervals. It was necessary to use the available night configurated F4U5s and ADs in order to provide a maximum number of aircraft in the support area. The most practical close support load for the ADs was 1-500# GP, 1-220# fragmentation bomb and 1 Napalm bomb plus a maximum number of HVARs or 100# GP. The F4Us carried a 500# bomb or Napalm and maximum HVARs or 100# GP. All aircraft carried a maximum loads of 20mm ammunition at a ratio of 1 HEI, 1 AP, and 1 incendiary. The ADs were loaded with 2000# GP and 1000# GP on occasions when specific targets called for those types of explosives.

c. Ordnance.

(1) In order to save valuable time during operations an assembly line is set up on the hanger deck and all HVAR lug bands are spaced properly as they are loaded aboard from the ammunition ship.

V45/A4-3
Serial:

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B. LOGISTICS

1. Aviation Supply.

(a) Despite the detail of men to ammunition handling parties, issues were made in normal manner. Stock upkeep in this branch is a continuing problem, but every effort is being exerted to prevent AOGs. Requisitions for items in short supply have been forwarded by despatch to COMFAIR Alameda, and a small percentage is being received by Air Mail. Information available indicates the balance is being shipped by air or surface transportation to COMSERVRON 3 for further transfer to the ship. The outlook is good for replacement of critical items.

5 8

CV45/A4-3
Serial:

[redacted]

C. PERSONNEL

(1) Ship's personnel, other than air department, were on Condition 3 watches continuously from 1200, 16 July to 1400, 31 July, except for a period of 15 hours while at Sasebo. Air Department personnel were at Flight Quarters (Condition 1) 44 percent of the time, and at Condition 3 the remainder of the time. Ordnance crews for bolting ammunition, assembling rockets, breaking out, and arming aircraft were required to operate in shifts around the clock.

In spite of the above conditions, all personnel appeared alert, though obviously quite tired by the end of the 13 day period. No deck handling accidents resulted from personnel fatigue, and almost all strikes were re-armed on time, though at the end of the period a maximum effort was required to meet the launching schedule.

L. K. RICE

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Intelligence Summary for period 16 through 31 July 1950

ACTION REPORT 18 JULY 1950

The support sorties launched at sawn were recalled when it was obvious that no enemy opposition would be encountered in the landing at Pohang. In all, 28 support and 5 defensive sorties were launched.

At 1130, the first combat sorties of the day were launched, composed of 11 ADs, 8 F4Us and 19 F9Fs. A triangular area of land formed by apexes at Wonsan (39°-10'N, 127°-25'E), Pyonggang (38°-25'N, 127°-15'E), and Kosong (38°-40'N, - on east coast) was divided into three areas by the attack planes and fighter bombers.

After the ADs and Corsairs took off, four divisions of jets were launched, two of them sent as a sweep up the coast to Wonsan and the other two sent inland to sweep Pyonggang airfield. Seven jets swept up the coast to Wonsan where they made strafing runs on a hangar and possible AA emplacements (unmanned). Pilots observed Wonsan Oil Refinery and reported it intact. A 60 foot sampan was strafed in the harbor and left burning. Near Kojo a small fishing boat was strafed; damage unknown. At Kosong, they strafed a line of cars on a siding, firing two tank cars, and probably inflicting damage to boxcars. No anti-aircraft was encountered.

At Pyonggang, the sweep found two rows of single-engine aircraft, with planes about 30 yards apart. All planes made a least two runs up and down the rows, starting no fires but observing hits on many of the planes. Of a total of 25 enemy aircraft observed on the ground probably 3-4 were destroyed, many damaged. Nearby, a locomotive underway was strafed, bringing it to a stop and resulting in a steam explosion. Two flashes from small arms fire were the only evidence of anti-aircraft.

A second sweep of Pyonggang on the heels of the first accounted for 3-5 more planes destroyed or probably destroyed, 6-8 damaged. No anti-aircraft was encountered.

These sweeps were followed by sweeps against targets of opportunity, such as railroads, trucks, and personnel lines. The 1st division stayed south of the tracks from Kosong to Pyonggang making their first attack at Kunsong rail yards. Bomb

hits tore up track, and subsequent strafing runs set fire to a group of 3 tank cars, 2 miles south of Kumsong, and to a lone car further down the track. On the afternoon strike, the group of cars were seen still burning. From there, they followed the tracks to the northeast to Hwachon-ni (38°-50'N 127°-50'E) where ENS HARRIS made a direct hit on a RR bridge with a 1000# bomb. Three other pilots verify the report that one span was completely destroyed.

The division north of the RR tracks hit the yards at Kosong with 1 1000# bomb, continued north up the coast to Kojo where they turned inland. The division leader reported 2-3 rocket hits on a small bridge at 39°-45'N 127°-36'E. Near Hoeyang (38°-45'N-127-40'E) rockets set fire to an electric power sub plant. Two explosions were observed and thought to be napalm hits until the division leader observed that no napalm had been dropped. With Corsairs, the field at Pyonggang was then strafed, and eight Yak's were left burning on the field.

The third division hit in and around Pyonggang, dropping a power line with rockets, just north of the city. In the same vicinity a napalm hit set fire to a string of 2 or 3 coal cars, which were burning on retirement. No anti-aircraft was encountered at any of the targets.

Two divisions of Corsairs accompanied ADs into the targets as fighter-bombers. The planes with the northern division of ADs strafed Kojo with rockets and 20mm setting fire to a repair shop and damaging 2 locomotives. At Pyonggang they observed 8 planes burning, so strafed the hangars with the rest of their rockets, possible fires being started.

The other division of Corsairs strafed a railroad bridge at Kumsong with rockets, but results were unknown. At Hoeyang, they strafed the power sub-station getting hits with rockets. At Yang Yang pilots strafed and damaged cars and tracks in a RR siding.

At 1700; after quickly rearming with napalm, 1000#, and 500# bombs, the ADs and Corsairs took off on a strike against the oil refinery at Wonsan. On the way up, one division of ADs made a run on the car barn at Kosong with rockets. One salvo with smoke rockets made the target appear burning, but on the return trip pilots all verified results as just damaged.

At the target, one division of Corsairs pushed over first, making a run with rockets and starting small fires in the refinery area. They were followed by the ADs who dropped everything they had, except for 1 plane who failed to drop his 1000# bomb at the target. The first division, firing rockets on the way down, made 1 direct hit with a 500# bomb in the building area on the eastern side of the refinery. The last of the two firing all their rockets into the target area. After their pullout six more Corsairs followed with rockets. These pilots verified reports of many explosions and fierce fires in the target area.

On retirement, the strike group headed south down the coast, looking for rolling stock and other target of opportunity to strafe. The AD with the hung 1000# bomb made a run on a vessel (about 100'-150') which was headed south. His bomb exploded just forward of the ship, enveloping the vessel in water. From reports of other pilots and a photograph, the ship was dead in the water and probably heavily damaged, evaluated as a probable sinking. At Kojo, a small craft was strafed and damaged. Further south, the damaged car barn was strafed again by ADs and Corsairs with bursts from 20mm shells the only observed damage. Here, they left the coast to return to the ship. The only anti-aircraft encountered was some 20mm and 40mm from a gunboat in the harbor at Wonsan. She was worked over by a few F4Us with unobserved results. No enemy aircraft were encountered at any time during the day.

ACTION REPORT 19 JULY

In a pre-dawn launch, Air Group FIVE sent 13 ADs, 19F4Us and 24 F9Fs against the enemy farther north. The primary target for attack and fighter-bombers was the Bongun Chemical Plant at Hamhung, with secondary importance given the Kogen RR bridge. The jet sweeps were launched against Yonpo, Sondok, and Kanko West airfields.

Finding no planes at Kanko West, the sweep went on to Yonpo and Soldok. At the former, pilots saw up to 12 aircraft on the field, and at the latter, they saw up to 15. The planes were typed as Yaks and IL-10s. In 20-25 concentrated runs on the two fields, flying in a figure eight from one field to the other, the two sweeps left 13 planes burning on the two fields, 7 at Sondok, 6 at Yonpo. 5-6 others were estimated as damaged, for though no fire occurred, some hits were observed. Ten runs were made on the hangars, which were damaged but not burned. Retiring to the east and north, the fliers made runs on 4 orage tanks at the tip of the breakwater in Hungnam. Four were destroyed by fire, and four more damaged as a result of strafing runs. North of the pier, a power sub station was also strafed, sustaining some damage.

With the ADs, weather seemed to be the worst enemy, for the target was obscured by a combination industrial smog and clouds. Coverage was given as .8 by pilots of all divisions. However, the flight pushed over on a plant with 4 tall chimneys, believed to be the primary target. Six 2000# bombs, six 1000# bombs, and 4 HVARs were unloaded into this target, but although hits were seen, poor visibility obscured a proper evaluation of results. After this run, they retired to the south, where they found another factory at Hungpyong-ni. Firing what rockets were still left from the first run and 20mm machine guns, they strafed the factory, observing a hit near the base of a long, tall stack

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with one rocket. Visibility once again obscured evaluation of results. Four gun boats at Wonsan drew attention by firing AA at the planes near the town. One small boat was underway and headed out the mouth of the bay, two were larger craft in the process of getting underway near the center of the bay, and 1 small boat was anchored near the south side of the bay. The three still in the bay threw up a fair barrage of 20mm and 40mm, but knocked down no ADs. Once plane was hit in the radome under the port wing, but that was the only damage. All 12 ADs strafed the three gunboats in the harbor thoroughly, silencing the guns on one of them. The only anti-aircraft encountered was from craft in Wonsan Harbor.

Three divisions of Corsairs followed the ADs into the target, dropping their napalm and 500# G.P. bombs into the same area that the ADs hit. One pilot observed a hole in the roof of a long building in the area. At Hungyong-ni some planes still had napalm and bombs so they hit the factory after the bombers, noting smoke at the base of the stack and small fires in the buildings. The gunboats also drew the 12 Corsairs, so they thoroughly strafed them with rockets and 20mm. LTJG MUNCIE's F4U received flak damage in the oil cooler or oil line on his first pass, so that his engine began to smoke on pull out. Heading back for the ship, he was forced to ditch at approximately 39°-02'N, 128°-54'E. A CAP was maintained over him until the Sea Otter from the TRIUMPH landed and picked him up. The pilot was unhurt. The other division of Corsairs diverted, hitting some tanks in the city of Hungnam, which were mistaken for the chemical plant. Here they dropped 3 napalm and 1 500# G.P. on the tanks observing direct hits, no fire. One bomb hit a long building, and the explosion was observed. At Wonsan, a third run was made on a building at the oil refinery. The refinery, hit yesterday by sorties, was still burning furiously with a colum of smoke rising to 5000 feet. Anti-aircraft fire from .30 or .50 caliber was observed in NW Wonsan.

Two night fighters and a night AD went after rolling stock up the coast. Five miles south of Changjon, two locomotives exploded from 20mm fire. Three miles south of Wonsan, a third locomotive was exploded and three oil tank cars were set afire. At Hupkok one final locomotive was seen to explode steam. Also at Chonnjin, the planes burned 2 more oil cars and strafed and damaged a truck.

The photo plane and his escort found targets in the area also. They observed 6 aircraft burning at Sondok, 2 at Yonpo. Then, at Hamhung they strafed a locomotive and observed a stream of water issue from one of the holes in the boiler. At Kowan just north of the town, 8 locomotives were waiting in the yard. The escort went down and steam exploded three of them. No anti-aircraft was encountered.

In the afternoon, 12 ADs, 16 F4Us, and 1 F4U-5P took off on strikes and a photo mission against the enemy. Primary target for the ADs was Kogon RR bridge, but the weather over Korea was so bad that they diverted to a small bridge 3 miles west of Wonsan. The ground was completely overcast except for two thin spots, one just south of Wonsan and the other just off Hungnam. All but 2 of the planes dropped their bombs at the small bridge, where two near misses with 1000# bombs were made. From there, they flew to Sondok airfield where they saw 9 intact aircraft on the south side of the field, staggered. Also on the field, the remains of 3-4 more burned planes were sighted. On retirement, they left 3 more burning and 2 others smoking. One of the two planes, with hung 1000# bombs, dropped his bomb on a hangar at Sondok, while the other plane dropped his on an unidentified group of building in the Southeast corner of Hungnam. The flight leader reported white bursts of anti-aircraft through the overcast at 10,000' with about the same accuracy as when the enemy could see the aircraft. This accuracy would suggest some kind of control for the guns, though not good.

The Corsairs aimed their strikes at Hungnam, where a supposed natural gas plant was assumed to be. Dropping 5 G.P., 4 napalm, and firing 6 HVARs, the pilots produced only quick extinguishing of the napalm jelly, and the pilots were not satisfied with the estimate of the target. The rooves of building in the area were reported as rusty and little used. Flying north, they followed the railroad to Hongwon, where they strafed the railyard, exploding 5 locomotives and damaging 3. Installations in the yard were strafed with results unknown. No anti-aircraft was encountered.

The photo plane and his escort flew within 50 miles of the Manchurian border, reporting that the track was open all the way from the border to Hamhung. No tunnels were damaged. At Sinchang one part of the tunnel was being repaired, although the other part was open for traffic. At Songjin 3 large factories were in operation with 8 trains observed shuttling in or near them. The tracks formerly believed to cut across the jut of land from Songjin north to Odaojin were observed to follow the coast line. At Chaho (40°-10'N - 129-40E) 1 locomotive was exploded. At Tanchon (40-27N-129-00E) 2 more were exploded by the escort. Farther north a last locomotive was exploded just before entering a tunnel at Songho-dong (41-05N 129-44E). Steam came from both entrances to the tunnel. At Sinchong a 100' barge was left burning. Another smaller barge was strafed at Songjin. No enemy aircraft or anti-aircraft were seen or encountered.

The attack planes, unable to contact TAC, and unable to see Seoul because of weather, flew to Tack'Chon where two divisions bombed the RR bridge, target 69. Dropping their 1000# and 500# bombs, they destroyed the bridge, leaving it bent and twisted, with a span in the center sagging. Photos confirm this report. The approaches also received direct hits with bombs and rockets. A factory at Haeju was subsequently strafed with rockets and 20mm, sustaining unknown damage.

The third division of ADs hit another combination RR and vehicular bridge 3½ miles northwest of Tosong-ni. With 2 direct hits, 1 1000# and 1 500#, a complete span on the vehicle side was dropped. Photos show a complete section missing near the east end of the bridge. Damage must also have been inflicted upon the adjacent RR tracks. Five miles north of the bridge, an army truck was left burning by the division leader. Near Haeju in a railyard already burned out, a 12 car train lost its locomotive with a steam explosion. Also in the yards, a string of 100# bombs put one into the roundhouse, with a large hole observed in the roof. One pilot strafed a power station near Haeju observing a large white flash as if a transformer had shorted. No anti-aircraft was encountered.

One division of Corsairs could not find an opening in the overcast at any point so jettisioned their rockets and bombs at sea on the return to the ship. However, the other group of F4Us went into the bridge at Taekchon with the two divisions of Skyraiders making the hits with 500# bombs in the approaches to the highway bridge. Their observations agreed with those of the returning bomber pilots. Then, moving north, three power stations were hit and left smoking. Fires in the transformers are believed to have been ignited. These targets were at Taekchon, Kunchon, and Hamchonjom. Photos confirm these damages. They also saw the burning train and reported about 6 cars burning furiously. Photos show 10-12 burning, and the possibility of the fires spreading is very pronounced. Light bursts of anti-aircraft were seen between Taekchon and T'osong-ni, believed to have come from slit trenches on the hill overlooking the combination bridge 3½ miles northeast of T'osong-ni.

The photo planes and their escorts were with the ADs and F4Us throughout the strike, and their pictures give excellent confirmation of all damage inflicted.

Shortly after 1115 the second strikes of 28 offensive AD and F4U sorties were launched under continuing bad weather conditions. Following shortly were 18 jet sorties. Defensive sorties of CAP and ASP were continued over the force throughout the day.

It was again found impossible to contact the TAG, and strike groups proceeded to target areas with lines of communication trains, trucks, bridges and tunnels as primary targets.

Principal target areas were centered around the YONAN-TOSONG NI-KARSONG-SIGMAR areas. Two railyards were strafed with one locomotive destroyed, several previously damaged ones further shot up and various coal and box cars strafed. Two tank cars were holed with 20mm but refused to burn. The train carrying fuel and ammunition set afire in the morning was again attacked and one more section set blazing.

Six tunnels were attacked by ski-bombing and rockets. No appreciable damage is estimated except in one case where 500# bombs exploding inside caused flame to shoot out one end and debris to shoot out the other.

One camouflaged locomotive was discovered under netting by a tunnel mouth and exploded. One train and one locomotive in tunnels were attacked by bombs, rockets and strafing with no visible results.

Two tracks were burned - one on a bridge, and one additional track, apparently carrying ammunition was strafed and disintegrated in a violent explosion. Two RR bridges were bombed with hits on approaches resulting in damage to rails and ties.

A burned-out power station from the morning's attack was hit by 20mm and the one remaining transformer was burned out. An undamaged power station was hit with two-thirds of the transformers set afire.

While strafing a truck at about 37°-55'N 125°-30'E near KANGHYONG-NI, Ensign Donald E. Stevens, VA-55, failed to pull out of his dive and his AD was seen to crash and explode.

Lt(jg) R. (n) Heiderer, VF-52 crashed into the sea during a catapult shot at 1215 due to apparent power failure of his F9F-3. He was picked up by helicopter and suffered no injuries.

One group of jets headed for KIMPO airfield, 10 miles west of SEOUL in the hopes of surprising planes on the ground. Several damaged planes were observed on the field and five to ten others believed to be heavily camouflaged or dummies were observed by one pilot. Hangars, barracks areas and AA positions were strafed.

The most spectacular damage occurred at INCHON. Attacked by first one group of F9Fs and then by the other, seven huge oil storage tanks and two small ones were destroyed by burning. Fires started by 20mm ammunition blazed fiercely with towering flames and black smoke extending thousands of feet into the clouds. Leaking oil caught fire and flamed throughout the vicinity. Photographs confirm the destruction of this principal oil storage installation.

Two locomotives were knocked out and small fires were started in a possible small refinery in INCHON. The oil storage facilities at INCHON naval base were strafed but no visible damage resulted although this installation appeared to have been previously damaged.

In most areas AA was absent, light or meager. At KIMPO airfield, however, the most intense AA yet experienced in Korea was encountered. Although relatively light in caliber (estimated mostly 20mm to 40mm), the fire was intense and accurate. At least two jet aircraft suffered minor AA damage.

Throughout the most successful operations of the day's strikes, photographic planes of MAG-12 provided excellent coverage. No indications of enemy radar were observed by QUEEN Planes.

ACTION SUMMARY, 25 JULY 1950

With the mission of stopping the advance of North Korean ground forces in the critical southwestern sector of Korea, carrier planes arrived over enemy territory beginning the morning of 25 July. Relying upon aircraft from HMS TRIUMPH to furnish the bulk of CAP and other defensive missions, 19 offensive sorties and one defensive sortie left the deck of the VALLEY FORGE beginning at 0800. The relatively late launch was due to the inability of the ships to arrive at the launching point earlier. The force was rearmed in port on 24 July with rearming completed in less than eight hours after the first load came aboard the USS VALLEY FORGE. For perhaps the first time in history, rockets and bombs delivered from a rearming ship alongside a carrier went directly to rails and racks of waiting aircraft. As a matter of interest, the first offensive sortie was launched considerably less than twenty-four hours after the planning for the operation had begun.

Eleven F4U Corsairs and eight AD Skyraiders comprised the first offensive striking planes under a special shedule which envisaged having carrier aircraft over the target area continously throughout the day. The target area assigned was designated as a "free navy opportunity area" since facilities on the ground for close troop support were not made available to navy planes. Principal targets were enemy troops, armor and vehicles, rolling stock, barge traffic and lines of communication.

At 0945 eight F9F Panthers were launched to sweep the target area. One plane suffered mechanical difficulties, so only seven jets made offensive sorties.

Returning pilots reported little evidence of any enemy advance to stop. The only troops reported were twenty to twenty-five on a bridge midway between Songjong-ni and Pochon-ni, about 35-15N 126-25E. Strafing apparently killed six to ten. Most people sighted were in groups of five to ten working in fields and were composed of men, women and children. They usually ignored planes overhead, not even looking up. Several groups of fifteen to twenty people dressed in white were sighted. The first group was strafed by one plane in accordance with information received from the Army that groups of more than eight to ten people were to be considered troops, and were to be attacked. Since the first pass indicated that the people seemed to be civilians, other groups were investigated by non-firing runs. As they all seemed to be working in the fields, they were not attacked. An installation believed to be an

ammunition storage or other military installation was strafed on one pass until it was determined to be a pottery factory. So many people came streaming out it lead to speculation that they may have been evacuated from their homes and had taken refuge. Most were women and children.

About fifteen troops were sighted in a river bed near Kaltan-ni, about 35-32N 127-09E, with white and blue panels spread. They made no attempt to hide and were not attacked.

No tanks were sighted. About six damaged or burnt out trucks were sighted northwest of Kwanju with three other burned out trucks sighted in other areas. In the middle of Kwanju, two trucks, not moving, were strafed. Trucks probably destroyed. Four trucks and six or seven horse-drawn vehicles were sighted on the road south of Kwanju. None appeared to be moving, although several people were seen to jump out of one truck. One truck was destroyed and three others probably destroyed. The horse-drawn vehicles were strafed with an estimated three damaged. One large truck, completely covered with brances, was burned and destroyed four miles south of Iri, two trucks were burned and destroyed five miles west of Chonjin and one truck damaged near Sonchon-ni.

Several people on bicycles were sighted, but none appeared to have packs or guns. Several empty carts were observed along the road tween Kunsan and Namwon.

The only live locomotive sighted was a small one with four cars bout ten miles north of Kinsan. Since it was out of the assigned rea, it was not attacked. Twenty to thirty boxcars and flat cars were strafed at Kwanju with minor damage to all. All cars appeared to be empty. The rail yards at Kwanju were damaged by one hundred pound bombs and rockets. Four damaged or destroyed locomotives at Iri were not attacked.

Two possible YMS and 3 power boats, believed to be South Korean, were sighted at about 35°-40'N 127°-52'E. A factory at the north end of Kwanju was bombed and damaged with two fires started. A railroad and adjacent highway bridge near Sonchon-ni (about 12 miles south of Chonju) were bombed and strafed. One 100# bomb hit and several 500# bomb near misses and some rocket hits damaged the RR bridge breaking ties. The highway bridge suffered minor damage.

A large power plant south of Iri was attacked by 3 500# bombs. One hit destroyed about a quarter of the installation. A RR tunnel at about 35°-28'N 126°-52'E was bombed and suffered minore damage to the approaches.

Kunjo and Sonchon-ni appeared to have burned-out sections and 4 F-51's were observed firing into the town of Namwon with several buildings smoking.

No AA was observed, although there were several instances of mall-arms fire and one F4U had a .30 caliber hole in the wing on turn.

Eighteen offensive sorties and 1 defensive sortie were launched at 1100 with 7 AD and 10 F4U proceeding to target area. About 6-8 troops on a railroad handcar camouflaged by tree branches, was sighted just south of the village of Tamyang. Strafing attacks killed about half the occupants, it is believed. The car was headed south. Eight probable troops carrying guns or sticks were observed leaving a burning hut 5-6 miles south of Kwanju. Strafing probably killed 5-6.

One truck was destroyed by burning. It appeared to be carrying POL, and was attacked near Sango-ri. Two other trucks in the area were damaged. Three trucks (1 camouflaged) and 2 jeeps (1 camouflaged) were seen between Kwangju and Hwasun. All were damaged. One jeep was burned 5 miles south west of Namwon, 2 trucks were destroyed and 3 damaged on a mountain highway south of Chongup. One armored car was damaged near Samchon-ni and another damaged south of Chongju. Other trucks strafed are believed to have been previously damaged.

One locomotive, camouflaged with two box cars just north of Kwanju was attacked by strafing, 1 rocket and 1 100# bomb. Fires started in area. Two box cars and the locomotive was damaged. Rail yards in Iri were damaged by bombs and rockets.

A railroad bridge, south of Taeon was destroyed by 500# bombs. One span was knocked out and approaches were damaged.

A highway bridge 1 mile west of Kwangju A/F suffered minor damage from rocket hits.

A factory northwest of Kwangju was damaged with HVAR and one 500# bomb hit. The factory hit during the earlier strike was still burning and is now judged to be 50% destroyed.

Once again, the only AA observed was small arms fire. One AD came back with a .30 caliber hole in the right horizontal stabilizer.

Ensign L. E. Thomson, VF-53, had a forced landing due to loss of oil (cause unknown) at about 34-58N, 127-13E at 1340. He made an uninjured, wheels-up landing and maintained radio contact for a short while with planes overhead. Plans for rescue included sending two carrier planes to Taegu Air Field in an attempt to have light planes or helicopter sent in to pick up Thomson. These planes were launched, as was one AD3W as a communication relay plane. No further details are presently available.

The second jet sweep consisted of eight offensive sorties. No military activity was noted along lines of communication. Two parked command cars at Kwangju Air Field were damaged and the locomotive and camouflaged boxcars previously damaged were again strafed. Locomotive now assessed as probably destroyed.

Two trucks parked near houses ten miles west of Kwangju were strafed and damaged. About fifteen dome-shaped, covered revetments were observed on the east side of Kwangju Air Field.

At 1400, fifteen offensive sorties (8F4U and 7AD) and one defensive sortie left the deck. Two F4Us and two ADs of VC-3 located one camouflaged truck parked in a dry river bed under a bridge five miles southeast of Kochang and damaged it by strafing.

Four F4Us of VF-54, plus an F4U photo plane, sighted six friendly trucks parked in the vicinity of Sunchon (34°-56'N, 127°-,28'E) with white panels and waving white flags. Six to nine men were around each truck. Fired rockets into building at power station at Iri. Transformers were already burned out and negative results were obtained.

Railyards at Kwangju were again hit by three 500# bombs, causing considerable damage to tracks and the yards.

Five ADs of VA-55 caused additional damage to trucks already hit. Since no military activity was observed, four bridges were attacked with bombs and rockets. The first bridge was a highway bridge on the southwest corner of Sunchang. One near miss of a 500# bomb caused no damage. The second highway bridge was northwest of the same town. Three near misses with 500# bombs caused possible heavy damage. The third highway bridge was four miles east of town and was hit with 100# bombs and several near misses occurred with 500# bombs. Bridge was damaged. The last bridge was a railroad bridge just north of Kikson (about ten miles south of Namwŏn). A string of twelve 100# bombs resulted in several direct hits. Rails and ties were displaced.

Considerable movement (mostly pedestrians) was observed in the vicinity of the 35th parallel southeast of Kwangju and outside of the area assigned to the Navy. From chatter on the air between "Mosquito Dog" and "Gas Mask", it would appear that a tank concentration and a fuel dump were located near Chongsŏn, about twenty miles east of Taejon, and that 2,000 troops were concentrated just above the 36th parallel at about 127°-40'E, with identity uncertain. Communications between "Mosquito Dog" and Navy planes were never satisfactorily achcived except in isolated instances.

On the railraod running northeast from Kwangju, rails are out from a point five miles north of the city for perhaps ten miles. Pilots estimated that almost half of the highway bridges in the vicinity of Kwangju were destroyed.

Shifting to the east and north, the carrier lay off Pohang-dong, on the east coast of Korea, early on the morning of 26 July. From here, she launched the Navy's contribution to close air support over the rapidly changing front lines. Two Corsair night fighters, three night ADs, four ADs, five F4Us and an F4U photo plane constituted the offensive sorties on the 0730 launch. Four other Corsairs made up the rescue sorties, and one AD3W teamed with two Firefly's from HMS TRIUMPH for the single defensive sortie.

The missions for the various divisions were a result of information concerning enemy dispositions issued by the Army and Air Force at Taegu last night. Tactical Air Control parties based on Korea established communications with the strike planes and assigned them various targets in or near the North Korean front lines.

Support I, consisting of the night elements of the Air Group, the photo plane and his escort split into two groups over the area. The four fighter type aircraft saw action only between Yonpung (36°-46'N, 128°00'E) and Mungyong (36°-44'N, 128°-06'E) where "Picklebarrel", an L-17, vectored them on 8 vehicles which were parked along the side of the road. Five trucks, one armored jeep, one reconnaissance car, and what appears to be a tank were strafed with rockets and machine guns by the four aircraft, smoking three trucks and inflicting damage to the others. The pilots reported a possible hit and a near miss with rockets, followed by runs, with 20mm. The damaged trucks showed holes from runs, although the targets did not burn, and photos show bursts leading to the vehicles. The armored jeep and tank were camouflaged with trees and shrubs, and the reconnaissance car with cloth spread over it. All the vehicles were parked on the shady side of the road utilizing the deception afforded by shadow to the maximum.

The three AD3Ns of the other group followed the wrong road to Taejon, never finding a target. Their bombs were all jettisoned in the mountains, and they returned to the ship with their rockets.

Four ADs reported over Taegu and received some fire from friendly forces, then were called for some strikes against supply boxes at Nonson (35°-25'N, 127°-24'E). Two 100# and two HVARs were dropped with unobserved results. At O'san-ni (35°-35'N, 127°-24'E) three 500# and two 100# hit a red tile warehouse and left one end burning. Still on call to the TAC, the planes dropped 7 500#, 20 100#, 21 HVARs on a small town 7-8 miles NNE of Yongdong. On retirement, the town was burning in several locales. During the flight, friendly vehicles were seen proceeding west from Taegu and east from lines near Taejon.

Also on the hop, 4 Corsairs, who preceded the ADs into their targets, scored a near miss on the warehouse at Onsan-ni. Results were unknown damage. At the little town NNE of Yongdong, they used 500# bombs and rockets to start scattered fires, which the ADs

reported burning. H[illegible]s, which burned, ignited [illegible] if oil were present. On the road nearby, 2 burned-out tanks were sighted, and a truck was strafed and damaged.

Eight more offensive sorties took off at 0945 when two divisions of F9Fs struck at communication lines between Suwon and Taejon. One pilot strafed and killed a horse pulling a horse cart on the road between the two cities. People were seen moving along roads with no apparent general direction of travel. These people appeared to congregate around vehicles already destroyed to wave off attacking aircraft. Near Chonan, a string of well-strafed boxcars were observed, and between Suwon and Taejon the road was littered with hundreds of destroyed vehicles. At Chochiwon, one division leader strafed the only truck which appeared intact, damaging it. Near the truck, he observed 6-8 destroyed tanks.

At 1115, the second group of propeller aircraftwere launched, sending out 15 more offensive sorties and 1 defensive sortie. The photo plane and his escort were sent from Taegu to Uijongbu (37-44'N, 127-03E) near Seoul to take pictures of troops. None could be found. At Suwon Air Field, both planes strafed and destroyed a previously damaged IL-10 and a previously damaged B-26. The former burned from their fire. The pilots saw the port wing crumble and fall off as a result of their fire on the latter.

Seven Corsairs were directed to Yongju, where they waited to be sent on the target for half the flight. Once directed against the target, they strafed 3 trucks, exploding two and damaging a third camouflaged truck. They reported Yongju and Punggi burning.

Six ADs went with the F4Us to Yongju where they bombed RR tunnels in the vicinity of 36°-55'N, 128°-25'E. Eight 500# bombs were dropped on the first, which was difinitely damaged. Joining the Corsairs, they bombed and destroyed 25% the orchard in which one of the destroyed trucks was hidden. On retiring from the area, two trucks parked in Punggi were bombed, strafed, and destroyed.

A relatively high amount of ammunition expended resulted from both lack of suitable targets and overloading the air controller. One TAC had 7 F4Us, 6 ADs, and 4 F-51s. No more than one division of planes can be adequately controlled by a single controller.

The four F4Us on the rescue mission failed to find any information concerning the downed pilot. The downed aircraft and helicopter were both strafed and destroyed. Already the enemy had partially camouflaged both craft. NearPosang, (34-16N, 127-05E) considerable movement was noted on highways. Several trucks in the town and 40-50 along the road to the east were discovered parked and camouflaged. Many were driven into backyards, against the back of buildings. Two blown-out tanks were observed - one in Posong, the other at(34°-44'N, 127°-00'E). One truck bore a white diamond with a red circle inside painted atop the cab. Straw and branches from trees were the prominent instruments of camouflage. Returning

to Taegu, the planes were armed with napalm by the Air Force. Back in the Posong area, they destroyed 4 trucks, probably destroyed 2, and damaged 5 more. An undetermined number of troops were possibly killed in fires started by napalm drops in the street and on four small building south of Yundun-ni (34-47N, 127-20E). Six motorcycles and a jeep were seen moving east from Posong, all camouflaged with branches.

At 1315, 14 offensive sorties and 1 defensive sortie were launched. Four ADs, directed to "wipe out" Yongdong, hit the town with napalm, leaving it burning fiercely. From here, they were sent to a RR bridge west of the town, where one hit with a 100# bomb and one with a rocket damaged the span. On a road WSW one and a half miles from Yongdong, camouflaged vehicles were bombed, strafed, and rocketed, where it is conservatively assumed they destroyed 1 truck. Nearby, two 100# bombs were dropped on a small village, igniting two fires. Another village was rocketed and set afire; one more village was strafed with 20mm. Observations gave news of relatively large numbers of friendly troops moving NW from Waegon (35-59N, 128-25E) to Kunchon, with vehicles and artillery in company.

Four F4Us on the way into the target, sighted two friendly trains headed north; one with all boxcars and the other with some flat cars apparently carrying heavy mechanized equipment. Also seen were two blown-out tanks just west of Yongdong. Two to three miles west of town TAC sent them after "20 trucks" in the valley, where they exploded camouflaged ammunition stock piles and trucks under camouflage with more ammunition. Three trucks were burned and 2 more were damaged. Pilots believe the controller estimated the camouflaged piles of ammunition to be trucks, so there were probably only 6-8 trucks in the area. NNE of this target, they strafed a small village, where the huts caught fire as if oil or vehicles were hidden withing. At Yongdong, eight 100#, two 500#, and one napalm bomb started fires.

Four F4Us and two ADs were directed from Mungyong (36-44N, 128-05E) NW to Yonpung, where they started fires with each of 4 napalm bombs. They were directed to bomb a narrow sketch of cliff road towards Mungyong and stock traffic. Twenty-nine HVARs, eight 100#, and four 500# bombs damaged the road badly, leaving it passable only to light traffic. Halfway between the two cities, a destroyed tank appeared, possibly one strafed on the morning strike by the photo plane. At 36°-45'N, 128°-03'E on the road, they saw 12 trucks destroyed. Half a mile SE of Yonpung strafed a camouflaged truck with 20mm, damaging it. An Air Force report on anti-aircraft at 37°-02'N, 128°-19.5'E was intercepted.

Eight offensive sorties and 1 defensive sortie were launched at 1715 for the last launch of the day. The 8 Corsairs hit Chongsan and set fires, then bombed and probably destroyed a small village 5 miles SW of Taejon. Nearby a power station was damaged with fires being started in the transformers.

ACTION SUMMARY
28 JULY 1950

After a day of mail and refueling, the force returned to the Yellow Sea where planes were launched at 0745 to begin the day's string of sorties in close support of ground troops. This first launch sent out 16 offensive sorties (7AD, 9 F4U), 1 defensive sortie (1 AD3W ASP), and 2 napalm test sorties (AD-4). At 0815 8 more offensive sorties (8 F9F) headed east on a sweep up the west coast to Kunsan. All other offensive sorties reported to controllers in close support missions.

One division of the jets checked Mokpo Airfield, which was deserted, but they did see 5 locomotives. Although four were already knocked out, the 5th was strafed, with some smoke observed. This locomotive was probably destroyed. Near 35°-25'N, 126°-50'E five trucks were seen, only 2 of which were undamaged. These were strafed and probably destroyed. Nearby, an observation post and foxholes were strafed with unobserved results. One truck in Mokpo was seen and blown up in a strafing run. Ten miles NE of Mokpo, a handcar was strafed and probably destroyed.

The other division of jets strafed some buildings at Kwangju Airfield and 1 camouflaged truck or tank in the vicinity. Without positive identification, it must be evaluated as 1 truck damaged. Kunsan Airfield appeared unused, but 3 boxcars and 1 tank car were strafed nearby. These, unfortunately, appeared previously damaged. A horsecart, 5 miles west of Yonggwang (35°-17'N, 126°-27'E), was destroyed with its load of supplies.

As on previous days, the pilots saw groups of people in white shirts, apparently working in the fields; but the people paid no attention to the planes. In one village almost every backyard appeared to have a group of people gathered around an unidentified object. Upon return to the ship, the outgoing pilots were cautioned to investigate more fully and attack if these parties appeared to be enemy.

Four AD-4s reported to TAC and TACP over Homchang (36°-34'N, 128°-11'E) for close support. On this town they dropped 3 napalm and 2 250# fragmentary bombs and strafed in two runs. Fires were reported and it is evaluated as damaged. Following the Naeson-chon River east, they strafed what the controller designated as enemy trying to cross the river from north to south. One pilot saw packs and rifles, and in strafing runs the pilots reported an undetermined number of animals in company and men killed. Returning west to Yongam-ni (36°-36'N, 128°-00'), they hit the town with all remaining bombs and rockets. Strafing runs followed after TAC explained that our troops had been bothered last night by fire from that town. Five buildings, barn-like in appearance, were seen burning well on retirement. Evaluation is probably destroyed. Following targets were observed

39 #2

on the return trip: thirteen trucks on the move and headed NW from Taejon (showing no panels), large RR installations, 14 warehouses, 15 trucks moving north from the warehouses, and 2 diesel junks all at Yongdang, which is across from the port of Kunsan. Small arms fire was thrown at them on all three targets, on which they made runs earlier. Weather decreased to 3500' ceiling and rain at Taejon and eastward.

The eight Corsairs were sent to Yongdong where the divisions split between two controllers. One division dropped 4 500# bombs on a camouflaged tank, one of which hit near enough to turn it 90°. The TAC investigated, evaluated it destroyed, so directed the plane to another camouflaged tank 200 yards away. 8 100# bombs and 21 HVARs blew camouflage off target but damage was hard to observe due to steep valley. Evaluation - damaged. One 100# bomb hit a row of undetermined camouflaged mounds, but damage was undetermined. Warehouses at Nonsen (36°-12'N, 127°-05'E) and Kunsan were strafed with negative results.

The other division was directed to an apparently camouflaged tank, which was found to be a field piece when the camouflage was blown off near the end of the run. Previously 2 hits and near misses with rockets were scored through the camouflage. Destruction could not be determined, so it must be evaluated as damaged. At Nonsan a string of already strafed boxcars was seen.

A VC-3 division of 1 F4U-5N and AD3Ns were also launched as a support group. Two of the ADs flew to Taeju, where they landed and let off a liaison officer from the Air Group FIVE staff. The Corsairs and ADs were directed to a small canyon NW of Yongdong towards Simchon-ni supposedly containing troops and the tank which the other Corsairs damaged. Two fragmentary bombs and 1 500# bomb were dropped, but the area was so difficult to navigate in that the pilots could not check on the damage done. Eight rockets and 20mm ammunition was thrown into the same area with unobserved results. This valley had a large cave at the end. Near the valley, the 2 ADs, which had gone to Taegu, joined the other planes over 2 small villages. Said to contain enemy troops, the 2 villages were hit with 20mm, 29 HVARs, 1 napalm, and 5 500# bombs; and they were left burning fiercilty. The evaluation is 2 villages probably destroyed.

At 1045, 14 more offensive sorties (6 AD, 8 F4U) and 1 defensive sortie (AD3W) were launched, with the same missions as in the first launch. Then at 1230, 8 F9F sorties swept the rail lines and roads of the western seaboard again.

One division of jets strafed 20-30 loaded carts at Yongdong destroying 7. Wheels and other parts were seen to fly off during the run. Five oil cars, probably already hit were strafed with no apparent damage. At Hondok (35°-31'N, 126°-42'E) they strafed and destroyed 1 camouflaged truck and damaged 2 more.

The other division flew first to Chichonni (34°-38'N, 126-58E) where they burned 1 truck and damaged 2 motor junks. At about 34°-52'N 127°-55'E they burned a truck, and at Sunchow destroyed 1 more. Here, they further strafed 3 coal cars and 5 boxcars because for a possibility of hidden troops. Just north, they probably destroyed 1 truck.

Four F4Us were sent to Mokpo (34°-45'N, 126°-23'E) to hit shiping. Dropping 1 500#, several 100# bombs, and HVARs, they sank 2 freighters and 2 tugboats, which were actually observed to sink beneath the surface. One 500# bomb hit on the dock, but damage was unknown. Flying north to Kunsan, the pilots saw 2 fighter air strips about 6000' long, apparently built on red clay, 25 miles north of Mokpo. No activity, planes, or buildings were seen there.

The other four Corsairs and six Skyraiders flew to Nonsan where the flight leader acted as TAC. On the way in, the group assesses the following damage: burned 1 truck on the dike across a canal north of Nonsan, burned 1 truck in a small village 2 miles SW Nonsan, and probably destroyed a motorcycle and side car 1 mile SW of Nonsan. All these vehicles were camouflaged with matting or straw. In and beyond Nonsan, they accomplished the following: damaged Nonsan with bombs (8 fires started), burned 2 jeeps north of the city, probably destroyed 1 truck in the city with napalm, burned 1 bus on the NE corner of town, and destroyed 1 tank (#315) 5 miles east of the town. On the return, the Corsairs burned transformers, damaging a power station 2 miles south of Kanggyang. One pilot strafed a long building just SW of Nonsan where he observed tank tracks in the courtyard. He believes that troops were present, for he received 6 holes in his wings and tail surfaces from small arms fire.

At 1345, the third support group of the day was launched, fielding 15 offensive sorties (4 AD, 2 ADN, 8 F4U, 1 F4U-5N) and 1 defensive sortie (AD3W). Then, at 1530, the 8 F9F sweep was also launched.

One division hit the coast at Mokpo and strafed a stationary train which has been evaluated as already damaged. However, subsequent strafing runs destroyed 1 large oil storage tank and damaged 3 sampans next to the quay wall. On the south edge of Kingjon (34°-37'N 126°-16 'E), the pilots claimed 6 trucks burned and 2 damaged. These targets were in a stockade. Posong found two more trucks damaged by our pilots.

The other division went farther south to the Yongam area (34°-50'N 126°-43'E) where they probably destroyed 3 trucks. Although moving when spotted, they stopped, and troops poured from them. At Simsong-ni (34°-51'N 126°-56'E) 2 trucks were damaged. Five trucks (probably ammunition) exploded on road from Hadong to Chinju, just east of the former. At Kawa-do 25 junks were sighted; no action, because no ammunition.

Four ADs reported to TAC at Yongdong, where [redacted] explained that the first tunnel north of the city was occupied by enemy troops, the second one north by friendlies. Four napalm hits were put into the tunnel, after which large quanities of black smoke issued from the ends. This target is evaluated as damaged with countless loss of lives. Pilots could see the front lines from their position at the tunnel, for many white and cerise panels were showing to the SE. Three villages were burning, evaluated as damaged. In one of the villages a napalm explosion sent a sea of fire the whole length of one of its streets. Okchon was strafed with no apparent damage. One bus was damaged between Kanggyong and Nonsan. Crewman and pilot confirm two direct hits with 100# bombs on two warehouses at Yongdong. West of Yongdong a barge was burned on retirement.

Four Corsairs reported to TAC at Hamchang (37°-33'N, 128°-12'E) and made runs on 5 uncamouflaged tanks, two of which were already burned out. Two hits with HVAR on 1 tank knocked off the right tread. Moving south and 10 miles to the west of Sangju they bombed, strafed, and rocketed troop positions atop a mountain, by direction, but no activity was noted. Small arms fire was received over the tanks and at the troop positions, and 1 plane was hit with 1 shell.

The other four F4Us could not contact controller over Yongdong or Sangju, although the latter was seen to have numerous trucks and tanks spotted below him. Continuing north, they contacted TACP three miles south of Hamchang, who directed them to hill at 36°-31'N 128°-01'E, where many troops had been sighted. Here, they dropped 2 250# incendiaries and fired 20mm and 21 HVARs. TACP said that the troops were getting out of their cover and running all over, so they strafed and rocketed the positions again.

VC-3 flew 1 F4U-5N and 2 AD3N to Yongdong where they set fire to 3 villages within 3 miles of the city to the east. One napalm was put into a tunnel, which TAC reported as housing 400 troops, in the same locality. These two targets are evaluated as the same which the 4 ADs hit, and the tunnel as the same also. This would make 5 hits in all in the tunnel with napalm. In a valley to the east, many strafing runs were made, during which 20mm and 14 HVARs were fired. TAC said 200 troops were located there. On the runs many personnel were seen to fall. Other strafing runs were made on camouflaged targets with undetermined results.

At 1630, the last launch for the day sent 14 offensive (8 F4 U, 6 AD) and 1 defensive (AD3W) over the target area in their role as close support aircraft.

Six ADs reported to TAC at Hamchang, from where they were directed to a hillside about 5 miles SW of the town along a small

42 46

stream which runs N[illegible]SW. Having been told that there were troops who had been bothering our troops in the valley, they dropped everything but their incendiaries on the hillside, following these runs with strafing runs using all their ammunition on the area. On the west side of a hill, they destroyed a small village with incendiaries.

The 8 F4Us were directed to Namwon (35°-24'N, 127°-23'E) where TAC directed them to burn as much as possible of the town, keeping a sharp lookout for parked vehicles. Two trucks were destroyed with 2 direct HVAR hits. One truck and 1 jeep were damaged in the town. The town was evaluated as damaged. Three miles east, runs with rockets on reported vehicles, unseen by pilots, grotted no visible damages. Small caliber machine gun fire came from Namwon.

ACTION SUMMARY
29 JULY 1950

Following the same general missions as yesterday, carrier planes hit targets near the front lines around Hadong. The Navy was given its own bomb line and private area to destroy roads and answer any other call missions directed TAC in the vicinity. At 1000, the first group of planes returned from 24 offensive sorties (8 F9F, 8 AD, and 8 F4U) and 1 defensive sortie.

The jet sweep, launched at 0830, split into 2 divisions as yesterday. The first of these swept Kunsan (35°-58'N, 126°-42'E), ChongJu (35°-49'N, 127°-09'E), and Kongju (36°-27'N, 127°-07'E) where they strafed 3 previously damaged vehicles. The 2nd division hit farther east near Namwon (35°-25'N, 127°-22'E) where they strafed three RR cars attacked yesterday. At Chinan they hit and damaged a small vehicle. Several trucks near Chunsong-ni were let go because the aircraft could not strafe the mountainside road. Two columns of troops were seen to scatter into a nearby house in Kamjangni, so the planes strafed the building. At Kaltam-ni (35°-30'N, 127°-08'E) 2 camouflaged trucks were probably destroyed.

Back with the props, 4 F4Us dropped one cluster of incendiaries on a warehouse near the Sonchon-ni rail yards, starting several smoldering fires. To the south of town a RR and an adjoining highway bridge sustained damages; the former from a near miss with a 500# bomb, and the latter from a direct hit with a 100# bomb in the approach. No anti-aircraft was encountered. Two fires from yesterdays attacks were seen still burning at Nemson during the flight.

Four more F4Us heard a controller at Hadong (35°-05'N, 127-46E) yelling for many fighters, so they diverted before reaching Kochang (35°-40'N, 127°-54'E). At the target, by direction of the controller, they found at least 50 vehicles on the road east of town. Two of these vehicles were reported as definite tanks.

43 #6

Strafing with machine guns and rockets, they burned 4 trucks and damaged 10 more. Then, they dropped 4 napalm on the town, seeing 1 hit and burn a double warehouse. Other fires were started. Then in a rocket run, three hit another warehouse which burst into flame and spread madly. Other rockets fired into the town may have caused damage, but smoke obscured results; 1 town damaged. Many people along the road were strafed with undetermined results. In the vehicle area, a temporary gun emplacement, throwing up heavy machine gun fire was strafed and silenced. Around the town, they saw the ADs hitting the target also.

At Anui, a controller took the ADs to a road which needed cutting. With their bombs they accomplished the mission by starting rockslides in the canyon with 2000# bombs. Further dispatched to Hadong, they burned 1 reconnaissance car in the center of a bridge. Following runs damaged the bridge with a hole from a 500# bomb on the SW end. As the Corsairs hit the town, the ADs also started fires with their napalm. Some 100# bombs and rockets hit 2 school houses containing troops. 1 truck was strafed and damaged. Three miles SW of Hadong a 100# bomb burned and destroyed another truck. Other vehicles damaged were 1 jeep and a truck. Still another truck bearing troops was burned. At 35°-25'N, 127°-35'E a flat-bottomed boat was damaged and many people killed by strafing runs. Five miles SW of Namwon 1 truck was destroyed, and in the town a 250# fragmentation bomb was dropped. Many targets are to be found near both Hadong and Kochang, and this information was passed to the sweep (1030) about to be launched.

At 1330, the 1 defensive (AD3W) and 24 offensive (8 F9F, 4 AD, 8 F4U, 2 AD3N, 2 F4U-5P) of the days second group landed. All planes returned undamaged.

The two photo planes flew north to the road near Anui, where the ADs started a rockslide earlier this morning. Although the cloud coverage made photography difficult, they took a few pictures of the area, and reported the road only partially blocked. From there, they went to Namwon under the control of "Mosquito Charlie". Here they exploded 1 ammunition truck, burned another, damaged another, and damaged a bus. With F-80s, F-51s, and our own jets they strafed the town where fires were started.

The four ADs from VA-55 and 2 AD3Ns from VC-3 were directed to a small town just to the SW of Yongdong, where they dropped everything they carried except 1 napalm. Fires erupted all through the town, and reports indicate that it was 70% destroyed. A school house on the edge of town, designated a division headquarters of NK troops by the controller, was thoroughly strafed. Other targets hit were 1 jeep burned, 3 miles SW of Taejon, and 1 truck damaged 6 miles SW of Taejon. LCDR HODSON checked at Nonsan to observe the two trucks, he had bombed with napalm yesterday. Bother were destroyed, so the truck is valuated as probably destroyed yesterday is now destroyed.

The jets sent two divisions on their 1130 sweep. One division hit and probably destroyed 1 camouflaged truck at Nampyong (35°-03', 126°-50'E) and probably destroyed another between Kwangju and Hwasun. One large horsecart and passengers were strafed in the same vicinity, destroying the cart. 1 vehicle between Kwangju and Hadong was damaged. Under TAC, they strafed building along river entrance at O'hwanggumni (34°-55'N 127°-38'E) and saw many pople leave the huts after the run. This division was unable to contact "Mellow Control", and they also found control by "mosquito Peter" on channel four unsatisfactory. The other division strafed and damaged 2 trucks and 1 bus at Kwanju. At Namson, with the two photo planes from the carrier, they strafed the town, where F-51 Mustangs had started fires. No other targets were seen.

The 8 F4Us contacted the TACP at Hadong where they were directed to hit a highway bridge 3 miles east of the city. Two direct 100# bomb hits and several misses combined to damage the structure and prohibit use for some time, at least. South and east of Hadong, they saw many camouflaged vehicles along the roads. Splitting into teams, they damaged 1 truck, probably destroyed 1 tank, and damaged 2 camouflaged vehicles. 10 miles east of Hadong, they attacked three settlements, strafing people in the villages and dropping napalm. Fires were started in all three. Three napalm duds were later ignited by 20mm fire.

Twenty-three offensive sorties (7 AD, 8 F4U, 8 F9F) and 1 defensive sortie (AD3W) took off in stages at 1300 and 1430 to hit more close support targets. The jet sweep was the first back with no losses. At Hadong the first division probably destroyed 2 trucks and saw many of our planes over the area. Two other divisions probably destroyed 1 jeep and 1 camouflaged truck at Posong. Near Hadong they damaged one camouflaged truck and 1 camouflaged weapon carrier.

Operating in the same area, one division of F4Us attacked numerous camouflaged vehicles with rockets and 20mm machine gun fire. Several direct hits were observed and 6 vehicles were left burning, two of which were identified as trucks. The other 4 unidentified due to camouflage. One other truck received direct hits, but did not burn and was believed probably destroyed. Additional vehicles were strafed in the same vicinity with results undetermined. Troops in brownish-yellow uniforms were observed in the area, but the attack was concentrated on vehicles. The other division of F4Us hit targets of opportunity around Hadong due to the large numbers of plane which conjested the area southeast of Hadong. Troops and vehicels were reported hiding in a small settlement of about 10 huts, 5 miles NW of Konyang (35-03N, 127-58E). Napalm hits were achieved on the settlement, burning it down. One truck at the edge of the village was hit squarely with a 5" rocket destroying it. Several oil or gas drums near the truck were ignited with 20mm fire. A camouflaged armored jeep was heavily damaged and left smoking 5 miles east of Hadong. One exposed truck on the road 3 miles east of Kwangyang (34-58N, 127-35E) was strafed and damaged. Another truck was similarly damaged in the hills just north of Okkwa (35-17N, 127-08E).

45 48

Direct hits were obtained with 5" rockets, one 1000# bomb, and strafing on a power sub station at Nungju (34-59N, 126-58E). It was left burning and believed to be completely destroyed.

The seven ADs headed north for the area, which they had hit hard on the previous two hops of the day, stopping at Sunchon long enough to ignite a long building on the north side of town with a 500# bomb, destroying 1 truck, and damaging 2 others. Here, three of the planes left the formation for other targets, while the other four headed for the lucrative area near Hadong. Reporting to a controller over the city they were directed to a bridge and 3 villages in that order. The bridge sustained damage from 1 1000# and 3 500# near misses, a village 10 miles east of Hadong showed furious fires from several 500# bomb hits, and 2 villages NW of town were damaged by fire, after being hit with their ration of the remaining bombs. In subsequent strafing runs 1 truck was destroyed by rocket hit, 3 trucks were burned to the east, and 5 more were damaged in the same area. A strafed train of horsecarts was left in extreme disorder as the planes retired. Meanwhile, the other three planes damaged 2 trucks and burned 1 jeep 5 miles SW of Kurye. Lashing out at everything they saw, they damaged 1 truck at Koksong, damaged an unidentified vehicle under straw at Namwon, and burned a truck at Chumgnum-ni. Directed to Kochang they damaged another bridge a near miss 1000# bomb and a 500# bomb right in the approaches. Fires were started in Kochang and at a village 6-8 miles east. Nearby, they again went wild over numerous trucks and tanks, burning 1 truck, damaging 4 others, and damaging 2 tanks. White panels were seen in Unbong (35°-26'N, 127°-32'E) on the ground and vehicles.

The 1600 launch consisted of 11 offensive sorties (3 AD and 8 F4U) and one defensive sortie. The two divisions of Corsairs contacted an air controller at Hadong and were directed to bomb the vehicular bridge southwest of, and near, Hadong. The bridge had been previously damaged, but suffered another direct hit with a 500# bomb which passed through the surface and exploded near the water. A large hole in the pavement was the only damage unless the bomb blast inflicted additional weakening from beneath. Another 500# bomb blew a large crater in the road leading to the bridge. A napalm bomb hit one of the approaches to the bridge and ignited a wooden span and the repair lumber pile nearby. The controller then directed the F4Us to several vehicles about 5-8 miles east of Hadong. A previously strafed armored car was again strafed with damage unknown. One truck received a direct hit with a 100# bomb. The truck burned and was destroyed. Two additional gas or ammo trucks were exploded and destroyed by strafing. Friendly troops were seen about 3 miles east of the burning trucks with cerise panels displayed.

Three ADs were the only other planes at the target, and they reported damage similar to that described by the Corsairs at the bridge at Hadong. One of their 500# bombs made a direct hit on the eastern abuttment. Three miles east of town three napalm bombs were dropped on a village starting three good fires. In

a gully one half mile to the east the controller directed them on target designated as trucks. Strafing 3 of the trucks parked close together in a grove, a tremendous explosion created a pyrotechnic display which was still exploding as they left. Believed to have ammunition in them, 3 trucks were evaluated as destroyed. Nearby a rocket into the rear end of a tank set it afire and ultimately destroyed it. 2 more trucks were burned, 1 by strafing, the other by napalm. An observed field piece present may be damaged, but no pilots saw hits on it. 40mm anti-aircraft was encountered, and one AD was hit in the wing. The gun emplacement was not spotted.

CAP was furnished by the Spitfires of HMS TRIUMPH.

Score of damage inflicted against targets in Northern Korea by Carrier Air Group FIVE for the period 16-30 July 1950:

TYPE	DESTROYED	PROBABLY DESTROYED	DAMAGED
Aircraft	33	13	8
RR Cars	9	1	43
Locomotives	27	2	5
Trucks	75	25	62
Tanks	3	2	4
Horsecarts	9	-	2
Other vehicles	11	4	16
Train(24 cars, oil or ammo)	1	-	-
Wonsan Oil Refinery	75-100%	-	-
Oil Storage Tanks	13	-	2
Power Stations (Transformers)	4	-	8
Factories	-	-	5
Chemical Plant	-	-	1
Cement Plant	-	-	1
Refinery (small)	1	-	1
RR Bridges	2	-	10
RR Tunnels	-	-	5
Highway Bridge	-	-	4
Gunboats	-	-	3
Barges	2	-	3
Junks (large)	-	-	13
Vessels (small)	-	2	1
Fishing Boats	-	-	2
Hangars	-	-	4
RR Carbarns	-	-	1
Railyards	-	-	2
Warehouses	-	-	6
Villages	1	8	22
Ammo Dump	-	-	1
Freighters	2	-	-
Tugboats	2	-	-
Gun Emplacements	-	-	1
Road	75% blocked	-	-

Additional undetermined damage was inflicted on railroad yards, several railway cars, and tank cars, hangar areas, and oil storage areas.

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CV45/A4-3
Serial:

[redacted]

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TABULATED DATA

Ammunition Expended 16 July - 31 July 1950.

Bombs:	
General Purpose Bombs	141 Tons
Napalm	106 Bombs
Rockets:	
HVARs	1843 Rockets
Smoke	22 Rockets
20MM Ammunition	160,662 Rounds

Number of hours flown:

Jet aircraft	260.3 Hours
Prop aircraft	1344.1 Hours

Amount of aviation gasoline consumed:

Jet aircraft	112,855 Gallons
Prop aircraft	139,280 Gallons

Amount of Navy Special Fuel: 19,262.1 Barrels

Miles steamed: 5700 Miles

ENCLOSURE (3)

4952

U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV45/A4-3
Serial: 094

24 August 1950

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.
Commander Naval Forces Far East.
Commander SEVENTH Fleet.
Commander Carrier Division THREE.

Subj: Action Report for period 4 through 21 August 1950

Ref: (a) CNO ltr op 345 res ser 1197 P34 of 3 August 1950

Encl: (1) CVG-5 conf ltr ser 067-50 dtd 24 August 1950, Action Report for period 4 through 21 August 1950

1. In accordance with reference (a), the action report for the period 4 through 21 August 1950 is submitted.

PART I: Composition of Own Forces and Mission

The VALLEY FORGE with Carrier Air Group FIVE embarked in company with the PHILIPPINE SEA and other units of Task Force 77 departed Buckner Bay, Okinawa, on 4 August 1950 for Korean waters to attack enemy troops and previously selected targets as coordinated with FEAF in order to furnish support for the United Nations Forces in Korea in accordance with Commander SEVENTH Fleet secret oporder 13-50 of 3 August 1950.

PART II: Chronological Order of Events

About 1800, 4 August 1950, the VALLEY FORGE departed Buckner Bay, Okinawa, sortied with elements of the SEVENTH Fleet, and proceeded northward for Korean waters. After the sortie was completed, AA firing practice with other units of the task force was conducted on sleeves towed by JD type aircraft furnished by UTRON 7 detachment based at Kadena, Okinawa. The task force arrived off the south coast of Korea early in the afternoon on the 5th at which time the carriers launched strikes against the enemy. The planes from the VALLEY FORGE were launched as close air support for United Nations Forces in southeastern Korea and those from the PHILIPPINE SEA were launched for specific targets in southwestern Korea. After completion of air operations for the day, the task force proceeded westward taking position in the Yellow Sea where strikes against the enemy along the west coast of central and southern Korea were launched on the 6th and 7th. The task force retired from the area upon completion of air

[redacted]

operations on the 7th and proceeded southward to rendezvous with the logistic group for the purpose of refueling aviation gasoline and fuel oil. The rendezvous was made on the morning of the 8th and the remainder of the day was spent refueling the task force. That night the task force returned to a position in the Yellow Sea where strikes were launched on the 9th and 10th as before. The task force retired from the area during the night of the 10th and rendezvoused with the logistic group on the morning of the 11th to refuel. Upon completion of refueling, the task force proceeded to a position in the Yellow Sea where strikes were conducted on the 12th against the enemy along the west coast of central Korea and on the 13th along the west coast of Korea north of the 38th parallel. That night the task force retired from the area and headed for Sasebo, Japan, to refuel and rearm, arriving at Sasebo about 0930 on the 14th. After refueling and rearming, the task force left Sasebo about 1800 on the 15th and proceeded northward into the Sea of Japan where strikes were launched against the enemy on the east coast of central Korea on the 16th. At 1115 at the request of the FIFTH Air Force, Advanced, in Korea, all strikes were diverted to cover the evacuation of the Third ROK Division at Yondok. The remaining strikes of the day were launched against a concentration of enemy troops which threatened the evacuation. That night the task force headed further north where strikes against the enemy on the east coast as far north as the 42nd parallel were launched on the 17th. The task force retired southward during the night, passed through Tsushima Strait, and rendezvoused with the logistic group. After refueling and rearming during the day on the 18th, the task force proceeded westward that night taking position off the west coast of central Korea where strikes were launched on the 19th. That night the task force worked northward and on the 20th launched strikes against the enemy along the west coast north of the 38th parallel. Upon completion of air operations for the day, the task force proceeded for Sasebo, Japan, arriving at Sasebo about 1400 on the 21st.

PART III: Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

No comment.

PART IV: Resume of Battle Damage - Own and Enemy

The ship sustained no battle damage. For damage inflicted upon the enemy see Enclosure (1).

PART V: Comments

A. Air Department

1. Aviation Gasoline Fueling

[redacted]

a. Considerable delay in fueling operations can be remedied by anticipating the following problems:

(1) Aircraft carrier receiving fuel should have on hand at the fueling station both the male and female ends of the quick disconnect coupling in anticipation of the tanker sending over the wrong end and/or an end which will not fit.

(2) Gasoline filling lines should be tested for blown gaskets prior to fueling and in sufficient time to allow for replacement of faulty gaskets.

(3) If a flowmeter is installed at the fueling station, a simple by-pass should be constructed around the flowmeter. This will make disconnecting the flowmeter unnecessary in the event of failure or clogging and will not stop fueling operations while the meter is being disconnected.

2. Bomb and Rocket Disposal

a. Hung bombs and rockets brought aboard by returning strikes must be anticipated. A good percentage of hung armament will leave the aircraft on landing. Provision must be made for qualified personnel to defuse and jettison this armament with a maximum of safety and minimum of interference to flight deck operations.

3. Jet Aircraft Turn-up

a. When turning up jet aircraft on the flight deck with tails pointed over the side, care must be exercised that 20mm shipboard gunsights are not in line with the blast. The 20mm shipboard gunsight is rendered inoperative by the apparent vibration of the jet blast. The heat effect does not appear to be a problem.

PART VI: Personnel, Performance and Casualties

Operations during this period were conducted with 79% of the wartime complement on board. The personnel shortage was somewhat aggravated by severe unbalances in some rating groups and the shortage of non-rated personnel. The performance of personnel has been excellent, and they have stood up well under long hours at duty stations and hard work. Personnel have been ordered to the ship to build the on board figure up to about 85% of wartime complement which will relieve the situation considerably.

L. K. RICE

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Serial: 094

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U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV45/A4-3
Serial: 0108

26 September 1950

[redacted]

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division THREE
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander U. S. Naval Forces Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for period 25 August through 6 September 1950.

Ref: (a) CNO ltr Op 345 res ser 1197P34 of 3 August 1950.

Encl: (1) CVG-5 conf ltr ser 070 dated 20 September 1950, Action Report for period 25 August through 6 September 1950. P.5

1. In accordance with reference (a), the action report for the period 25 August through 6 September 1950 is submitted.

PART I Composition of Own Forces and Missions:

USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) with ComCarDiv THREE and Carrier Air Group FIVE embarked departed SASEBO Harbor, Japan, 25 August 1950 in company with other units of Task Force 77 in accordance with Commander SEVENTH Fleet Operation Order 14-50. Acting Commander SEVENTH Fleet, CTF 77, and CTG 77.4 is ComCarDiv ONE. OTC is ComCarDiv ONE in the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47). The task force proceeded for Korean waters to furnish support for United Nations Forces in Korea.

PART II Chronological Order of Events:

About 1200, 25 August 1950, the VALLEY FORGE departed SASEBO Harbor, Japan, sortied with elements of the SEVENTH Fleet, and conducted AA firing practice during the afternoon with other units of the task force. Practice was discontinued upon receipt of a report of a submarine contact. The contact was later evaluated as not a submarine. The task force then proceeded northward toward the operating area in the Sea of Japan in formation 4-R.

Planes were launched August 26 to provide close air support in eastern Korea and to strike targets north of the bomb line. During the night the task force steamed northward taking position off the east coast of North Korea where strikes were launched August 27 against targets in the Wonsan-Chongjin area.

The task force retired from the area upon completion of the day's operations and proceeded southward to rendezvous with the Replenishment Group, Task Group 77.7, south of the Korean Peninsula. The two groups rendezvoused early August 28, and the remainder of

[redacted]

[redacted]

the day was spent refueling.

During the night the task force took a position in the Yellow Sea from which strikes were launched August 29 for targets near Seoul and Inchon. From the same operating area the force struck at targets in the Chinampo-Pongyang area August 30.

After completion of air operations for the day, the task force steamed southward to rendezvous with Task Group 77.7 to refuel and rearm. Rendezvous was effected early 31 August.

Upon completion of replenishment that night the task force steamed northward taking a position in the Yellow Sea where strikes against targets in the Seoul-Inchon area were launched on the morning of 1 September 1950.

At noon, emergency orders from ComNavFE were received to provide immediate all-out close air support for the 25th Division of the 8th Army in order to aid in repulsing enemy attacks in southeast Korea. All aircraft from the target area were recalled and close air support missions were launched from 1312K until dark. The task force remained in the operating area during the night and planes were launched for controlled support missions throughout the next day.

Upon completion of air operations, the task force proceeded southward for rendezvous with Task Group 77.7 on 3 September. At 1433K the task force ceased replenishment operations in response to an emergency request from U. S. 8th Army Headquarters for close air support of UN ground forces in southeastern Korea. At 1645K, support missions were launched. After completion of air operations for the day, the task force moved northward in the operating area where strikes were launched for targets in west central Korea on 4 September. At 1415K another emergency request for close air support for UN ground forces in southeastern Korea was received. Strike groups were recalled and preparations rushed to launch support missions. At 1545K CinCFE annulled the request for close support and the task force resumed its strike operations. The task force remained in the operating area during the night.

At 0658K, 5 September, weather reconnaissance flights were made over the target area. Target area weather was determined to be unfavorable for launch of strike missions, whereupon the task force proceeded for SASEBO, Japan to replenish, arriving about 1400K, 6 September 1950.

PART III Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment:

No comment.

PART IV Resume of Battle Damage - Own and Enemy:

The ship sustained no battle damage. For damage inflicted upon the enemy see enclosure (1).

[redacted]

[redacted]

PART V Comments:

A. Operations

1. Use of Emergency Turns

It is recommended that two emergency turns of the same magnitude not be given in quick succession by the OTC particularly at night in view of normal communication difficulties experienced in the task force. There are many times when some ships do not receive the original transmission which entails a repetition of the signal and possible misinterpretation by other ships in the force. It is recommended that the second turn be made a different magnitude in order to obviate the possibility of confusion and resultant hazard.

B. Air Department

1. Shipboard Plane Handling

(a) During this reporting period frequent use was made of the "split spot" to give maximum flexibility on the flight deck. This spot consisted of seven jet aircraft on the extreme after end of the flight deck. Seven jets were used because it conveniently constitutes two full rows of planes and only seven tractors are available for towing forward in case of the need for a ready deck. Ahead of the jets the ADs were spotted in two rows on one side of the flight deck and the F4Us in two rows on the other, so that either type could be taxied out for launch without moving the other. In front of these were spotted the special purpose aircraft: AD-3W, AD-3N, F4U-5N, and F4U-5P. If these special purpose aircraft are not needed for ASP, RAPCAP, or NITECAP there was ample room to strike them below using the side deck elevator.

The principal reason for using this spot is to achieve maximum flexibility in order to meet the needs of the tactical situation which many times required a shift from strike to close support or vice-versa on short notice.

(b) During this period two emergency landings of jet aircraft were effected without injury to personnel or damage to the aircraft beyond the capacity of shipboard maintenance facilities to repair. In the first instance the starboard landing gear could not be lowered. The plane made a normal landing, the hook engaged the wire normally and damage to the wing tip was all that resulted. The second plane had hydraulic failure and was unable to lower the hook or flaps, and was without aileron boost. On landing, the crippled plane engaged the first two jet barriers and came to rest with the right wing tip against the flight deck crash crane, parked alongside the island structure. One main landing strut was sheared off and the right wing damaged to the extent that replacement was necessary.

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[redacted]

PART VI Personnel, Performance and Casualties:

No comments.

L. K. RICE

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AUTHENTICATED:

D C Hillman

D. C. HILLMAN
LT. U.S. NAVY
Administrative Officer

05066

4

U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV45/A4-3
Serial: 0111

4 October 1950

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division THREE
(2) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN (CTG 77.4)
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander U.S. Naval Forces Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for period 6 through 21 September 1950

Ref: (a) CNO ltr Op 345 ros ser 1197P34 of 3 August 1950
(b) SEVENTH Fleet Dispatch 212325I of September 1950

Encl: (1) CVG-5 conf ltr ser 072-50 dtd 4 October 1950, Action Report for period 6 through 21 September 1950 P.5

1. In accordance with reference (a) and (b), the action report for the period 6 September through 21 September is submitted.

PART I Composition of Own Forces and Mission:

USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) with ComCarDiv THREE and Carrier Air Group FIVE embarked departed SASEBO Harbor, Japan, 11 September 1950 in company with other units of Task Force 77 for operations in accordance with Commander SEVENTH Fleet Operation Plan 9-50, Commander Amphibious Group ONE Operation Order 14-50 and Commander Carrier Division ONE Operation Order 1-50. CTF 77 is ComCarDiv ONE. Commander Joint Task Force SEVEN is Commander SEVENTH Fleet in USS ROCHESTER (CA-124), not in company. OTC is ComCarDiv ONE in the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47). The task force proceeded for Korean waters to furnish support for United Nations Forces in amphibious assault on the Inchon-Seoul area.

PART II Chronological Order of Events:

Upon completion of replenishment, the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) departed SASEBO Harbor, Japan, at 0545, 11 September 1950, and sortied with other elements of Task Force 77. AA firing practice was conducted during the morning. Upon completion of firing practice, the task force formed formation 4-R and proceeded for the operating area west of Inchon, South Korea. During the period from 12 to 15 September the VALLEY FORGE and its Air Group were engaged in air operations to soften up the Inchon-Seoul area in preparation for D-Day, 15 September, when UN Forces landed at Wolmi-Do and Inchon, Korea.

[redacted]

During this period air strikes and sweeps were conducted during all daylight hours with partial replenishment during late afternoon of 13 September.

Following the initial landings at Wolmi-Do and Inchon, aircraft were flown in close and deep support of the advancing troops. During the period from 15 to 21 September, carriers in the task group refueled every third day with only defensive flight operations being conducted on replenishment days. The VALLEY FORGE began replenishment according to this schedule on 17 September.

During the afternoon of 15 September Task Group 77.4 was joined by the USS BOXER (CV-21) with Carrier Air Group TWO embarked.

PART III Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment:

No comment.

PART IV Resume of Battle Damage - Own and Enemy:

The ship sustained no battle damage. For damage inflicted upon the enemy see enclosure (1).

PART V Comments:

A. Operations

1. Logistics

(a) The definite need for more expeditious transfer of aviation gasoline to the carrier operating jet aircraft was again apparent. During the current operations, jet sorties averaged 36 a day, with resultant avgas usage of approximately 30,000 gallons a day. The result of high tempo operations of both jet and propeller types, such as this was, necessitated the taking on of some 100,000 gallons every third day. Experience to date with present type AO, with but one avgas fueling station, has shown the average maximum fueling rate is approximately 27,000 gal/hr at sea. (This figure may be increased when fueling via the forward fueling connection to the forward tanks only) This rate necessitates a three and a half hour period of considerable vulnerability to sub-surface and surprise air attack. If for good reason it is necessary to replenish after as much as 3 or 4 days operations, the time alongside rapidly reaches unacceptable proportions. To safeguard against attack by a determined opponent would require an abnormally strong screen or a fueling area well removed from probable enemy craft. It should be noted that in the current operations the replenishment area was within 100 miles of the operating area, thereby affording a minimum loss of time away from the operations.

[redacted]

(b) It is urgently recommended that present type AOs be refitted to allow a second aviation gasoline fueling station aft and that future construction be such as to provide for a greatly accelerated transfer rate.

2. Combat Information

(a) During this period the use of jet aircraft in combat air patrol was extensive. It was found that their obvious advantage of speed over the propeller driven aircraft eliminates the requirement of having the CAP stationed on two or three sides of the force because they can be maneuvered with as much facility as propellor aircraft and in much less time. The greatest difficulty noted with employment of jet aircraft on CAP is the poor jet tracking characteristics of the SX type radar. However, by the use of G Band IFF in conjunction with the SX radar acceptable jet tracking is achieved. It has been found that by stationing the jet CAP at least 20 miles from the controller that continuous tracking can be accomplished with the SX-G Band combination. Excellent controlled intercepts were conducted up to 50 miles from the force in this manner. Vessels in the task force equipped with SPS-6B radar have maintained excellent jet presentation from approximately 7 to 90 miles. Conventional aircraft have been picked up as far away as 140 miles from the force.

It is recommended that in order to afford more complete control of jet CAP and more complete protection to the fleet by early detection of incoming flights, SPS-6B type radar be installed on all CVs at the earliest possible date. It would also seem highly desirable for all other vessels responsible for aircraft control to be outfitted with the SPS-6B.

(b) Because of the great amount of radio traffic concerning air control in a task group of two or more carriers, the use of a distinct air control net is considered highly desirable. Utilizing the CI net to carry this traffic overly crowds it and it thereby loses much of its value for fast relay of information within the task force.

(c) CAP control within the task force was hindered in many cases during this operation as a result of heavy use of most aircraft VHF channels by TADC afloat, TACC ashore and TAC and their TACP and TAO in the target area. Frequently CAP experienced serious delay in executing a vector as a result of the controller being blocked out on the air by a transmission from an amphibious or shore-based controller. It is felt this communication difficulty would prove disastrous if enemy aircraft should attack.

It is recommended that the aircraft and ships of a fast carrier task force be crystallized so a minimum of two clear

CV45/A4-3
Serial: 0111

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channels be available for CAP control exclusively when operating within 150 miles of an amphibious operation or its VHF equivalent.

PART VI Personnel, Performance and Casualties:

No comments.

W. T. SHIELDS,
Acting.

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CO, USS LEYTE	4	
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CAG 11	1	
CAG 19	1	
CAG 3	1	
CAG 2	1	

AUTHENTICATED:

D. C. HILLMAN, LT, USN
Administrative Officer

08475

Original

U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV45/A4-3
Serial: 013

14 January 1951

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division THREE (CTG 77.3)
(2) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN (CTG-77.4)
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander U.S. Naval Forces Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for period 5 to 19 November 1950

Ref: (a) CNO ltr Op-345 ros ser 1197P34 of 3 August 1950

Encl: (1) Ordnance expended and resume of damage to the enemy pr 6

1. In accordance with reference (a), the action report for the period 5 through 19 November is submitted.

PART I Composition of Own Forces and Mission:

USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) with Commander Carrier Division THREE (ISIC and CTG 77.3) and Carrier Air Group FIVE embarked departed SASEBO Harbor, Japan, in company with other units of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN and Seventh Fleet for operations in accordance with Commander SEVENTH Fleet Operation Order 17-50 and Commander Carrier Division ONE Operation Order 3-50, modified. CTF 77 (Acting) is ComCarDiv THREE. ComSEVENTHFlt embarked in USS MISSOURI (BB-63). OTC is ComCarDiv THREE. The task force proceeded for the east coast of North Korea to answer an emergency request from UN ground forces for air support needed as a result of Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean War.

PART II Chronological Order of Events:

The USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) departed SASEBO Harbor, Japan at 0733 on 5 November and sortied with other elements of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN and SEVENTH Fleet. Winds up to 50 knots and heavy seas necessitated a reduction in speed, delaying start of operations by seven hours. On the afternoon of 6 November armed reconnaissance missions were flown north of the bomblime to the Manchurian border in areas assigned the task force. Strikes, close support, and jet sweeps were conducted during the next two days. On the 9th the task force was joined by the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) with ComCarDiv ONE (CTF 77) embarked. The task force was assigned the mission of destroying bridges across the Yalu River at the boundry between Korea and Manchuria. Strikes were launched on the Changtion-ho-kou highway bridge. On the 10th the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) replenished. On the 11th and 12th

[redacted]

coordinated strikes were launched against bridges at Changtion-ho-kou, Gosichongdong and Sinuiju. One span of the Sinuiju highway bridge was destroyed by combined attacks by planes of the USS LEYTE (CV-32) and USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) on the 12th. On the 13th the force launched a coordinated strike on military installations in Hyosanjin at the request of TENTH Corps. Replenishment was conducted on the 14th. Close support and armed reconnaissance missions were flown on the 15th, the scheduled strike on Sinuiju bridge being diverted due to restricted visibility at the target. Following replenishment on the 17th, close support, armed reconnaissance and a coordinated strike on the Sinuiju bridge were launched on the 18th. Combined attacks by planes of the USS LEYTE (CV-32) and the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) dropped both bridges at Hyosanjin on the 17th. On the 19th the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) was detached from the task force to proceed to Yokosuka, Japan, preparatory to returning to the United States.

On six of the thirteen days included in the report period, weather affected air operations adversely. Although there were no days when all scheduled offensive air operations were cancelled, at least part of the force's offensive power was aborted due to weather limitations on 5, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 18 November.

PART III Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment:

No comment.

PART IV Resume of Battle Damage - Own and Enemy:

The ship sustained no battle damage. For damage inflicted upon the enemy see enclosure (1).

PART V Comments:

A. Operations

1. Air Operations

(a) During this period coordinated strikes were conducted against railroad and highway bridges across the Manchurian border employing the skyraiders as dive bombers carrying one and two thousand pound general purpose bombs and utilizing the corsairs as fighter bombers with the primary mission of bombing, rocketing, and strafing AA positions. For the first time in the Korean Campaign, due to the advent of the Chinese Communist Air Force into the Korean War, the jets were employed as fighter cover for the props while they were in the target area. The targets were approximately 225 miles from the launching position. By launching the jets 50 minutes after the prop launch the props were afforded protection 8 to 10 minutes prior to the attack and an additional 30 minutes while in the target area. A second jet launch 10 to 15 minutes after the first jet launch from a carrier in company

afforded cover for the preps on their retirement from the target area.

(b) On two occasions enemy jets were encountered by VALLEY FORGE jets. On the first occasion the enemy jets did not make an attack. However, on the second occasion a MIG-15 was shot down and seen to explode on striking the ground. The skyraiders and corsairs were not attacked by enemy fighters at any time, encountering only fire from AA batteries.

(c) It is noted with grave concern the reported superior performance of the MIG-15 as compared to the F9F-3. It is believed that if they had been manned by pilots as aggressive and well trained as ours that own pilot and plane losses would have been great.

(d) It is believed that all means available should be employed in developing a carrier based fighter that will compare favorably if not out perform any aircraft a potential enemy may put in the air, and equip the fleet with this aircraft at the earliest possible date.

(e) The operational personnel who should have been conversant with FTP 224 (Selection of Bombs and Fuzes for Destruction of Various Targets) were not aware of this publication for the first three months of the Korean Campaign. Its existence was discovered only by accident. It is recommended that a copy of this publication be held by the Air Operations Section of the Operations Department and that it be added to the list of required publications of the Air Operations Section and be included in the Type Commanders Administrative Inspection check off list.

2. Intelligence

(a) During the period of this report the Air Intelligence Section functioned satisfactorily and intelligence material was adequate for the assigned mission. However, the Air Intelligence Section has suffered from peacetime complacency since the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) and Carrier Air Group FIVE became involved in the Korean Campaign. Although intelligence material pertaining to the Western Pacific area was requested prior to the sailing of this vessel from the West Coast none was received. Aerial navigation charts had been ordered for all possible areas and were adequate for the initial operations. Trained personnel were not available on board, therefore it was necessary to train inexperienced personnel as the operations progressed.

(b) Each squadron based aboard requires a non-flying air intelligence officer in order to insure thorough and up to the minute briefing. Air Group FIVE was forced to place this added burden on its flying personnel with incomplete briefing and debriefing as an end result. Photo interpretation was a "lost art" to the Air Intelligence Section. Two reserve officers were finally

received on board in September coming directly from civilian pursuits after being completely divorced from photo interpretation work since 1945, a period of approximately 5 years. Obviously the work was not of a required standard for an appreciable period.

(c) It is recommended that an emergency source of trained photo interpretation officers be made available in aerial photo training squadrons ashore to meet situations of this nature in the fleet. In addition, photo interpreters should definitely be made available in the organized reserves where they may keep their training at an acceptable standard.

(d) In order to maintain an acceptable state of readiness in the intelligence section it is recommended that during peacetime it be mandatory for the following to obtain on CV type carriers:

(1) That the officer assigned to the air intelligence billet be a graduate of an intelligence school and that this be a primary billet.

(2) Have at least one AF3 graduate of Photo Interpretatic School assigned to the photo laboratory during peacetime and readily available for the air intelligence section when an emergency arises.

(3) That a YN3 or YNSN be assigned for typing, filing, and other office duties.

(4) That a man be assigned to the Intelligence Section familiar with aerial charts, publications, and common chartroom equipment.

(e) It is recommended that a job classification code under the basic rate of Air Operations Man be established to handle the job described in paragraph (d)(4) above.

(f) Recommended changes to the basic wartime and peacetime allowances are being forwarded under separate correspondence.

3. Operations Evaluation

(a) There appears to be a definite need for an operations analyst on an operating carrier. Representatives from various bureaus and from several boards appeared on the ship from time to time, all requesting various data and records. The information, though available, had to be dug out by personnel whose primary job was operational. The limited time available to most of these representatives often necessitated incomplete and perhaps inconclusive data being obtained. It is felt, however, that had an officer, or team, been detailed on the ship to do nothing but collect data of any and

received on board in September coming directly from civilian pursuits after being completely divorced from photo interpretation work since 1945, a period of approximately 5 years. Obviously the work was not of a required standard for an appreciable period.

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CV45/A4-3
Serial: ~~0111~~ 013

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all operational interest from the commencement of operations, then a ready source of information would have been immediately available to any and all data seekers. It is believed that such a billet should be set up as a wartime billet and filled at the earliest practicable date upon the commencement of any type combat operations.

PART VI. Personnel, Performance and Casualties:

None [illegible].

J. M. CARSON

Copy to:
CNO (Advance) 2 (Airmail)
Comairpac 10 (Airmail for further distribution as deemed appropriate)
Comcardiv ONE 4 (Airmail)
Comcardiv FIVE 4
CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA 4
CO, USS BOXER 4
CO, USS PRINCETON 4
CO, USS LEYTE 4
CAG 5
CAG 11
CAG 19
CAG 3
CAG 2

AUTHENTICATED:
D. C. HILLIAN, LT, USN,
Administrative Officer.

[redacted]

ORDNANCE EXPENDED AND RESUME OF DAMAGE TO THE ENEMY

1. Tons bombs: 225.8 - 5" HVAR: 542 - 6.5" SC: 26 - Tiny Tims: 17

20MM Ammo: 25,480

2.

TARGET	DESTROYED	DAMAGED
Aircraft	1	
Trucks	27	13
Carts		8
Tanks		2
Boxcars		7
RR Bridges		6
Hwy Bridges		7
Warehouses	2	4
Troop Concentrations		24
Barracks	5	
Ammo Dumps	1	
Supply Dumps		1

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE (1)

14

4

U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV45/A16-3/aej
Serial: 023

1 February 1951

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 19 December 1950 through 19 January 1951

Ref: (a) CNO restricted ltr Op-345/aa ser 1197P34 dtd 3 Aug 1950

1. In accordance with reference (a) the Action Report for the period 19 December 1950 through 19 January 1951 is hereby submitted:

PART I: Composition of Own Forces and Mission

Complying with ComNavFE secret despatch 180326Z of December 1950, the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) with Carrier Air Group TWO embarked departed independently from Yokosuka, Japan on 19 December 1950 joining CTF 77 (ComCarDiv ONE) embarked in the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) and other units of TF 77 on 22 December 1950.

Carrier Air Group TWO commenced operations under the command of Commander D. M. WHITE, USN and eleven staff officers with the following complement of pilots and number of aircraft:

Squadron	No. of Pilots	No. of Aircraft
VF-24	29	17 F4U-4
VF-63	27	17 F4U-4
VF-64	26	17 F4U-4
VA-65	28	20 AD-2 - 2 AD4Q
VC-35	6	3 AD4N
VC-3	4	2 F4U-5N
VC-11	5	3 AD4W
VC-61	5	3 F4U-4P
HU-1	1	1 HO3S
Total	130	85

On 7 January 1951 Commander R. W. RYND, USN assumed command of Air Group TWO.

The mission of Task Force 77 was to provide close air support, air cover and air interdiction to enemy forces in support of UN Troops in Korea in accordance with Commander SEVENTH Fleet Operation Order 18-50 of 12 December 1950.

CV45/A16-3/Aej
Serial: 023

[redacted]

PART II: Chronological Order of Events

(A) 19 December 1950: Departed independently from Yokosuka, Japan at 0824 to proceed to Task Force 77 in Korean Waters. Launched HU-2 detachment of 8 helicopters for First Marine Air Wing at Itami, Japan for further transfer to VMO-6.

20 December 1950: Conducted refresher landings, day and night. The USS HOLLISTER (DD-788) and USS OZBOURN (DD-846) joined the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) to act as escort.

21 December 1950: Conducted day refresher landings before passing through Van Diemen Straits.

22 December 1950: Launched tow target planes for AA firing practice conducted by 5 inch, 40 MM and 20 MM weapons. Rendezvoused with Task Force 77 at 1605.

23 December 1950: Conducted close air support operations on roads and villages containing troops in the vicinity of Hanhung. Planes were vectored to targets by Army and Air Force controllers. Ensign J. R. BRINKLEY, 506737/1310, USN, in F4U-4 Bu. No. 96899 crashed from enemy AA fire north of Hungham. Pilot and plane were lost in flames. Attacks for the day were made on Kolori, Tongdong, Chosin Reservoir, Wanpung-ni, Songburi, Changhungni, Toejo, and Oro-ri in 56 sorties.

24 December 1950: Air Operations consisted of ASP and CAP over formation. Ten sorties were flown.

25 December 1950: Launched tow target planes for AA firing practice by USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) and destroyer screen. Replenished 525,168 gallons of fuel oil, 63,800 gallons of aviation gasoline, and 74.3 tons of ammunition.

26 December 1950: Remained with replenishment Task Group 79.1 and received 120,014 gallons of fuel oil and 6,135 gallons of aviation gasoline.

27 December 1950: Remained with replenishment Task Group 79.1 and received 81,113 pounds of provisions.

28 December 1950: With the evacuation at Hungnam completed, close air support involved reconnaissance attacks on road routes in Eastern Korea north of the bombline. Air Force controllers also pointed out specific targets for attacks. Attacks were also made on Kalchon, Papori, Kuun-ni, Chigyong-dong, Hwachon, and Songdongni in 32 sorties for the day.

[redacted]

[redacted]

29 December 1950: Close air support continued in Eastern Korea with attacks made on twelve small villages, troops, and vehicles along the road routes. 76 sorties were flown.

30 December 1950: Attacks were made on seven villages, troops, and a bridge inflicting considerable damage and troop casualties. 12 sorties were flown. Operations were delayed due to bad weather.

31 December 1950. Rendezvoused with replenishment Task Group 79.1 and received 227,220 gallons of fuel oil, 43,500 gallons of aviation gasoline and 11.8 tons of ammunition.

1 January 1951: Early morning combat air patrol started flight operations and was followed by close air support and photo reconnaissance flights over Northeast Korea. Attacks were made on Wontong-ni, Whachon, Pia-ri, Kisan-ni, Kumhwa, Hyon-ni, and Sindal-ri. Damage was rendered to warehouses, buildings, trucks, and bridges. Troop casualties were estimated low. Photographers recorded conditions of many highway bridges, RR tunnels and bridges and road routes. 51 sorties were flown.

2 January 1951: The close air support operations this date included attacks on Kumwha, Ponge-ri, Changjon, Sangtan-ni, Kojin-ni, Songbyon-ni, Naesokyo, Chorwon, Yanggu, Kumsong, Tongduch-ri, and many small villages where troops were concentrated. Five mobile guns and an artillery piece were destroyed in addition to damage to targets similar to 1 January 1951. Photo reconnaissance recorded enemy activity in villages and troop movements along main routes. 91 sorties were flown.

3 January 1951: Continued close air support operations with attacks on Uijongbu, Kogo, Yonggin-ni, Oenyan-ni, Wonson, Tokahotan, Songbyon-ri, Pyongni, Hwachon, Chipo-ri, Yanggu and smaller villages as directed by controllers. 90 sorties were flown.

4 January 1951: Rendezvoused with Task Group 79.1 and replenished with 156,702 gallons of fuel oil, 98,530 gallons of aviation gasoline and 144.7 tons of ammunition.

5 January 1951: Close air support operations included attacks on Kosong and many small villages where troops had concentrated. A large number of enemy troop casualties were estimated for the strikes this date. 91 sorties were flown.

6 January 1951: Flight operations were cancelled because of low ceiling and poor visibility. ComCarDiv FIVE broke his flag aboard the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45).

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CV45/A16-3/aej
Serial: 023

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7 January 1951: Rendezvoused with replenishment Task Group 79.1 and received 114,912 gallons of fuel oil, 36,600 gallons of aviation gasoline, and 82.2 tons of ammunition.

8 January 1951: Flight operations were cancelled due to low ceiling and poor visibility. ComCarDiv FIVE hauled down his flag in USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) and departed for USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47).

9 January 1951: Low ceiling and poor visibility continued to prevent flight operations. USS GURKE (DD-783) came alongside and received 61,530 gallons of fuel oil.

10 January 1951: Poor weather prevented flight operations. Task Force moved to position off southern end of the Korean Peninsula.

11 January 1951: Flight operations were delayed until noon, for better visibility. Close air support attacks were made on Kangnong, Suwon, and Pyongyong-ni. Damage included a number of buildings and RR cars, and some troop casualties were observed. 33 sorties were flown.

12 January 1951: Close air support attacks were made on Wonju, Chunchon-ni, Kangnong and some troop trenches. The operating distance from the base location hampered proper execution of missions. 60 sorties were flown.

13 January 1951: Rendezvoused with replenishment Task Group 79.1 and received 361,746 gallons of fuel oil, 41,000 gallons of aviation gasoline and 68.2 tons of ammunition.

14 January 1951: Close air support and armed reconnaissance attacks were made on Yongwal, Kosuri, Cheksong-ni, and Hangnung damaging warehouses, many large buildings, a radio antennae and accounting for some enemy troop casualties surrounding the evacuation of friendly troops by helicopter. The photo mission located a mobile gun near Majukkoni. 65 sorties were flown.

15 January 1951: Close air support and armed reconnaissance missions destroyed four villages, 220 troop casualties, and 160 buildings in many small villages including Suwon, Pyongchang, Kawachon, Anson and Hongchon. 88 sorties were flown. Ensign E. J. HOFSTRA, 0507028/1310, USN, ditched his F4U-4, Bu. No. 98865 near Wonsan and was rescued by a British Sunderland Flying Boat.

16 January 1951: Close air support and armed reconnaissance attacks were made on Hoeng-song, Ouigong-ni, Yongwal, Yongchun and other small villages and damage was rendered to a highway

[redacted]

17 January 1951: Rendezvoused with replenishment Task Group 79.1 and received 413,952 gallons of fuel oil, 35,000 gallons of aviation gasoline, and 98.6 tons of ammunition.

18 January 1951: Close air support and armed reconnaissance attacks were made on Chonchon-ni, Sangchang, Bougui, Tachwa-ri, Suwan, Sinwon-ri and smaller villages. One RR bridge was destroyed and two highway bridges were damaged. 71 sorties were flown. The photo flight verified the bridge damage.

19 January 1951: Close air support and armed reconnaissance attacks were made on many small villages including Tanyang, Wondong and Yongwal. 80 buildings and two RR bridges were damaged. Many troop casualties were reported. 98 sorties were flown. Departed operating area for Sasebo, Japan.

(B) Summary of Sorties

	F4U	AD	Total
Offensive	547	273	820
Defensive	78	43	121
Photo Reconnaissance	39	00	39
Weather Reconnaissance	1	9	10
Tractor	0	2	2
Courier	1	1	2

PART III: Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

(A) Ammunition Expenditure:

	TYPE	QUANTITY
Bombs:	100# G.P.	2959
	220# Frags.	239
	250# G.P.	146
	260# Frags.	1498
	500# G.P.	190
	1000# G.P.	109
	2000# G.P.	18

	TYPE	QUANTITY
Machine Gun Ammo:	50 Caliber, rds.	422,325
	20MM, rds.	39,695
Rockets:	5" HVAR	462
Napalm:	F-51 and Mk. 12 Drop Tank.	712

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CV45/A16-3/aej
Serial: 023

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(B) Performance of Ordnance Equipment:

See special comments, PART VI.

PART IV: Battle Damage:

(A) Damage to ship: None.

(B) Damage to aircraft:

	COMBAT		OPERATIONAL		
	F4U	AD	F4U	AD	TOTAL
Lost	2	0	1	1	4
Damaged	2	4	2	0	8

(C) Damage inflicted on enemy:

TARGETS	DESTROYED	DAMAGED
Aircraft	0	1
Trucks	4	12
Tanks	2	0
Carts	17	4
RR Bridges	0	5
Highway Bridges	0	14
Field Pieces	8	0
Armed Cars	1	0
RR Cars	3	8
Ammo Dumps	3	0
Supply Dumps	0	3
Warehouses	29	19
Villages	17	49
Houses	400	12
Oil Storage Tanks	1	0
Observation Posts	1	0
Radio Stations	0	1
Junks	0	1
Troops	Possibly 4,000 casualties. No means of confirming estimate.	

PART V: Personnel

(A) Performance: See Special Comments, PART VI.

(B) Casualties: Ensign J. R. BRINKLEY, 506737/1310, USN killed in Action.

[redacted]

CV45/A16-3/aej
Serial: 023

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PART VI: Special Comments

(A) Airmen Training:

Large drafts of AA and AN ratings have been received during the past three (3) months. These men were all eager and willing to take their places in the ship, but were completely ignorant in the scope of airplane handling, aviation ordnance, aviation gasoline handling, and fundamental knowledge of aircraft. This imposed the problem of training and absorbing large numbers of personnel into the Air Department during rather strenuous operations.

It is recommended that a study be made of recruit training of airmen with an eye toward giving them at least a working knowledge of the subjects listed in the paragraph above. It is not difficult to visualize the type of training required to make them familiar with these subjects. Whether they go to an aircraft carrier or not it will still be sound training and well worth the effort. This is particularly true in the field of aviation safety. It would be a relatively simple problem to simulate a flight deck or parking ramp with their inherent dangers of propellors, high noise level, wing folding and taxiing.

(B) Aviation Ordnance:

During the period covered by this report the use of napalm as a primary weapon reached an all-time high. This brought to light certain deficiencies in the handling of napalm on board aircraft carriers.

Consideration should be given toward the development of a suitable napalm container. At the present time the Japanese manufactured F-51 tank and the Mark 12 external fuel tanks are used. Both are unsuitable as napalm containers although they will serve the purpose for the time being. The Mark 12 tank is too expensive to use as a napalm container. More important, however, is the difficulty encountered in hanging or dropping the Mark 12 tank when filled with napalm. During cold weather operations the tanks must be filled at a central filling station since it is mandatory to use "hot" gasoline. This, of course, necessitates transporting the full tank to the aircraft and hanging the full tank. For transporting full tanks the Mark 5 Mod 0 torpedo-bomb skid is used. This skid serves the purpose but is large and somewhat unwieldy. This limits the number that can be assembled on the flight deck which in turn limits the number of tanks that can be handled in a given time. If and when a napalm container as such is developed consideration should be given to adapting it for transportation on a Mark-1 Mod-1 bomb skid. These skids are available in large numbers and can be easily stowed in a matter of minutes thereby not interferring with flight deck operations.

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CV45/A16-3/aej
Serial: 023

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At the present time the Mark 12 tank is suspended by using a Mark 7 or 8 bomb hoist in conjunction with a "home-made" belly strap. This system is rather awkward since it requires about three men to juggle the tank the last two or three inches of the way. In the development of a napalm container a padeye between the suspension lugs should be installed to receive the swaged fitting of the bomb hoist cable. This will insure rapid loading and unloading of the full tank. It is pointed out that this proposed padeye must be small enough to allow the tank to reach the suspension hooks without interference between the padeye and bomb cable swage fitting and the bomb rack.

The deficiencies noted above also apply to the Japanese tank with the additional undesirable feature of having to bash in the tank to accomodate sway braces.

The Mark-1 Mod-0 Incendiary Mixer is used to mix napalm powder and gasoline. This mixer is unsatisfactory. All napalm must be sifted prior to using in the Mark-1 Mod-0 mixer. It is necessary for one man to continually agitate the pre-sifted napalm as it is poured in the mixer to prevent clogging. On the flight deck this is a rather messy procedure. It is strongly recommended that serious consideration be given toward the development of a larger and more adequate mixer. The proposed development should envision a large mixer capable of handling at least 1000 pounds of napalm powder. The mixer should be mechanical and have the ability to mix automatically a pre-determined napalm mixture.

At the present time the E3R5 and E4R8 igniters are used on napalm bombs. While the percentage of duds has been very low it is felt that some duds have occurred as the result of the igniters inability to arm due to the tumbling of the napalm bomb. Experiments should be conducted to ascertain the ability of the anemometer type arming device on these igniters to rotate the required 18 turns on a tumbling bomb dropped from low altitudes. The tumbling bomb is more desirable than the finned bomb since it gives a better "spread" of napalm and resultant fires.

J. M. CARSON

Copy to:

CNO (Advance)	2	(Airmail)
ComAirPac	10	(Airmail for further distribution as deemed appropriate
ComCarDiv ONE	4	
ComCarDiv FIVE	4	
CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA	4	
CO, USS BOXER	4	
CO, USS PRINCETON	4	
CO, USS LEYTE	4	
CTF 77	2	

U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV45/A16-3/aej
Serial: 051

DECLASSIFIED

2 April 1951

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces FAR EAST
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 31 January 1951 through 26 March 1951

Ref: (a) CNO rest ltr Op-345/aa ser 1197P34 dtd 3 Aug 1950

Encl: (1) Pilot Briefing Form
(2) Pilot Debriefing Form
(3) ACI Organization Chart

1. In accordance with reference (a) the Action Report for the period 31 January 1951 through 26 March 1951 is hereby submitted:

PART I: Composition of Own Forces and Mission

Complying with ComSEVENTHFlt secret despatch 260138Z of January 1951, the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) with Carrier Air Group TWO embarked got underway enroute from Sasebo, Japan to the operating area in company with the USS OZBOURN (DD-846), USS MCCAFFERY (DD-860) and DesDiv 52 on the morning of 31 January 1951 and joined CTF 77 (ComCarDiv ONE) embarked in the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) and other units of TF 77 on 1 February 1951. After 16 days of operating the USS VALLEY FORGE returned to the port of Yokosuka, Japan on 26 February 1951 for a period of maintenance and upkeep. By order of ComSEVENTHFlt secret despatch 060556Z of March 1951 the VALLEY FORGE, with Carrier Air Group TWO and ComCarDiv ONE embarked, again returned to the operating area in company with the USS MISSOURI (BB-63), USS BOLE (DD-755), and USS LOFBERG (DD-759) on the morning of 11 March 1951 and joined TF 77 consisting of the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47), USS PRINCETON (CV-37), and other units on 13 March 1951.

Commanding Officer of Carrier Air Group TWO was R. W. RYND, CDR, USN, with the following complement of pilots and number of aircraft at the beginning of flight operations:

SQUADRON	NO. OF PILOTS	NO. OF AIRCRAFT
VF-24	29	17 F4U-4
VF-63	27	17 F4U-4
VF-64	26	17 F4U-4
VA-65	28	18 AD-2, 2 AD-4, 2 AD-4Q
VC-35	6	3 AD-4N
VC-3	4	3 F4U-5N
VC-11	5	3 AD-4W
VC-61	5	3 F4U-4P
CVG-2 & Staff	10	- - - - -

Serial: 051

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PART II: Chronological Order of Events

(A) 1/31/51: Underway enroute from Sasebo, Japan to operating area in company with destroyer escort. Launched ferry flight to Itazuke, Japan and landed courier planes from Itazuke. Conducted AA firing practice.

2/1/51: Rendezvoused with TF 77 in the early morning. Launched close air support strikes and photo missions over Northeastern Korea with 58 sorties for the day.

2/2/51: Launched close air support, bridge strikes, photo missions and night hecklers. Several hundred troop casualties were inflicted. 31 sorties were flown.

2/3/51: Air attacks consisted of close air support and bridge strikes taking a toll of several hundred enemy troop casualties, 30 houses containing troops, and damaging two RR bridges. 60 sorties were flown.

2/4/51: Rendezvoused with replenishment group and received 329,070 gallons of fuel oil, 65,000 gallons of aviation gasoline and 76.7 tons of ammunition.

2/5/51: Conducted close air support, bridge strikes, photo missions and night heckler attacks. Dropped two spans on RR bridge. 53 sorties were flown.

2/6/51: Flight operations were limited to [illegible] sorties due to low ceiling and icing conditions. Six sorties were flown. The USS CUNNINGHAM (DD-752) and the USS EVANS (DD-754) came alongside and received 68,010 and 54,504 gallons of fuel oil respectively.

2/7/51: Weather conditions delayed flight operations until late morning. Close air support, bridge strikes, and photo missions were conducted in two events totaling 47 sorties for the day. Two F4U aircraft were lost, one on catapult takeoff in which Ensign G. A. MARTIN, 0505344, USN was not recovered and the other on landing approach in which Ensign G. W. STINNETT, Jr., 0507860, USN was recovered by helicopter.

2/8/51: Rendezvoused with replenishment group and received 298,956 gallons of fuel oil, 38,830 gallons of aviation gasoline and 141.2 tons of ammunition.

2/9/51: Launched early morning hecklers only. Further flight operations were prevented by snow and icing conditions. Eight trucks were destroyed in five sorties for the day.

2/10/51: Close air support, bridge strikes, photo missions and night heckler attacks were conducted in 57 sorties which accounted for damage to two RR bridges and one highway bridge.

2/11/51: Conducted close air support, bridge strikes and photo missions in 85 sorties which inflicted approximately 100 enemy troop casualties.

[redacted]

2/24/51: Poor weather prevented flight operations.

2/25/51: Rendezvoused with replenishment group and received 227,976 gallons of fuel oil, 59,050 gallons of aviation gasoline, and 116.3 tons of ammunition.

2/26/51: Departed from operating area in the morning for Yokosuka, Japan.

2/27/51 - 3/2/51: Enroute from the operating area to Yokosuka, Japan.

3/2/51 - 3/10/51: Moored to Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka, Japan for maintenance and upkeep.

3/11/51: Underway enroute from Yokosuka, Japan to the operating area in company with destroyer escort. The USS MISSOURI (BB-63) joined the formation in the afternoon and all ships conducted AA firing practice.

3/12/51: Proceeding from Yokosuka, Japan to the operating area. Conducted AA firing practice enroute.

3/13/51: Rendezvoused with TF 77 and replenishment group in the early afternoon and received 274,974 gallons of fuel oil.

3/14/51: Conducted close air support, special strikes, naval gunfire spotting, and photo missions in 71 sorties for the day. Three (3) highway bridges and a locomotive were damaged.

3/15/51: Flight operations consisted of early morning hecklers, bridge strikes, naval gunfire spotting and photo missions in 57 sorties. Five (5) railroad bridges and one highway bridge were damaged.

3/16/51: Launched early morning hecklers, bridge strikes, railroad seeder, laying long delay fused bombs along tracks, and lumber destroyer special strikes, naval gunfire spotting and photo missions. Five (5) railroad bridges, railroad tracks and lumber piles were damaged. 60 sorties were flown.

3/17/51: Conducted close air support, early morning hecklers, bridge strikes, railroad seeder and lumber destroyer special strikes, naval gunfire spotting, and photo missions. Two (2) highway and six (6) railroad bridges were damaged in 111 sorties for the day.

3/18/51: Rendezvoused with replenishment group and received 234,822 gallons of fuel oil, 92,500 gallons of aviation gasoline, and 294.2 tons of ammunition.

3/19/51: Conducted close air support, bridge strikes, naval gunfire spotting, lumber destroyer, railroad seeder and

CV45/A16-3/aej
Serial: 051

DECLASSIFIED

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2/14/51: Poor weather conditions prevented flight operations with the exception of a special search mission. 35,585 gallons of fuel oil were transferred to the USS CUNNINGHAM (DD-752), 41,792 gallons to the USS HOLLISTER (DD-788), 46,008 gallons to the USS KNOX (DD-742) and 44,218 gallons to the USS FISKE (DD-842).

2/15/51: Conducted close air support, bridge strikes, and photo missions in 105 sorties damaging three highway bridges, destroying seven trucks, and inflicting 350 enemy troop casualties. A successful wheels up landing in an ADN aircraft was completed by LTJG R. C. MAXWELL, 0478219, USN. J. V. BRICE, Jr., AN, 302 31 02, USN, was injured in the foot by a 20MM shell fired from one of the guns of the plane during this landing.

2/16/51: Conducted close air support, special strikes, and a photo and early morning heckler mission. Bad weather prevented afternoon flight. 42 sorties were flown.

2/17/51: Rendezvoused with replenishment group and received 476,826 gallons of fuel oil, 79,000 gallons of aviation gasoline, and 166.2 tons of ammunition.

2/18/51: Flight operations were delayed until the afternoon and close air support, armed reconnaissance, special strikes and a photo and search mission were launched in 47 sorties. Ensign R. M. TVEDE, 0508284, USN, after an engine failure in his F4U aircraft went down at sea in a mine field. He was rescued by a small boat from the USS OZBOURN (DD 846).

2/19/51: Conducted close air support, special strikes, naval gunfire spotting, and a photo and search mission in the morning launch, delayed due to poor visibility and bad weather. One RR bridge was damaged and a tank and junk destroyed. 47 sorties were flown.

2/20/51: A full days flight operations were conducted with close air support, special strikes, naval gunfire spotting, and heckler and photo missions. Six barracks and two trucks were destroyed. An F4U flown by LTJG B. F. MCDERMOTT, 0299564, USN, was hit by anti-aircraft fire on a photo mission and ditched at sea. He was rescued by a small boat put out from the USS WALLACE L. LIND (DD-708). 72 sorties were flown.

2/21/51: Rendezvoused with replenishment group and received 241,290 gallons of fuel oil, 53,800 gallons of aviation gasoline, and 104.4 tons of ammunition.

2/22/51: Conducted close air support, special strikes, naval gunfire spotting, and photo missions in 92 sorties for the day. Severely damaged a RR bridge and destroyed 4 barracks, 26 buildings, and 22 houses containing enemy troops.

CV45/A16-3/aej
Serial: 051

DECLASSIFIED

[redacted]

3/20/51: Launched close air support, bridge striked, naval gunfire spotting, lumber destroyer, railroad seeder and breaker special strikes, and photo missions. Four (4) highway bridges and two railroad bridges were damaged in 68 sorties for the day.

3/21/51: Conducted close air support, bridge strikes, photo missions, and night heckler attacks. Ensign R. R. LEAGLUND, 0496938, USN, in his AD-4Q aircraft, received AA fire over the bombline and crash landed his place at Seoul Airfield without injury to himself or passenger. E. H. HANLEY, AN, 719 23 71, USN, received serious chest injuries in a plane handling accident on the flight deck. 81 sorties were flown for the day.

3/22/51: Rendezvoused with replenishment group and received 157,246 gallons of fuel oil, 77,400 gallons of aviation gasoline, 155.3 tons of ammunition, and 55 tons of provisions.

3/23/51: Launched early morning hecklers, railroad breakers, naval gunfire spotting, bridge strikes and a photo mission in 65 sorties for the day. Two highway and three railroad bridges were damaged and a fully loaded ammunition train was destroyed in a tunnel.

3/24/51: Launched early morning hecklers, close air support, railroad breakers, naval gunfire spotting and a photo mission. Ensign W. G. CLANEY, 0508122, USN, barrier crashed his F4U-4 to an extent beyond repair but without injury to himself. Four bridges were damaged and railroad tracks were broken at 23 locations. 71 sorties were flown.

3/25/51: Poor visibility prevented flight operations on this Easter Day.

3/26/51: Departed the operating area enroute to Yokosuka, Japan.

(B) Summary of Sorties

	F4U	AD	TOTAL
Offensive	790	471	1261
Defensive	131	94	225
Photo Reconnaissance	103	--	103

PART III: Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

(A) Ammunition Expenditure:

	TYPE	QUANTITY
Bombs:	100# G.P.	503
	220# Frags.	802

CV45/A16-3/aej
Serial: 051

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED

(B) Performance of Ordnance Equipment:
(See Special Comments, PART VI)

PART IV: Battle Damage

(A) Damage to Ship: None

(B) Damage to Aircraft:

	COMBAT		OPERATIONAL		
	F4U	AD	F4U	AD	Total
Lost	4	0	3	0	7
Damaged	0	3	2	2	7

(C) Damage Inflicted on Enemy:

Targets	Destroyed	Damaged
Tanks	4	16
Trucks	34	39
Command Cars	4	0
Locomotives	0	1
Ammunition Trains	1	1
Carts	59	15
Wagons	0	3
RR Bridges	0	47
Hwy Bridges	0	49
RR Yards	0	4
RR Turn Tables	1	0
RR Track Hits	0	99
Tunnels	0	17
RR Cars	35	117
Supply Dumps	4	7
Ammo Dumps	0	1
Oil Dumps	1	2
Oil Refinery	1	0
Warehouses	30	21
Barracks	23	11
Houses	313	300
Buildings	264	305
Gun Emplacements	5	1
Huts	84	12
Airfield Runways	0	1
Mortar Positions	3	0
Command Posts	1	0
Fuel Tanks	7	0
Steel Mill	0	1
Lumber Piles	6	4
Aquaducts	4	0
Radio Installations	0	1
Horses	13	0
Oxen	11	0
Sampans	3	1

Troops (Estimated 3,145 casualties. Not confirmed)

PART V: Personnel

[redacted]

(B) Casualties: G. A. MARTIN, ENS., 0505344/1310, USN.
Killed in Action.
D. A. McCOSKRIE, LTJG, 0485391/1310, USN.
Missing in Action.
J. V. PRICE, Jr., AN, 302 31 02, USN.
Injured in foot from accidential 20MM shell fire on flight deck during plane landing.
R. C. LOOMER, ENS., 0507201/1310, USN.
Missing in Action.
E. H. HANLEY, AN, 719 23 71, USN.
Injured in the chest after fall under wheel of plane during plane towing on the flight deck.

PART VI: Special Comments

(A) Air Group Composition:

The five squadron air group is considered undesirable under wartime conditions. Although only four squadrons have been embarked during this period a further consolidation is believed desirable for operation on the CV-9 class carrier. It is recommended that groups be composed of three squadrons only. Administration and tactical organization would be simplified and the severe congestion caused by two squadrons operating from one ready room would be alleviated.

(B) Aircraft Handling:

(1) Aircraft complement - Much has been written on the ideal or desirable complement of the CV-9 class carriers. During this period the ship operated 85 aircraft which is considerably less than the total that could be operated. However, the proficiency with which the 85 aircraft were handled as compared with the loss of efficiency when operating at maximum complement of 95 or 96 aircraft was amply demonstrated. It was possible at all times to spot the flight and hangar deck before receiving the air plan and always have aircraft available for the first event in the number and types required. However, replacement of aircraft imposed a very small problem in this operating area. In areas where replacement of aircraft is expected to be a difficult problem the maximum complement is of greater importance.

Maintenance of aircraft benefitted greatly by operating this "ideal" complement. Maintenance and its end result, availability, were enhanced by the simple fact that portions of the hangar deck could be spotted loosely thereby permitting the rapid movement of planes to and from the hangar deck maintenance areas.

Proficiency in ordnance loading was greatly facilitated by this "ideal" complement. It permitted the deck to be spotted to alleviate ordnance loading difficulties such as sufficient room between planes; sufficient room to load outboard wings and racks of aircraft along the deck edge; spreading of wings or

[redacted]

(2) Catapulting - Considerably more catapulting than was absolutely necessary was done. It would have been possible to spot the deck, at times, to permit flyaway takeoffs. However, there are two distinct benefits derived from constant catapulting. First, the machinery is exercised and the crews get more practice. In this way both are able to maintain a "keen" edge. Secondly, pilots get very proficient at taxiing on the catapults. The net result is that when the occasion arises which calls for catapulting considerable numbers of prop aircraft, an interval of 25 to 27 seconds can be realized for the entire launch.

(3) Flight Deck Shoes - The present type flight deck shoe can be greatly improved. The type now in use has two distinct deficiencies. It is not waterproof or even water repellent and it does not give enough support to the foot. A shoe built on the order of the field shoe would give the necessary support. The leather should be treated to make it waterproof and then kept in that condition by the application of neatsfoot oil or any other water repellent. The soles and heels could be improved by making them thicker. Differently constructed soles should be experimented with to find a better gripper.

(4) Sound Power Phone Talker Helmet - There is a definite need for a specially constructed helmet to accomodate sound power earphones for talkers on the flight deck. The high noise level, particularly with jets aboard, make the talkers almost useless. A helmet with properly designed ear cups would enhance the value of phone talkers considerably.

(C) Aircraft Maintenance:

Considerable credit must be given to the embarked squadrons for their willingness to work on "down" aircraft on the flight deck. There is a tendency among most air groups to do the minimum amount of maintenance on the flight deck and this is readily understandable. Air Group TWO has been doing a maximum amount of maintenance on the flight deck. This has resulted in a higher availability and has, of course, lessened the handling problem. Their attitude and willingness in this matter is commendable.

(D) Landing Signal Officers:

During this period five Landing Signal Officers were assigned. While it is realized that training for LSO's is needed, five is simply too many on one ship. The amount of work they can do individually is very small. The constant shifting of LSO's to give each an opportunity for practice does not particularly enhance operations. It is recommended that not more than three (3) be assigned to a CV.

(E) Aviation Ordnance:

The need for much improved ordnance handling equipment and better napalm mixing facilities has been recommended in the past. The need is an urgent one.

CV45/A16-3/aej
Serial: 051

DECLASSIFIED

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(F) Engineering:

This ship has benefitted greatly as the result of two availability periods since its return to the combat area. The first of these was a ten day period in Sasebo Harbor during the latter part of January and the second for eight days at Yokosuka during the first part of March. A ten day availability for every thirty days of operations is considered adequate to maintain this class of vessel in excellent state of operational readiness and reliability. Changing the location of the availability from Sasebo to Yokosuka has also proven very beneficial since the ship can take advantage of the Naval Base ship repair facilities and the base supply depot for spare parts at Yokosuka.

During the entire period that the VALLEY FORGE has operated in WesPac the question of boiler power when flying jet aircraft has continually arisen. This vessel has concluded that eight boiler operation is the only guarantee against marked decreases in wind intensity which demand higher ship speed. A good prediction might be made for a particular area but if the vessel shifts to a new operating area the prediction may no longer hold and whereas the wind might have been sixteen knots in the morning it might be only three knots in the late afternoon.

Eight boiler operation allows for maximum speed if demanded easier operation of boilers by fireroom personnel, and "split plant" operation (both main and auxilary steam piping systems). The last feature is very important in case the ship is attacked. Operating on six boilers has a singular advantage in that the ship is able to reduce speed to as low as ten knots and still maintain flow through the boiler superheaters. It is not more economical and it imposes boiler operating problems on fireroom personnel when speed is increased or decreased radically. Nor does it permit good smoke control. With six boiler operations the main and auxiliary steam lines are completely open. This is not good engineering damage control when operating in waters where the ship could be attacked and where thirty knots is frequently demanded. If a ship should be ready for twenty eight knots then it should be ready for maximum speed.

Replenishment days present excellent opportunites for boiler and fireroom maintenance. If boilers are periodically hydrostatically tested and all opportunites taken advantage of to perform minor repair work, eight boiler operation between dawn and dusk should be no problem. Operating a CV-9 class carrier at thirty knots on six boilers means that the ship is at mixiumum speed and the failure of forced draft blowers or pumps means a decrease in speed if an engineering casualty is to be averted. In other words no reserve power is available.

[redacted]

(G) Electronics:

DECLASSIFIED

With regard to electronics, the work performed on the SX fighter-director radar during the last two availability periods has markedly increased its performance. Bogies have been picked up at ranges of 60, 70, and 80 miles depending on the type of aircraft and number of planes in the raid. All other radars have been operating very efficienctly. Radio communications over-all have been excellent; some difficultly has been experienc on teletype reception, but this was mainly due to the time of day and atmospheric conditions. CCA was operated during March with excellent results. This equipment has been maintained in good operating condition in case of emergency.

With the exception of a failure in the antenna pedestal of the Mk 5 IFF all electronic equipment at present is in full operating condition. The Mk 5 IFF was originally installed in February 1949, as an experimental model on the VALLEY FORGE. It was tested with aircraft at San Diego during February 1950 with excellent results. The equipment was not put to operational use until the return of this vessel to WesPac. Since then it has been in constant use until recent failure occurred in the antenna pedestal. Until the failure, results obtained from this equipment were excellent. Jet aircraft (F9F) were easily controlled and used as CAP to intercept other aircraft which appeared on the PPI scope as bogies when the jets could not be seen using normal radar return information. Jet aircraft (F9F) were tracked solidly out to 150 miles using Mk 5 IFF. The maximum range that these aircraft could be tracked, using this IFF was not determined but it is believed that good return signals could be expected out to 200 miles. The various modes (IFF, FI, PI) proved very useful in identifying different flights.

The antenna assembly AN/JPA-11(SN-21), for Mk 5 IFF is considered unsatisfactory for shipboard use. During high winds the antenna was slowed or speeded up and sometimes even stopped due to the sail effect of the large surface area of the antenna and the fact that the drive motor is only 1/8 H.P. It is believed that because of the strain on the antenna by high winds a clutch arrangement between the antenna drive motor and the main antenna drive gear was worn out causing a constant slipping between the drive motor and the antenna. The Bureau of Ships has been advised of this failure and steps are being taken to procure a new antenna pedestal which will be installed by ship's force during the forthcoming naval shipyard availability.

The AN/URD-2 has been operating well with a minimum of required maintenance. Its present location on the towing light mast creates a null area directly astern. This area exists at altitudes below the line of sight from the antenna elements to the stack. Operation will be optimum when the antenna array is installed above the YE radio homing beacon on the stub mast. It is recommended that the presently installed fibre glass insulators be replaced with porcelain insulators. It has been found through experience on board this vessel that the fibre

CV45/A16-3/aej
Serial: 051

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED

(H) Communications:

During the period concerned there were no particular problems concerning communications. Through what appeared to be a decrease in the traffic handled over fleet broadcast circuits (JIG FOX) traffic with a precedence as low as "DEFERRED" was frequently received on the day originated. During the period July-December, 1950, even traffic with a precedence as high as "OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE" often appeared on broadcast schedules as long as four days after its origination.

It was noted that certain intelligence information was often duplicated by various commanders. It is believed that, where practicable, a screening of intelligence by some joint agency, which would be responsible for dissemination of this type of information, would eliminate, or largely reduce, duplication and would, thereby, reduce the load on personnel at smaller communications activities. While, in some cases, the nature of the intelligence to be transmitted would be of such importance that immediate delivery to an action addressee is necessary, it is believed that in many instances the following procedure might be employed:

(a) All intelligence information of a general nature be forwarded to a joint intelligence center for screening.

(b) A series of dispatches, addressed to all concerned be originated by the joint intelligence center, wherein duplications are eliminated, and certain non-essential items deleted or made the subject of separate dispatches to only those who need to know.

(I) Intelligence:

(1) General Organization - All ship and air group intelligence personnel were pooled and placed under the senior air group intelligence officer to work together to handle all air group and ship's intelligence work. Squadron and ship intelligence officers were then reassigned as their experience and capabilities dictated. The organization chart of the Air Intelligence Section is attached as enclosure (3). Thus each individual squadron received an intelligence officer whose primary job was intelligen

The practice of combining the air group intelligence function and the ship's intelligence function under the direction of the Air Group Intelligence Officer proved [illegible] and would be even more effective if the ship's intelligence officer has had previous squadron intelligence experience.

(2) Briefing and Debriefing - With the squadron AIO's working under the direction of the Ship-Air Group Intelligence Officer and out of the ship's Intelligence Office, a complete PILOT BRIEFING SHEET was compiled each night to be used by each squadron AIO for the next day's briefing. Every available

[redacted]

Though the above system sounds cumbersome, once it is installed it becomes surprisingly easy to handle and a very simple and exact way to be sure that all intelligence and operations personnel concerned receive the correct information with a minimum of confusion. The PILOT BRIEFING SHEET became the Bible of intelligence operations but in no way supplanted the efforts of the squadron AIO's who used the SHEET as a base for their own initative, efforts, and briefing.

An intensive program was developed to maintain a running file of targets of opportunity. These were briefed by the AIO relative to the assigned mission and in the event no secondary targets were assigned. This practice is highly recommended to avoid abortive missions due to weather over the assigned targets, etc.

All squadrons were briefed and debriefed in their ready rooms by their individual AIO's. Mass debriefing was and should never be attempted because of the obvious and dangerous fallacies and inaccuracies inherent in this system. The integration of the individual squadron debriefing information (particularly important when several squadrons hit the same target) into a composite and informative Strike Flash Report, was handled by the Ship-Air Group Intelligence Officer. After a period of trial and error, a highly efficient Pilot Debriefing Form was developed, based upon three points; (1) efficiency and speed in debriefing, (2) efficiency and speed in Strike Flash reporting, (3) compliance with Air Summary requirements CNO letter 1 Sept. 1950 ser 013P05C. Sample briefing and debriefing forms are attached as enclosures (1) and (2).

In order to simplify Strike Flash reporting, a definite pattern was developed as follows: Target name, target description in detail, coordinates, ordnance used by category of destruction, results of attack, pertinent observations of results. Each attack made was described in this manner. It is recommended as a means of establishing uniformity in reporting to the Task Force Commander.

(3) Personnel.- The ship's intelligence and assistant intelligence officers were assigned the duties of statistical report and plot responsibility respectively. All squadron Combat Reports were funnelled through the Ship-Air Group Intelligence office for correction and distribution. In cases where squadron yeoman fell behind in the compilation of these reports, assistance was lent by the Ship-Air Group office. A quartermaster striker was placed in charge of all charts. By means of a running inventory log, office stocks were kept at operating levels by drawing from storerooms. When not busy, the striker assisted the AIO yeoman. In this manner sufficient stenographic help was available at all times. The ship's intelligence officer was placed in charge of the preparation of all statistical ship and air group reports required, with the exception of the Strike Flash Report. The assistant ship's

CV45/A16-3/aej
Serial: 051

DECLASSIFIED

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(4) Charts - With the application of the UTM grid to all charts regardless of originator or scale, a long step towards coordination of Army, Navy and Air Force operations will be made. The AMS L552 series are particularly desirable because of their tint shaded gradation. However, elevations in meters neutralize this advantage. The blue UTM grid lines are excellent for night operations. It is recommended that the foot scale replace the meter scale on the AMS L552.

The quartermaster striker issued all charts and maps from the Ship-Air Group Intelligence Office upon request of the squadron AIO's. A log was kept to avoid wastage. Ten sheets of each Close Air Support chart were kept for issue in the office. These were logged out to each AIO and returned after each hop. This system was found necessary, for strikes against the same target were run time and time again; if the squadron AIO's were not held responsible, the storage supply as well as the office supply would soon be exhausted. It was necessary to store 67,000 CAS charts in order to have available 100 of each 670 CAS charts of all Korea. It is urgently recommended these charts be packaged in 50's with an informative label. Currently they are issued in bulk, about two thousand charts to a box without labeling or sequence of any kind. As a result hundreds of unnecessary hours of mishandling is necessary in order to set up a storage supply system which can be readily drawn upon when office stocks run short. The same situation was found in the issue of AMS L552 charts, in fact worse for these charts came in rolls which made additional handling necessary.

(5) Air Combat Reports - All squadron Air Combat reports were funnelled through the Ship-Air Group Intelligence Office for correction and distribution. Responsibility for preparation and typing was left entirely in the hands of the squadron air intelligence officers.

(6) Office - A Master Plot Board of all intelligence was kept in the Ship-Air Group Intelligence office. From this master, squadron AIO copied whatever information was necessary for their operations or whatever, because of its classification, was not included in the Daily Pilot Briefing Sheet. This plot was carried on USAF 1:250,000 Approach Charts and proved highly valuable in briefing squadron commanders and operations officers of the ship as to the full progress of the war and the reasons behind our daily activities. Reconnaissance routes, interdiction destruction, enemy concentrations and supply dumps, flak traps, troops movements and concentrations and the like were plotted on acetate roller curtains over the Master Plot.

A miniature of the Master Plot was installed in the Ward Room for general information and was corrected each day. All pre- and post- target photos were posted on the miniature as well as master plot. This method developed an intense interest in aerial photography and much healthy inter-squadron bombing rivalry.

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(7) Intelligence - A continuing lecture program by the five Air Group AIO's for Air Group and Ship's personnel was instituted and run as often as possible on refueling days. If a personal lecture was not feasible the lecture was mimeographed. A General Intelligence Brief prepared by the Ship-Air Group AIO was prepared and dissimenated to ship and air group personnel each refueling day.

Lectures and Briefs covered the following topics: Korean Communism, Geopolitics, Communism, Russian Imperialism, China, Malay States, India, and Japanese Communism.

The value of having a fully staffed Air Intelligence Center at ComNavFE or JOC, TAEGU cannot be overemphasized. The need for the integration of Air Force, Army, Navy and Marine Intelligence was proven many times over in World War II. Because intelligence work in the Korean conflict often overlaps into operational intelligence, little time is left to dig through reams of dispatches and material to gather the necessary information. It is highly recommended that this office, staffed by experienced ACI officers, be established.

(8) USAF Target Dossier - The target dossier was found to be excellent and is highly recommended as a source of detailed information for briefing.

The accompanying USAF Target Illustrations were found useful less than half the time - only about 50% of the targets listed in the Dossier are accompanied by illustrations. Repeated requests were made for missing illustrations. As a substitute, Navy photographs were combined with Dossier information and proved quite satisfactory.

(9) Photo Interpretation - The Ship's Photo Interpretation Officer gave several lectures to Air Group pilots on the knack of reading photographs. This is highly recommended for it was found that pilots, when given photographs for identification of targets from the air, were thoroughly unfamiliar as to how to "read" a target photograph.

Every effort was made to stimulate pilot interest in pre- and post- attack photographs thru extensive Ward Room displays and discussion.

(10) Recognition - Intensive recognition training was carried on for both ship and air group personnel. Though material and slides available is thoroughly out-dated, research in commercial and service publications provided sufficient pictures and data to keep the program interesting. It is recommended that attention be directed to the lack of recognition material.

PART VII: Summary of Recommendations

It is recommended that:

CV45/A16-3/aej
Serial: 051

DECLASSIFIED

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(4) Suitable hoists for bomb loading on wing racks when wings are folded be developed to be available as soon as new aircraft types are assigned to carrier air groups.

(5) Operational schedules be adjusted to provide ten days in port availability for every thirty days operations in the combat area.

(6) A joint central intelligence agency be established to accumulate, screen, digest and disseminate intelligence information.

(7) More complete and better recognition material be made available.

(8) Target Dossiers be more completely illustrated with up to date photographs.

J. M. CARSON

Copy to:

CNO (Advance)	2	(Airmail)
ComAirPac	10	(Airmail for further distribution as deemed appropriat
ComCarDiv ONE	4	
ComCarDiv FIVE	4.	
ComCarDiv THREE	4	
CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA	4	
CO, USS BOXER	4	
CO, USS PRINCETON	4	
CO, USS LEYTE	4	
CTF 77	2	
CAG 5	2	
CAG 11	2	
CAG 19	2	
CAG 2	2	
CAG 3	2	

PILOT BRIEFING FORM

A. LOCAL INTELLIGENCE:
Any info enemy or friendly specifically concerning our general operations; daily or long range. Target info found in previous days debriefing forms etc.
Weather.

B. FLAK:
Include flak from debriefing.

C. BOMCOMOPS:

D. SAR AND E & E:

E. EMERGENCY AIRFIELDS:

F. STARS; PANELS; VEHICLES; SURFACE:
Recognition Signals.

G. STRIKE INFORMATION:

1. OPS INFO AND INTELLIGENCE:
Ops policies, strike or enemy intelligence.

2. ARMED RECCO:
2a. ARMED RECCO SECONDARY.

3. CAS TACP'S AND PLANES
3a. CAS SECONDARY:
3b. TACP LOCATIONS:

4. DUMP TARGETS:

5. STRATEGIC STRIPS:
5a. STRATEGIC SECONDARY.

6. PHOTO MISSIONS:

7. HECKLER OR NGF:
7a. HECKLER SECONDARY.

H. BOMBLINE IN SEQUENCE:

I. COMMUNICATIONS:

J. APPENDIX
Issued in numerical sequences during the following day as additional information is available.

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U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
Air Intelligence
PILOT DEBRIEFING FORM TYPE SORTIE_____

Air Attack Report No._____Date_____
Squadron _____Type Plane_____Event No._____TOT_____
COMMUNICATIONS COMMENTS-CAS:

E. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT:
   1. Number of sorties_____
   2. Total number runs made on ground or surface targets (Bombing, rocket, napalm and strafing)_____
   3. Total aircraft hours on station awaiting target assignment_____ Total aircraft hours over target from first until last run_____
   4. Number of night sorties_____
F. OFFENSIVE SORTIES:
   1. Number of sorties_____
   2. Total number runs made on ground or surface targets (Bombing, rocket, and strafing)_____
   3. Total aircraft hours over target from first until last run_____
   4. Number of night sorties_____
G. NUMBER RECCO SORTIES_____
H. NUMBER AIR DEFENSE SORTIES_____
I. NUMBER ANTI SUB SORTIES_____
M. TOTAL AIRCRAFT LOST (CAUSES)_____
N. NUMBER AIRCRAFT LOST TO AA_____
O. NUMBER OFFENSIVE AIRCRAFT LOST TO ENEMY_____
P. NUMBER DEFENSIVE, ASW AND RECCO AIRCRAFT LOST TO ENEMY_____
T. AIRBORNE ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED AND DAMAGED BY OWN AIRCRAFT:
   In vicinity of Task Force (Day) Destroyed:_____Damaged_____
   In vicinity of Task Force (Night)Destroyed:_____Damaged_____
   Over target area Destroyed:_____Damaged_____
U. AIRBORNE ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED AND DAMAGED BY SHIP'S GUNFIRE: Destroyed_____Damaged_____
V. ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED AND DAMAGED ON GROUND_____
W. DAMAGE TO ENEMY VESSELS:
   Type vessel(size) Location Results

FLAK:
_____ _____ _____
caliber intensity accuracy

_____ _____
location damage to aircraft

WEATHER:

X. DAMAGE TO GROUND TARGETS:
   Target and Description . Location . Ordnance . Results

OBSERVATIONS: (Includes info such movements, damaged bridges and facilities, condition of highways and railroads, and anything unusual pertinent to Intelligence not related to results).


CAG
Ship's Operations Officer
Ship's - Air Group Intelligence Officer
Master Situation Plot, Briefing - Strike Flash
Ship's Intelligence Off.
Administration
Reporting (Ship&Air Gru)
Air Group Combat Reports
Registered Pubs.
Security
Assistant Ship Intelligence Officer
Master Situation Plot
Charts Issue
Escape and Evasion
Flak Plot
Ship's Photo Interpreter
Photo Interpretation
Briefing - Photo Unit
Air Intelligence Officer
Briefing & Debriefing
Attack Squadron, ASW & Night Attack Units
Air Intelligence Officer
Briefing & Debriefing
Fighter Squadron, Night Fighter Unit
Air Intelligence Officer
Briefing & Debriefing
Fighter Squadron
Air Intelligence Officer
Briefing & Debriefing
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Briefing
Lectures

USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

ORIGINAL

CV45/A9-4
Serial: 028

29 January 1952

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division FIVE
(2) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, FAR EAST
(5) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 7 Dec 1951 through 19 Jan 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV Instruction 3480.5 dated 1 July 1951

Encl: (1) Commander, CATG ONE conf ltr ser 01 of 19 Jan 1952 P.W.

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period of 7 Dec 1951 through 19 Jan 1952 is hereby submitted:

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

Complying with ComAirPac Confidential Dispatch 091943Z of October 1951, the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), CAPTAIN OSCAR PEDERSON Commanding, departed San Diego, California, for Hawaiian waters. After a period of training, the USS VALLEY FORGE left Pearl Harbor, T.H. 26 November 1951 for Yokosuka, Japan, in accordance with ComCarDiv FIVE Operation Order 1-51 of 25 November 1951 with REAR ADMIRAL F.W. MC MAHON, ComCarDiv FIVE embarked. After voyage repairs in Yokosuka departed for the Operating Area in accordance with ComFltAct Yokosuka Dispatch 060800Z on 7 December 1951.

On 11 December 1951 joined Task Force 77 close to the 38th Parallel on the East Coast of Korea. The Task Force was commanded by REAR ADMIRAL JOHN PERRY, ComCarDiv ONE aboard the USS ESSEX (CV-9) and operated under Task Force 77 Operation Order 22-51 (1st Revision). It was composed of USS ESSEX (CV-9), USS ANTIETAM (CV-36), USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), USS ST PAUL (CA-73), USS MANCHESTER (CL-83), USS WISCONSIN (BB-64), USS WILTSIE (DD-716), USS FLETCHER (DD-445), USS CHANDLER (DD-717), USS O'BANNON (DDE-450), USS CHEVALIER (DDR-805), USS RADFORD (DDE-446), USS KYES (DD-787), USS WALKER (DDE-517), USS SHIELDS (DD-596), USS TWINING (DD-540), and USS CALAHON (DD-685).

On 17 January 1952 the USS VALLEY FORGE departed Task Force 77 for Yokosuka, Japan for a period of maintenance and upkeep and arrived on 19 January 1952.

(2) Provide air cover for replenishment ships and other friendly naval surface forces when necessary.

(3) Protect the force against air, surface and subsurface attacks.

(4) Provide air spot to bombardment forces when directed.

(5) Conduct photo and visual reconnaissance as required.

(6) Coordinate air operations with the 5th Air Force through JOC, Korea.

(7) Exchange intelligence information with friendly naval forces engaged in surface interdiction operations on the east coast of Korea.

The Commanding Officer of Carrier Air Group ONE is CDR C. H. CRABILL, Jr., USN, with the following complement of pilots and number of aircraft at the beginning of flight operations on 22 October 1951.

SQUADRON	NO. OF PILOTS	NO. OF AIRCRAFT
VF 52	22	16 F9F-2
VF 111	25	16 F9F-2
VF 194	27	5 AD-3 11 AD-2
VF 653	30	2 F4U-4 16 F4U-4B
VC 3	5	4 F4U-5NL
VC 11	6	3 AD-4W
VC 35	7	2 AD-2Q 4 AD-4NL
VC 61	5	3 F9F-2P
HU 1	2	1 HO3S

PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

USS VALLEY FORGE, with Air Task Group ONE embarked, arrived in Yokosuka, Japan on 4 December 1951 for a 3 day availability. Personnel from the ship and each squadron went aboard the USS BON HOMME RICHARD for a conference with Air Group 101 pilots. On 5 December one member of each squadron was given TAD orders to the USS ESSEX to fly combat missions for training and familiarization. In addition, at the same time, one ship's officer was sent to the USS ESSEX on TAD orders for familiarization with the ship's operating procedures.

12-7-51: Underway for operating area, no air operations.

12-8-51: Conducted refresher air operations in Area TARE. A mid-air collision cost the lives of two (2) VF 653 pilots. LT J. T. POTERFIELD and LT D. E. LONDON collided while engaged in squadron tactics.

12-10-51: Refresher air operations continued in Area TARE.

[redacted]
SECURITY INFORMATION

lost to enemy flak. LTJG H. E. ETTINGER, pilot, and two crewmen are listed as missing.

12-14-51: Continued our attacks on Northeastern Korean Rail Net and flew armed reconnaissance. One F4U and one AD were forced to land at K-18 due to flak damage. Photo coverage was flown over the area of the downed heckler. Results were negative.

12-15-51: 64 offensive sorties, 22 defensive sorties were flown by ATG-1 pilots. Targets were Korean main supply routes.

12-16-51: Replenishment as sea, replenishment was difficult due to heavy weather and was discontinued.

12-17-51: Continued replenishment in morning, resumed flight operation early afternoon by launching a total of 33 sorties against the enemy.

12-18-51: Interdiction of enemy supply routes continued. Also, attacked concentrations of small boats in Wonsan Harbor damaging approximately 33 boats. LCDR B. T. PUGH, executive officer VF 194 was lost when he was forced to ditch his AD just north of Wonsan.

12-19-51: Mounting a total of 76 sorties we continued our rail interdiction program and attacked other targets of opportunity.

12-20-51: 28 rail cuts were scored by 58 offensive sorties. Planes from the USS VALLEY FORGE also attacked other targets of opportunity.

12-21-51: Replenishment at sea.

12-22-51: Continued to carry out our mission of rail interdiction, launching a total of 81 sorties. LT R.L. SOBEY of VF 653 was hit by flak causing him to crash with no chance of survival. LT SOBEY is listed as killed in action.

12-23-51: A total of 81 sorties were flown against the enemy as we continued our rail interdiction mission.

12-24-51: Air Operations as before, a total of 80 sorties being flown.

12-25-51: Replenishment at sea.

12-26-51: Weather cancelled all air operations.

12-27-51: Only 4 CAP sorties flown, weather continued bad.

12-28-51: A total of 84 sorties were flown, The primary mission continued to be rail interdiction. LTJG D. F. TATUM ditched his F9F within the task force screen when it flamed out on his approach. He was recovered by our helicopter with no difficulty.

12-29-51: Continuing our interdiction program 58 offensive

1-2-52: LT CARTER, flying a dawn heckler mission, landed his F4U-5N at K-18 as a result of automatic weapon flak damage received near Yonghung. The Task Force Commander sent a "Well Done" to a morning launch prop strike this date. 70 of the 86 sorties flown were offensive.

1-3-52: 78 tons of bombs were delivered by 67 offensive missions to Northeastern Korea. ENSIGN E.L. RIEMERS effected a water landing in Songjin Harbor after being hit badly in the starboard wing root section approximately 60 miles inland from Songjin. The USS ENDICOTT completed the rescue in eight minutes. Pilot suffered minor shock effect from exposure and the actual landing.

1-4-52: The force replenished at sea.

1-5-52: Bad weather forced the cancellation of the afternoon portion of scheduled operations, however, 56 sorties were flown and 38 tons of bombs were delivered.

1-6-52: Excellent results were realized against rail lines and bridges. Total bridge destruction - 4 RR bridges and a RR by-pass destroyed, 3 damaged and unusable. 84 missions were launched during the day.

1-7-52: The force replenished at sea.

1-8-52: In an exceptionally effective mission a prop strike accounted for 7 RR bridges and 3 RR by-passes. This performance earned a "Well Done" from the Task Force Commander. LTJG A. A. PETERSON was force to ditch his plane in Wonsan Harbor, as a result of being hit by small arms fire north of Hungnam. The helicopter from LST-802 picked him out of his raft 45 minutes after ditching. Pilot was recovered in good condition. One Corsair of VF 653 was forced to land at K-18 due to flak damage.

1-9-52: A total of 81 sorties were launched today against enemy lines of Communication. Flak over all the area was active. In the vicinity of Kowan LT W.M. FRANKOVITCH of VF 653 became seperated from his wingman, a few minutes later he reported loss of oil pressure and was thereafter not heard from. It is presumed he crashed into the sea as an oil slick was found in the area. LT FRANKOVITCH is listed as missing.

1-10-52: Replenished at sea. In the early afternoon, 2 Corsairs were launched to search the area for LT FRANKOVITCH, negative results were obtained.

1-11-52: Bad weather delayed flight operation until afternoon. One F9F was lost over the side as the ship took a violent roll. 38 sorties were scored in the half-days operation.

1-12-52: Operation "Moonlight Sonata" was carried out with gratifying results. The operation took full advantage of the moon to hit Communist night activity. At least 2 locomotives and 18 rail cars were destroyed. A total of 76 sorties were flown.

1-15-52: Again our planes struck rail and road supply routes. A total of 56 rail cuts were made, a record for the VALLEY FORGE todate.

1-16-52: We again flew the "Moonlight Sonata" with very good results. A total of 3 bridges were effectively destroyed by today's strikes.

1-17-52: Replenished at sea, departed for 10 days availability at Yokosuka, Japan.

PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

A. Ammunition Expended.

2,000# G.P. Bombs	27
1,000# G.P. Bombs	950
500# G.P. Bombs	626
250# G.P. Bombs	4732
100# G.P. Bombs	1874
260# Frag Bombs	376
5" HVAR Rockets	340
6.5 ATAR Rockets	177
Incediary Clusters	18
Napalm Bombs	33
Parachute Flares Mk 5	78
20mm Ammunition	271,213
.50 Cal. Ammunition	116,210
Incendiary Clusters	18

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Damage to ship:

None.

B. Damage to Aircraft:

No. of planes	Types	Causes
16	F9F-2	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
16	F4U-4(4B)	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
2	F4U-5NL	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
14	AD-2(3)	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
3	AD-4NL	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.

C. Loss of Aircraft:

Date	Squadron	Type	Bu.No.	Causes
12-9	VF 653	F4U-4	97496	Mid air collision
12-9	VF 653	F4U-4B	97314	Mid air collision

D. Damage Inflicted on Enemy:

Targets	Destroyed	Damaged
Tanks	1	0
Trucks	139	28
Locomotiwes	4	7
Oxcarts	111	14
Highway bridges	3	10
Supply Dumps	3	6
Fuel Dumps	2	0
Factories	0	4
Barracks & Buildings	75	33
Warehouses	5	6
Gun Emplacements	12	22
Lumber piles	0	4
Wagons	1	0
Villages	0	1
Boats	19	62
Radar Installations	0	5
Bunkers	0	1
M/Y Yards	0	6
RR Cars	87	94
RR Bridges	37	10
RR By-passes	11	14
Roundhouses	0	1
Bulldozer	1	0
Rail Cuts	743	
Highway Cuts	2	
Troops Killed	584	

The above mentioned table represents a conservative estimate of the actual damage inflicted on the enemy during this operational period. Only those instances where the damage could be assessed by the pilot were used in compiling this table. There were many attacks where the results were obscured and could not be assessed and are not included. There was no close air support flown during this period.

PART V

PERSONNEL

A. Performance:

Personnel performance has been excellent during the period of this report. Morale remained high.

Difficulties have been encountered in operating with an average on board count of 1933 which is below the recommended allowance of 1969. The influx of enlisted personnel is not sufficient to offset losses through the continued transfers of personnel for separation and to shore duty assignments; therfore the petty officer situation is critical, especially in the key ratings of electronics, engineering, gunnery, and communications. If the ship is to continue operating satisfactorily under almost constant

The length of time consumed from the time replacement personnel are ordered until the time they report for duty appears excessive. It is strongly recommended that faster transportation from CONUS be made available. If time spent awaiting transportation at the RecSta SFRAN could be reduced it would help tremendously. A survey reveals that an average of 18.5 man days is spent at RecSta SFRAN awaiting transportation. This added to the time spent enroute exceeds one month per man in practically every case.

During the operation the ship had a Protestant Chaplain aboard, but was without the services of a Catholic Chaplain. In order to provide services for Catholic personnel Chaplains traded services, using helicopters for transportation. Due to weather and operations this was not always possible. In the interests of morale each deployed CV should have both a Protestant and Catholic Chaplain aboard.

The Chaplain found that a tape recorder has been of significant value in connection with broadcasts to the fleet and aboard the ship. It is recommended that each CV have one available for such use. The Cor-Web Recorder with a supply of two dozen fifteen minute tapes and one dozen thirty minute tapes is adequate.

The Chaplain believes the brief (two to four minutes) evening prayer broadcast over the 1MC immediately after tattoo is of greater morale value than any other service he performs aboard the ship. It is highly recommended for adoption by other units.

B. RECREATION

Movies - Movies were shown daily in five different places. In two of these the program was repeated. During the operation fifty different programs were shown for a total of 270 times. On replenishment days there was a showing in a ready room for those men (plane check personnel) whose duty prevented them from attending the regular schedules. It was estimated that 800 officers and men attended each night.

A broadcasting station was established using the R.B.O. In addition to disc-jockey programs on regular schedules, recorded programs of the Ship's Band and a "Western Band" were featured. Each day a brief interview with a pilot, ship's officer or key enlisted man was conducted. Summary of the news and strike news was a daily feature.

The response to these broadcasts indicate that their morale value is high.

The Hobby Shop was well patronized. The limitation on its usage was the availability of supplies. Four times as much material was sold as in any previous month of the shop's operation. The crafts supplied were leather, copper, plastic, models, painting. The space occupied by the shop is quite small so that little work was actually done there. It was primarily for the sale of materials and issue of tools. On the basis of tools issued and materials sold, it is estimated that

[redacted] SECURITY INFORMATION

C. Casualities:

LT Donald Earl LONDON, 355201/1315, USNR. On 9 December 1951, while flying an F4U, purpose 1B1, cause ABLE, off South Korea collided in the air with LT James Theas PORTERFIELD, Jr., 347037/1315, USNR also flying an F4U-4B. Both officers were killed. Both attached to VF 653. Remains not recovered.

LTJG Harry E. ETTINGER, 504133/1315, USNR (VF 194); Jess R. MCMELROY, 357 84 22, USNR (VF 194); Julian H. GILLILAND, 837 59 86, AT2, USN (VF 194). On 13 December 1951, Wonsan Area, Korea, above personnel flying in AD, purpose 3T1, cause XRAY. Plane last seen in controlled flight with engine smoking - two parachutes seen to open. Plane carried crew of three. The plane was not seen to land or strike the ground because of approaching darkness. All three are reported missing.

LCDR Benjamin Thomas PUGH, 165757/1310, USN (VF 194). On 18 December 1951, off Wonsan Bay, Korea, flying an AD, purpose 1T1 cause CHARLIE. LCDR PUGH successfully ditched aircraft after probably receiving own bomb blast damage. He was observed to abandon aircraft without pararaft. He was dead upon arrival of rescue craft after one hour ten minutes in water, probably from exhaustion and cold.

LT Robert Leroy SOBEY, 368995/1315, USNR (VF 653), On 22 December 1951, one-half mile east of Yonghung, Korea, while flying F4U, purpose 1T1, cause UNIT, plane disintegrated in air during intense AA fire. Remains not recovered.

LT William Mark FRANKOVICH, 437217/1315, USNR (VF 653). On 9 January 1952, 20 miles NW of Yodo-Ri, Korea, while flying in F4U, purpose 1T1, cause TARE, was last seen trying to land on the water off the coast because of engine trouble. Landing or bailout not observed. Reported missing in action.

PART VI

GENERAL COMMENTS

A. AIR DEPARTMENT

1. Aircraft Servicing

Introduction of lube oil into avgas for use in jet aircraft is somewhat of a problem. While the proportioner (FB-100-A) itself operates very satisfactorily, it materially reduces the overall fueling rate and requires that lube oil pumps be operated at high pressure over rather long periods of time. VALLEY FORGE rest spd ltr ser 101 dtd 13 January 1952 outlined two alternate possibilities for introduction of lube oil into the avgas. It is recommended that some activity with the facilities pursue the venturi idea which seems to be the most promising.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

This ship has experienced many of the problems inherent in the use of Mk55 bomb racks. Generally speaking, it is a satisfactory rack for use with prop aircraft. With jet aircraft a better, more positive rack is required. Hung bombs on jets during arrested landings carry away more than 50% of the time. These bombs coming off the Mk55 rack travel up the deck at a high speed usually tumbling end on end. The fuzes are always damaged and in many cases the fuzes have become at least partially armed. While all this is already known it is reiterated again for the benefit of present and future planning, and the necessity for designing bomb racks that will accommodate new type aircraft with their high speeds both in flight and on landing.

2. Aircraft Maintenance

The Sperry Engine Analyzer on board for evaluation has been used enough to justify its inclusion in the Section G allowance list at this time. It is, of course, readily adaptable for use with AD type aircraft but underway the general feeling among the mechanics is that it is simply more trouble to hook up and use that its worth. While the Analyzer is not recommended for carrier use at this time it is recommended that an AD squadron be issued the Analyzer early during the squadron's training period in the states. It is felt that if the mechanics were more familiar with the operation of the Analyzer and more aware of its inherent capabilities they would use it more than enough to justify its being included in the Section G allowance.

3. Aircraft Handling

No new or unusual problems were encountered in aircraft handling. Respotting of jet aircraft is somewhat complicated by the fact that only four gasoline fueling stations can deliver the avgas-lub oil mixture required in the J-42 engine. Close coordination by the Aircraft Handling, Maintenance and Service Officers has solved the problem and made up for inherent deficiencies of the proportioners (FB-100-A) now in use.

The jet barricade has presented no problems and a complete resume of its minor deficiencies and attendant local fixes was covered in detail in VALLEY FORGE rest. ltr ser 68 dtd. 12 January 1952.

Previous to this cruise this ship did not have jet blast deflectors. Consequently most of flight deck personnel were well checked out in the launching and handling of jets. Yet on the one occassion when one blast deflector was out of commission it was obvious that these people who were not familiar with operating procedures without blast deflectors made many mistakes. It is recommended launching jets without the use of a blast deflector or deflectors be made a standard training exercise for inclusion in USF 49 and that this exercise be conducted as part of all Operational Readiness Inspection

Temperature: Air: Maximum---59 F
Minimum---25 F
Average---41 F
Water: (30 Foot depth)
Maximum---62 F
Minimum---39 F
Average---50 F

Cloud Cover:
Clear	26% of observations
Scattered	22% of observations
Broken	23% of observations
Overcast	29% of observations

The predominate cloud form was stratocumulus with bases at 2000-3000 feet.

Visibility: Over 6 miles, 98% of observations.

Precipitation: Precipitation occured on 17 of the 36 days in the period. The most frequent form was snow showers which occurred on 13 days.

During this period the Asiatic high cell is fully developed giving a northerly wind flow over Eastern Asia. This air mass is very cold and dry and as it passes southward over Sea of Japan it becomes unstable, giving scattered snow showers.

With a northerly flow over North Korea, the North Korean highlands cause the wind to divide into a northeasterly flow off Northeast Korean coast, and a westnorthwesterly flow off the East coast between 38th and 40th parallel; A shear line or instability line is formed where these winds rejoin offshore. This shear line has many characteristics of a front with frequent to continuous snow showers, very low ceilings and visibilities. The mean position of the shear line is to the northeast of the operating area, but when a northeasterly flow predominates it moves southwestward to the Korean Coast.

On a few occassions it was necessary to reduce the bomb load carried on the jets due to light winds at launching time.

2. Communications

(a) Facsimile (Aerology Laboratory)

Attempts were made several times daily to copy surface, 700 MB, and Korean briefing charts, transmitted by NDT (Radio Photo Unit #5, Tokyo) and AIF-JPNZ (Tokyo blind weather broadcast).

Good reception was rarely obtained, with poor reception to none prevailing. Poor reception during the day is caused mainly by CW interference and at night by atmospheric interference.

(b) Radioteletype (Radio 1)

On the average, reception was only fair. Interference generally was given as cause for failures, with a few reported instances of mechanical failure. Copy was almost illegible at times due to faulty ribbons.

Pneumatic tube should be installed between main communications and the aerology laboratory to reduce delays and save man-hours in the handling of the multitude of weather messages.

Direct communications between CIC and the aerology laboratory should be installed.

3. Equipment and Supplies

(a) Radiosonde

The radiosonde was temporarily inoperative frequently due to mechanical trouble and local interference. Interference from the tractors on flight deck frequently cut the sounding out entirely.

(b) Other aerological equipment operated satisfactorily.

(c) At present we have 25 full bottles of helium aboard. The normal daily consumption when operating is 2.5 bottles. Re-supply in the forward area is indefinite. Recommendations contained in the Supply Department comments of Part VI are applicable and pertinent.

C. COMBAT INFORMATION

1. Radars

(a) General: All radars operated normally during this period and satisfactory results were obtained. Failures encountered are not considered excessive, but it is felt that most of them were due largely to continued operation. The slave antenna system for Mark V whidh is installed was originally designed for field operations and is not considered entirely suitable for shipboard use. Transformers and Relays were burned out early in this period due to constant overload from heavy winds and since there were no spare parts aboard or in the area there was a resultant loss of the use of Mark V in conjunction with SX radar. This proved to be a real handicap at the time because there was no means of obtaining range rings for air control when utilizing SPS-6B on SX consoles. However, our Electronics Officers had been working on a unit for that purpose and had it completed and operating within a few hours. The results have been excellent, but in case of failure of SPS-6B radar under present arrangement there would be no means of utilizing Mark V without major adjustments.

(b) Specific:

(1) SX was the most dependable all around radar. The CIC experienced considerable interference from same radar on other CV's and some from APS-2Q and ASP planes. Average dependable range for jets closing at altitudes from 10,000 - 25,000 is 40 to 50 miles with 2 or more planes flying together. It is most affected by weather and is good for locating fronts and turbulent type clouds.

(2) SPS-6B was best radar for long range air search having an average dependable range of 70 to 80

(4) SG-7 was determined to be good for short range surface search except for blind spot on starboard bow which is due to position of antenna relative to superstructure of ship.

2. Communications

(a) Cross talk was the most noticeable hindrance to good communications. The Strike Control, ASP control and CAP control frequencies frequently block each other completely and invariably if transmissions were being made simultaneously over two of the above mentioned circuit they were garbled. Enough of the above circuits fed-over into screen common to cause complaint by Flag and ships conn, so a trap was built which eliminated difficulty. It is believed, however, that the cross-talk in Strike, ASP and CAP channels can only be eliminated by use of frequencies more widely separated. It was consistently found that for reliable communications with returning strike planes the best arrangement was the utilization of the TDQ for transmitting and the AN/ARC for receiving. Using this combination, it was possible to establish and maintain communications at eighty miles. It is believed that the sensitivity of the RCKs could be increased if suppressors were installed on all the automotive equipment aboard.

3. Flag Operations

(a) CIC functioned as the Flag CIC for Task Force 77 in the absence of the ESSEX and was able to perform its duties in a satisfactory manner after making several changes in arrangement of speakers and status boards.

4. Recommendations

(a) Most recommendations have been made in the foregoing. However, one need, which has been mentioned in action reports of other ships, and is considered worthy of being mentioned again, is that for more communication equipment.

D. ENGINEERING

After the first heavy weather encountered after leaving Yokosuka, an inspection was made of the ship and the following damage was discovered, which is presumed to have been caused by the heavy weather:

a. A crack, about 45" long, was found in the skin of the ship at Frame 41 port under the gun sponson. This crack extends through two welded plates. It will be repaired by welding during availability.

b. A longitudinal support member at frame 27 starboard, in stateroom 201, is cracked through the web. This longitudinal is not a main strength member. It will be repaired by welding during availibility.

c. A 3" crack in welded seam, Frame 29 starboard, in deck of compartment A-704-A which is immediately above fuel tank A-902-F. This was repaired by welding.

E. INTELLIGENCE

urged that the full support of the Air Group embarked, be the primary duty of the Photographic Interpretor assigned to the ship. Close cooperation of the Intelligence section and the Photographic Interpretation section is necessary to produce photographic material for briefing purposes.

2. Operations

Upon arriving in the operating area, there were certain inadequacies apparent that should be noted. Difficulty was experienced in gathering current operational information in time to prepare briefs for the initial combat flights. Comprehensive briefs to new Intelligence teams should be scheduled so that information can be properly prepared for the first days of operation.

Personnel and physical space problems that were encountered at the outset of operations have gradually been overcome. Briefing and debriefing spaces in each ready room should be completed before deployment.

The major portion of briefing is concentrated on accurate flak information in assigned target areas. Due to the increase in the volume and accuracy of anti-aircraft fire this section of the briefing becomes increasingly important. Plotting flak on 1:50,000 scale maps and pointing out surrounding terrain features is standard practice. The use of current annotated mosaics for briefing purposes and for actual pilot use is preferable. It is suggested that debrief flak, FEAF flak reports, Air Force flak reports and current photographic flak analysis be compiled on a system of 1:50,000 scale maps with a careful system of maintenance by type and date. Additional information of each position can be carried in a Flak Log.

3. Search and Rescue:

During the period of this operation we had six pilots who ditched in the water and none that elected to ditch on the beach. Of these six, four were successfully rescued, one is believed to have spun in, and the other remained in the water without his life raft one hour and ten minutes, a period much longer than usually required to effect a rescue.

It is expected that the new Mark III exposure suit, currently available through ComFairJap, will greatly increase the pilots ability to successfully resist exposure until rescue facilities arrive.

The present facilities of helicopters and ships along the East Coast for SAR purposes generally form an accepted minimum of rescue facilities in this area. The optimum distribution is, one at the bombline, one in Wonsan Harbor, one at either Hungnam or Songjin for a total of three. These facilities, together with Air Force helicopters available at or near the bombline, form a great morale boost for all pilots flying in the area.

The establishment of Dumbo facilities along the East Coast is considered highly desirable.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

4. Evasion and Escape

Due to the classified nature of information on this subject it is considered that the Escape and Evasion Officer, Staff ComNavFE, should disseminate this intelligence. He is prepared to come aboard any carrier in Yokosuka, Japan for lectures, or, he may proceed with the ship to the operating area and give his lectures enroute.. Usually he is accompanied by two or more members of the Air Force who have recently been rescued from behind enemy lines. It is strongly urged that he be contacted for information on current escape and evasion methods.

Headquarters, Far East Air Force makes available, through the regular Navy Distribution list, current written reports on the debriefing of all personnel that have escaped or evaded. It is suggested that these publications be given wide pilot dissemination.

5. Reports

Reports are submitted in accordance with pertinent instructions contained in the NAVAL AIR WARFARE REPORTING MANUAL (OPNAV Instr. 3480.1) and CTF 77 Operations Order #22-51 Revised.

F. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION

1. Ships Photo Interpretation Staff

One experienced photographic interpreter (LCDR) and one trained enlisted man (QM2) are assigned to the ship for photographic interpretation duties. The volume of aerial photography necessitated the assignment of two additional officers to aid in the photographic interpretation work. Neither officer had training in photo interpretation but have shown great aptitude in carrying out their assigned duties. Additional aid in photographic interpretation of great value was obtained from the Photographic Detachment, VC-61 H.

2. The space assigned to the ships photo interpreter is in the ship's Air Intelligence Office and proves inadequate for the volume of work assigned. Additional spaces were used as conditions permitted. The VC-61 H photo detachment utilized the ozlid room for much of their interpretation work, primarily that of flak analysis and target search.

3. Photographic Interpretation Duties

Flash Report: All aerial photography assigned to the ship must be studied as promptly as possible to send out the necessary flash report on damage assessment, condition of enemy A/F and

rail routes were prepared in a form easily carried by the pilots. Studies of flak positions were double checked in all cases.

Target Search: The constant desire for suitable dump targets and targets for strike purposes constantly required the attention of the photo interpreters. All such targets were reported in the flash report and annotated photographs and mosaics were prepared as often as possible. The photo detachment, VC-61 H, aided the ship's P.I. and devoted a considerable amount of their time to target search.

Damage Assessment Photography: Damage assessments on all bridges, RR and other strike targets was reported by dispatch when photography was available. The largest number of aerial photographs examined have been for the purpose of making damage assessment reports.

Additional Photography: Flash interpretation of all photography was made and reported by dispatch. Photos have been taken and studied for search and rescue.

K-25 Strike Photography: The utilization of K-25 photos for strike damage assessment has been hindered by the availability of only 2 pods that were usable during this period, the small scale of the photos and the lack of clarity in the prints. This and other problems have been ironed out in part.

4. Conclusions

The volume of aerial photography has posed numerous problems. Personnel and space inadequacies have been solved in part by improvision. Due to the excessive volume of production of aerial reconnaissance photography, the varying quality of photographic paper, and other difficulties encountered by the photo lab, the quality of aerial prints did not always meet the standard necessary for much of the work done. The problems of photo interpretation for the ship were considerably increased due to the extensive support required in furnishing prints to ships along the east coast of Korea.

It is recommended as a solution to the problems that an Interpron Unit in daily contact with the fleet be established to carry out much of the photographic and interpretation work now carried on by carriers in the force.

G. PHOTOGRAPHIC LABORATORY

1. General:

No provision had been made for the large increase of Aerial Reconnaissance Photography since the ship last operated in the Korean Theater.

Additional space was needed to identify and annotate the film as well as equipment to process and dry it. The allowance of 4 developing outfits (S/N E18D163-120) was not enough to overcome

[redacted] SECURITY INFORMATION

The copying, by photography, of maps and charts for pilot use has assumed a major role in the present operations. An average of 10 copy negatives and 281 prints from these maps are made on each operating day with a peak works load of 33 negatives and 1303 8x10" prints in 24 hours.

In addition to the K-17 reconnaissance work, the Photo Lab also handles the K-25 strike photography on an average of 3 rolls per day. A flash print (Sonne) is made and delivered to the Photo Office of the respective Squadron concerned. The co-ordinate numbers are marked on the flash print, the print is then delivered to the Ship's PI Officer who selects prints to be made for distribution. The K-25 negatives are marked as per Manual of Photography instructions and 10 8.10" SWG enlargements are made from each negative selected for distribution.

2. Peak Work Load Information

The exposed film is delivered to the Photo Lab upon landing.

The film is processed, washed, and dried.

One flash Sonne Print is made and sent to ship's P.I. Officer for checking.

After the print is checked, the film is then marked by the VC-61 Unit with all necessary annotation and returned to the Photo Lab for printing.

From each roll of marked film, 10 Sonne Prints are made and three additional on all surface interdiction targets.

Processing Time Test Chart

The time schedule below is for a "peak work day".

Number of exposures - 227

Time received in Photo Lab	1145
Entered Developing Room	1145
Left Developing Room	1230
Entered Dryer	1231
Left Dryer	1250
Entered Print Room	1250
Delivered to A. I.	1340

Roll No.	Time Rec'd in Lab	Flash Print to PI	Neg to Photo Unit	Neg retur.	Smooth prints	No. expos.	Total No.

3. Work Accomplished During Present Operating Period:

K-17 film rolls developed	80
9½x9½" aerial prints made	106,777
8x10" prints from K-25 negatives	847
Prints, assorted sizes, from ro tine negatives such as Flight Deck Operations, copies, RUDM, PIO, etc.	8,467
Total Prints	116,091
Film transparencies (4x5" to 1fx22")	1,110
Gun camera film processed	22,000 ft.

H. SUPPLY DEPARTMENT

1. Aviation Supply

This ship deployed with about 98% of aviation items per applicable allowance lists on board. Non-critical and non-insurance items were stocked to 180 days with applied wartime conversion factor. Critical and insurance items were stocked to 90 days with no wartime conversion factor. Only two AOG's were experienced because of shortage of outfitting items as per basic allowance list. One casual item was F4U-4 wings; the other, HO3S-1 main rotor assembly. The first item was not obtainable in WestPac, the second is apparently not readily available in the system. More AOG's for this cause were prevented by maximum effort and improvisation by Air Task Group ONE maintenance personnel.

The balance of AOG's were caused by (1) non-allowance list items and (2) usage above allowance list quantities. About 10 AOG's were in the first category and about 8 in the second. Usage above allowance quantities arises from (1) heavier operating schedules than those anticipated at the time allowances were prepared, (2) anti-aircraft fire damage not anticipated by present allowance lists, (3) use of aircraft on advanced service tours, (4) too exacting an interpretation of the "Insurance" item concept to deployment outfittings, and (5) cold weather operations. It is expected that the new reporting system just inaugurated by ComAirPac and AMO Oakland will result in consideration of these factors in allowance lists. It is also expected that the new reporting system will highlight the need for flexibility in application of allowance lists upon outfitting in order that the outfit will be conformed to anticipated actual operating conditions, such as those outlined above, to the extent possible.

During the short period experience, COD delivery of urgently required spares has been disappointing. The few AOG items specifically requested for delivery by COD averaged eight days from time of submission of dispatch until the time items were received aboard. No recommendation is possible by the ship on this point since the reasons for delay are not apparent.

Intra-force emergency support in all categories of material,

2. GSK

Usage of helium for aerological soundings is high and variable. Consequently, although this ship carries sixty-six cylinders, because of the usage and the importance of aerological reports to a CV's operations it is highly desirable to replenish helium stocks at every opportunity and necessary to replenish those stocks at least once during a thirty to forty day period at sea. During the recent period it was possible to obtain 8 cylinders at one replenishment. During other replenishments, tanker loadings were such that only 2 or 3 cylinders were available. It is recommended that standard tanker loadings be reviewed and that, if other considerations permit, sufficient stocks of helium be put aboard tankers so that ten cylinders per CV are available at each replenishment.

For the information of CV's deploying in the future, allowances of special winter clothing are inconsistent with cold weather needs in this area. Separate report in reply to ComAirPac Supply Support Questionaire is being made on this subject. The allowances for trousers, winter underwear and face masks are excessive. Only personnel continuously and directly exposed to launching and landing wind draw these items. As a consequence, a considerable storage problem arises. On the other hand, almost everyone periodically requires an N-1 Jacket for wear on replenishment working parties, etc. When this requirement is combined with a sizing problem, the 75% allowance is inadequate. A 100% allowance is recommended for jackets.

3. Disbursing

Under restrictions as to currency used in NavFE area, one dollar MPC certificates and U.S. nickels tend to disappear from Ship's Store change. A beginning inventory of 4000 MPC ones and $800 in nickles, if a CV uses nickels in Ship's Store operations is recommended.

4. Ship's Store

The following are recommended items to be stocked in quantities sufficient for the whole cruise before deploying:

a. Items of minor operational spares, such as spare parts for Tailor Shop sewing machine and for patching machine in the Cobbler Shop.

b. Repair parts for Barber Shop's electric clippers.

c. Spare mangle aprons and an extra bleach crock for laundry.

d. Laundry supplies, to extent permitted by space.

4. Three extra hand irons for laundry finishing work.

5. Clothing and Small Stores.

The demand for underclothing has been two to three times that

soup available for unrestricted issue around the clock. It has been found that, while operating, the availability of soup at all hours has resulted in a 20% reduction in meat consumption at noon meals.

For the information of supply officers without experience in the operating area, provisioning at sea is very efficient. For use in estimating time requirements for provision loading, a good factor for first experience is 1.2 minutes per ton of provisions to be transferred.

In preparing provision requisitions, the ship has considerable difficulty anticipating what items will be available. If practicable, it is recommended that the replenishing task element send out, prior to the time requisitions from the task force are requested, a dispatch detailing items of provisions which will be available at replenishment. Confining this dispatch to fresh and frozen items would probably suffice.

Related to the above, there has been some experience of "forced issues" by provisiong ships. The need for moving stocks off provision ships is appreciated. In view of the fact that directives require that ships provision to capacity, forced issued of chilled or frozen items could result in an impossible storage problem for the provisioning ship. It is believed that the recommendation under above is a solution to this problem as well.

There has been considerable delay in receipt of invoices after receipt of the related provisions at sea. Unit prices and confirmation of quanitities are desirable for record purposes as early as possible, at any time, and particularly at the end of an accounting period. It is requested that provision ships emphasize timely preparation of invoices and guard mail delivery after at sea delivery of provisions.

On at least one occasion of at sea provisioning, this ship was not issued fresh fruits which had been requisitioned and stocks of which were broken out on topside of the provisioning ship. In order to avoid misunderstanding, it is recommended that task force ships be advised of the basis for rationing of desirable provision items as between ships of a force or as between ships at different locations.

I. COMMUNICATIONS

1. Radio:

During the period covered by this report the radio facilities handled approximately 13,000 messages, exclusive of service messages and relays. The volume of radio communications during the portion of this period when this vessel was the flagship of Commander Task Force 77 taxed the capacity of available personnel and equipment. During such time, the personnel on duty in Radio I were required to stand watches in Condition TWO in order to cover all designated circuits. In the main, the communications personnel performed excellently, and rapid communications were conducted satisfactorily. However, towards the end of the period the operators were beginning to become overtired and listless from

The assignment of the full complement of communications personnel is necessary to enable this command to fulfill its requirements satisfactorily when serving as the Task Force flagship. It is highly desirable to enable radio personnel to maintain Condition THREE in order to avoid an increase in the ratio of errors and diminishing reliability of communications resulting from excess fatigue and listlessness from sustained watch standing in Condition ONE. The training program being conducted will relieve the personnel situation in time provided adequate numbers of non-rated personnel with aptitude are assigned to communications duty.

The shortage of radio transmitters caused traffic to be delayed on numerous occasions. Excessive sparking from planes on the forward portion of the flight deck by reason of the radiated field from the TBA transmitter on frequencies around 10 megacycles forced the securing of this transmitter pending field-strength investigations. After obtaining rough data on field strengths at various levels of power outputs, it was determined that this transmitter might be safely operated with reduced power output pending the procurement of complete data on field strengths. The four TCA transmitters located in Radio II and Radio III proved unsatisfactory for long range communications and for CW transmission.

Unless field strength tests dictate otherwise, it is recommended that a radio room to house the TBA transmitter be built on the 07 level just forward of the stacks and that this transmitter be removed to that location. It is further recommended that the TCS transmitters be replaced by TDE, TBL, or TBM transmitters.

The two TDQ and RCK equipments installed in Radio II proved unreliable by reason of the whips which must be lowered to a horizontal position beneath the flight deck level during air operations. Accordingly, it is recommended that these equipments be removed to the island and that the antennae therefore be located on the mast structure. Moreover, under existing operating conditions in a Carrier Task Force, three additional VHF equipments are desired.

By separate correspondence, this command has pointed out the added need for three additional UHF equipment. The three complete UHF equipments (TDZ/RDZ) now installed were augmented by setting up a model MAR equipment in Radio VII. One of the three RDZ antennas was used with the latter equipment. All existing TDZ/RDZ equipments were operated continuously on three different frequencies, and the MAR was held in immediate readiness on the most important of these frequencies. Failures of the TDZ transmitters necessitated the use of the MAR with acceptable results. However, it is believed that more satisfactory performance would be obtained from additional TDZ or TED (preferably TED) equipment than can be expected from the MAR.

2. Visual:

Visual communications were conducted satisfactorily. At times screening ships were extremely slow in hoisting signals transmitted by the OTC using flag hoist. It is probable that such delays were occasioned by shortages of signal personnel precluding continuous guard on OTC or responsible relay ship and

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SECURITY INFORMATION

that use of the 24MC system is preferable to sound-powered telephone. However, the advisability of installing voice tubes between these spaces should receive further consideration as a possibly more satisfactory channel.

Oscar Pederson
OSCAR PEDERSON

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USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)
USS PRINCETON (CV-37)
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ComSerPac

USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV45/A9-4
Serial: 060

27 February 1952

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ UNCLASSIFIED

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division FIVE
(2) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, FAR EAST
(5) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 30 January 1952 through 22 February 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV Instruction 3480.5 dated 1 July 1952

Encl: (1) Commander, CATG ONE conf ltr ser 05 dated 27 Feb 1952 p.14

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period of 30 January through 22 February 1952 is hereby submitted:

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

In compliance with CTF 77 dispatch 162350Z of January 1952, the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), CAPTAIN OSCAR PEDERSON Commanding, with ComCarDiv FIVE (REAR ADMIRAL F.W. MC MAHON) embarked, departed Yokosuka, Japan, for the operating area on 30 January 1952.

On 1 February 1952 the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) joined Task Force 77 close to the 38th Parallel on the east coast of Korea. The Task Force was commanded by REAR ADMIRAL JOHN PERRY, ComCarDiv ONE, aboard the USS ESSEX (CV-9) and operated under Task Force 77 Operation Order 22-51 (2nd Revision) dated 6 December 1951. It was composed of USS ESSEX (CV-9), USS ANTIETAM (CV-36), USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), USS ST PAUL (CA-73), USS RADFORD (DDE-446), USS O'BANNON (DDE-450), USS FLETCHER (DDE-445), USS H.J. THOMAS (DDR-833), USS SHELTON (DD-790), USS J.E. KYES (DD-787), USS S.N. MOORE (DD-747) and USS MADDOX (DD-731).

On 20 February 1952 the USS VALLEY FORGE departed Task Force 77 in accordance with ComTask Force 77 dispatch 160226Z and arrived in Yokosuka, Japan 22 February 1952 for a period of maintenance and upkeep.

The mission of Task Force 77 was as follows:

(1) Conduct air operations from an operating area off the

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SECURITY INFORMATION

(4) Provide air spot to bombardment forces when directed.

(5) Conduct photo and visual reconnaissance as required.

(6) Coordinate air operations with the 5th Air Force through JOC, Korea.

(7) Exchange intelligence information with friendly naval forces engaged in surface interdiction operations on the east coast of Korea.

Commander Carrier Air Task Group ONE is CDR C.H. CRABILL, Jr., USN. The Group had the following on-board count of pilots and aircraft at the beginning of flight operations on 2 February 1952.

SQUADRON	NO. OF PILOTS	NO. OF AIRCRAFT
VF 52	22	13 F9F-2
VF 111	23	14 F9F-2
VF 194	27	8 AD-2 7 AD-3
VF 653	26	17 F4U-4
VC 3 (Detachment)	5	3 F4U-5N
VC 11 (Detachment)	5	3 AD-4W
VC 35 (Detachment)	5	1 AD-4N 3 AD-4NL
		2 AD-2Q
VC 61 (Detachment)	4	3 F9F-2P
HU 1 (Detachment)	2	1 HO 3S
TOTAL	119	75

PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

1-30-52: At 0800 the ship departed Yokosuka for the operating area.

1-31-52: The ship was enroute to the operating area. Shipboard training exercises were conducted.

2-1-52: Replenishment day. The ship joined Task Force 77.

2-2-52: Air operations were conducted for the first day of the present period. LCDR W.H. ROGERS, VC 11 Detachment and two crewmen narrowly escaped a serious accident when the catapult ring broke during turnup, and the ice-covered deck denied the full use of brakes. Their AD-4W made a power take-off in only 137 feet of deck space, actually touched the water off the bow, but remained airborne and completed the assigned mission. LT R. HERMAN, VF 653, ditched his F4U within the landing pattern of the ship when his plane caught fire as he was returning to the ship for landing. He was recovered by the VALLEY FORGE helicopter, suffering mild shock, exposure, and minor burns about the face. LTJG P.P. PIERSON, VF 653, attempting a normal deck-run take-off in his F4U, engaged his tail wheel in Davis barrier No. ...

2-3-52: Air operations continued. A total of 83 sorties were flown. LTJG N.J. JOHNSON, VF 194, was shot down in his AD by flak just south of Hungnam. He was rescued in good condition by Monte Carlo helicopter (BELTING (LST 799)) about 45 minutes later. LT R.S. GEFFEL, VF 653, was hit by flak near Hungnam but managed to continue his flight to Wonsan Harbor where he ditched his F4U. He was picked up uninjured by the BELTING (LST 799) helicopter. A record number of 80 rail cuts were made this date. Six bridges were destroyed, and a small village containing military supplies was bombed. Numerous secondary explosions were noted and severe fires burned for several hours afterwards. At least 10 large storage buildings were completely destroyed. A total of 50 sorties were flown. 51 rail cuts were made in addition to other interdiction destruction of targets of opportunity.

2-8-52: Air operations began with a dawn launch of a RESCAP to cover the USS ROCHESTER (CA 124) helicopter's attempt to rescue LTJG H.E. ETTINGER, VC 35 Detachment. He had been shot down 13 December 1951 in the Kojo area south of Wonsan and was now in the hands of friendly guerrilla forces. Information received indicated he was in dire need of medical attention. On the first attempt the helicopter from USS ROCHESTER (CA 124) crashed at the scene. During RESCAP operation LT M.P. MC KENNA, VC 3 Detachment, was hit by flak and was last seen heading his F4U-5N seaward over Kojo Bay. LT MC KENNA is listed as missing in action. Five of the six planes on the RESCAP were hit by flak. LT M.E. SCHLUTER, VC 35 Detachment, was forced to land at K-50; all other proceeded to K-18. On a second attempt made immediately after word was received of the misfortune of the first helicopter, the helicopter from BELTING (LST 799) was badly damaged by flak and forced to return to the USS ST PAUL (CA 73). Rescue attempts at this scene were suspended for the remainder of the day. At about the same time, approximately 20 miles west of Kowon, ENSIGN M.S. BROOMHEAD, VF 194, was shot down by flak and crash-landed his AD on a mountain side. A RESCAP was immediately formed and maintained over him. He appeared to be badly hurt about the legs. The helicopter from the USS MANCHESTER (CL-83) attempted to rescue him but unfortunately crashed at the scene. Later, two people were observed carrying a third person up the hillside. A second helicopter furnished by JOC Korea arrived approximately 2 hours later but intense flak, high head winds, and approaching darkness forced him to retire with no success. Rescue operations were then suspended for the day. Relatively little damage was inflicted on the enemy due to diversion of most events to RESCAP. A total of 70 missions were flown.

2-9-52: Task Force 77 replenished at sea. At dawn 8 props were launched to search the rescue areas of the previous day. The planes operated from K-18 to take maximum advantage of daylight. No activity was noticed at either area. All signs indicated the probable capture of ENSIGN BROOMHEAD and the two helicopter crewmen with him. ENSIGN BROOMHEAD is listed as missing in action.

2-10-52: Air operations resumed. LT R. TAYLOR, VC 3 Detachment was hit by flak and landed his badly damaged F4U-5N at K-18. A total of 79 sorties were flown on which 49 rail cuts were made.

2-11-52: Air operations continued. 74 missions were flown

2-13-52: Task Force 77 replenished at sea.

2-14-52: Air operations resumed but were cancelled in the early afternoon because of unfavorable weather. A total of 32 sorties were flown and 35 rail cuts were scored. The Skyraiders and Corsairs destroyed 4 bridges during the morning operations.

2-15-52: Air operations were cancelled because of unfavorable weather.

2-16-52: Air operations were cancelled because of unfavorable weather.

2-17-52: With the advent of good flying weather, air operations were resumed. A total of 75 sorties were flown. The score for the day read: 97 rail cuts, 3 locomotives destroyed, 28 troops killed, 22 oxcarts destroyed and 5 RR bridges badly damaged.

2-18-52: Air operations continued. 76 missions were flown scoring a total of 46 rail cuts. The VALLEY FORGE and PHILIPPINE SEA teamed up on a special mission against a barracks concentration at Pungsan. The resultant score was 45 buildings destroyed, 20 severely damaged and 18 received minor damage.

2-19-52: Air operations continued. 68 sorties were flown, scoring 75 rail cuts, killing 121 troops, destroying 21 buildings, 15 oxcarts, 4 RR bridges, and inflicting other minor damage. LTJG D.F. TATUM, VF 52, was last seen as he crashed his F9F into a mountain following a glide bombing run on a rail cut. His plane exploded upon impact and LTJG TATUM is listed killed in action. His aircraft is presumed to have been hit by flak. LT W.P. JOHNSON, VF 111, ditched his F9F near the ship because of a flame-out and was picked up by VALLEY FORGE helicopter.

2-20-52: Task Force 77 replenished at sea and upon being relieved by the USS ESSEX (CV-9) and USS ANTIETAM (CV-36), the VALLEY FORGE together with the PHILIPPINE SEA departed for port at Yokosuka, Japan.

PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

A. Ammunition Expended:

2,000# G.P. Bombs	15
1,000# G.P. Bombs	479
500# G.P. Bombs	112
250# G.P. Bombs	1,810
100# G.P. Bombs	1,102
5" HVAR Rockets	250
Flares (Mark 5 & 6)	86
Napalm	45
220/260# Frag	48
20mm Ammunition	80,200
.50 Cal. Ammunition	106,460

PART IV

B. Damage to Aircraft:

No. of Planes	Types	Causes
5	F4U-4	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
18	AD-2(3)	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
2	AD-4NL	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
18	F9F-2	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
1	F9F-2P	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
1	F4U-5N	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.

C. Loss of Aircraft:

Date	Squadron	Type	Bu.No.	Causes
2-2	VF 653	F4U-4	82038	On fire from fuel leak. Ditched.
2-2	VF 653	F4U-4	97277	Crashed on take-off and burned. Jettisioned.
2-3	VF 653	F4U-4	81764	Enemy AA fire. Ditched at sea.
2-3	VF 194	AD-3	122269	Enemy AA fire. Crashed in enemy territory.
2-4	VF 194	AD-2	122327	Enemy AA fire. Ditched at sea.
2-8	VF 194	AD-3	122842	Enemy AA fire. Crashed in enemy territory.
2-8	VC 3	F4U-5N	124495	Enemy AA fire. Missing in action.
2-19	VF 111	F9F-2	127165	Enemy AA fire. Crashed into mountain.
2-19	VF 52	F9F-2	127203	Flame out. Ditched at sea.

D. Damage inflicted on Enemy:

	Destroyed	Damaged
Trucks	61	45
Cars	1	0
Locomotives	3	1
Oxcarts	60	0
Factories	0	1
Warehouses	4	0
Barracks and Buildings	109	42
Gun Emplacements	18	1
Oxen	29	0
Villages	0	2
Bunkers	2	0
RR Cars	46	42
RR Bridges	15	5
RR By-passes	12	0
Observation Post	1	0
Lumber Piles	30	0
M/Y Yards	25	0
Rail Cuts	691	
Troops Killed	171	

The above mentioned table represents a conservative estimate of the actual damage inflicated on the enemy during this operational period. Only those instances where the damage could be assessed by the pilot were used in compiling this table. There were many

B. Damage to Aircraft:

No. of Planes	Types	Causes
5	F4U-4	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
18	AD-2(3)	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
2	AD-4NL	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
18	F9F-2	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
1	F9F-2P	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
1	F4U-5N	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.

C. Loss of Aircraft:

Date	Squadron	Type	Bu.No.	Causes
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2-2	VF 653	F4U-4	97277	Crashed on take-off and burned. Jettisioned.
2-3	VF 653	F4U-4	81764	Enemy AA fire. Ditched at sea.
2-3	VF 194	AD-3	122269	Enemy AA fire. Crashed in enemy territory.
2-4	VF 194	AD-2	122327	Enemy AA fire. Ditched at sea.
2-8	VF 194	AD-3	122842	Enemy AA fire. Crashed in enemy territory.
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D. Damage inflicted on Enemy:

	Destroyed	Damaged
Trucks	61	45
Cars	1	0
Locomotives	3	1
Oxcarts	60	0
Factories	0	1
Warehouses	4	0
Barracks and Buildings	109	42
Gun Emplacements	18	1
Oxen	29	0
Villages	0	2
Bunkers	2	0
RR Cars	46	42
RR Bridges	15	5
RR By-passes	12	0
Observation Post	1	0
Lumber Piles	30	0
M/Y Yards	25	0
Rail Cuts	691	
Troops Killed	171	

The above mentioned table represents a conservative estimate of the actual damage inflicated on the enemy during this operational period. Only those instances where the damage could be assessed by the pilot were used in compiling this table. There were many

PART V

PERSONNEL

A. Performance:

Personnel performance continued to be excellent. Likewise, morale of the ship's company continued high.

The average on-board count of enlisted personnel during the operating period was 1892, of which 32 were away on temporary additional duty and 10 away from the ship on emergency leave. The total losses for various causes were 22, fifteen of which were petty officer ratings. The total gains were 46, all of which were non-rated personnel, which were badly needed. The petty officer shortages in the electronics, engineering, gunnery, and communication ratings continues critical. A vigorous on-the-job training program for non-rated men and third class petty officers is being prosecuted by all Departments. Likewise, each Department is examining personnel duty assignments to ensure the most efficient employment of personnel to obtain the maximum savings in man-hours.

The comments in the last VALLEY FORGE Action Report concerning the assignment of a Protestant and a Catholic chaplain to CV's deployed in a combat area still apply. It is noted with appreciation that a Catholic chaplain is being assigned to the ship. During this period, to meet the lack of a Catholic chaplain for Sunday services, the exchange of Protestant and Catholic chaplains by helicopter between this ship and the PHILIPPINE SEA and ANTIETAM was carried out when in company. The response of the respective ship's companies was enthusiastic. Our practice of the delivery of a brief prayer by the ship's chaplain at tattoo each evening, over the 1MC circuit, was continued. Comments received indicated an appreciative response.

B. Recreation:

The daily program of seven showings of motion pictures was continued for a total of 168 showings for this period.

A daily program of recorded music, news broadcasts, miscellaneous interviews, and re-broadcast of Armed Forces Radio programs from Tokyo was carried out over the ship's RBO system.

The hobby shop program was sustained throughout the period, with rewarding results.

A staff was appointed and work was begun on a ship's cruise book. The printing will be done in Tokyo in accordance with arrangements concluded by the ship's Chaplain during the last in-port period in Yokosuka.

When the ship returned Yokosuka, full advantage was taken by officers and enlisted men of the rest hotels in the area; it is considered highly beneficial for the maximum number of the Air Group to get off the ship and go to a rest camp for a portion of each in-port period. More applicants for this valuable form of recreation than reservations always exist.

More athletic facilities are needed in the Yokosuka area. Although athletic facilities do exist they are not believed adequate for both shore-based activities and ship personnel. In particular, more basketball courts, volleyball courts, softball and baseball diamonds are needed. At present there are no handball or squash courts. An indoor swimming pool is needed not only for recreation, but for survival training and swimming instruction. It is believed that the addition of more athletic facilities will do much toward reducing further the V.D. rate. The present lack of athletic facilities makes it difficult for AIRPAC units to carry out the AIRPAC Inter/Intra-Mural Athletic Program.

C. Mail:

During this operating period the capacity of the Post Office was increased considerably by a modification which consisted of moving the inboard bulkhead further inboard and by providing storage space for mail bags under the ventilation trunk adjoining the Post Office. Rearrangement of the lighting fixtures resulted in improved lighting. The speed and efficiency of mail handling has been noticeably improved by these simple expedients.

Only 97 bags of U.S. Mail were received on this ship during the entire period of this operation. Few, if any, addressed newspapers and magazines were delivered in the operating area. No mail was sent to the operating area during the last week of operations for delivery to this ship, although 10 bags previously dispatched and held by one of the replenishment ships was delivered on 20 Feb 1952.

D. Casualities:

LT John Patrick MC KENNA, VC 3 Detachment, 460267/1315, USNR. On 8 Feb 1952, while flying an F4U-4, purpose 1X3, cause TARE, he was last seen heading south over Kojo Bay, North Korea. LT MC KENNA was reported missing in action.

ENSIGN Marvin "S" BROOMHEAD, VF 194, 538977/1325, USNR. On 8 Feb 1952, while flying an AD, purpose 1T1, cause TARE, he crash landed in remote area of enemy territory thirty miles northwest Wonsan, Korea. He was known to be alive, but injured, on that date. ENSIGN BROOMHEAD was reported missing in action.

ENSIGN Richard Delbert JENSEN, VF 653, 537907/1325, USNR. On 11 Feb 1952 while flying an F4U, purpose 1T1, cause TARE, he crashed 1.5 miles southeast of Munchon, North Korea. His plane was seen to explode upon impact with ground. He was reported as killed in action.

LTJG David Franklin TATUM, VF 52, 506484/1315, USNR. On 19 Feb 1952, while flying an F9F-2, purpose 1T1, cause TARE, he crashed into mountain side during run on target, probably the result of AA fire. His plane was seen to explode upon impact with the ground. LTJG TATUM was reported killed in action.

During a deck run take-off from the 570 foot position the tail wheel assembly of an F4U picked up the engaging straps of Davis-rigged Number 4 barrier (Banshee webbing). The barrier was in the normal down position. The Davis-rigged barrier (Banshee webbing) has a normal tendency to lift about three inches off the deck when any type prop aircraft take-off across it. To prevent the reoccurance of this freak accident five bungees are rigged from tie-down track to the tie-down track across the engaging straps of the Banshee webbing. This fix prevents lifting due to prop blast on take-offs.

2. Aircraft Maintenance:

No comments.

3. Aircraft Servicing:

No comments.

B. Operations:

1. Air Operations:

In the interest of more efficient communications with aircraft, it is recommended that an AN/ARC 1 be installed in Air Operations. Such an installation would allow more effective utilization of the TDQ transmitters and RCK receivers now piped into Air Operations on remote position units by releasing them for use by the ship and flag based aboard. An AN/ARC 1 would permit more flexibility than now possible in controlling aircraft from other ships. The AN/ARC 1 is generally easier to maintain than the other radio units.

2. Aerology:

During the period 1 February to 20 February 1952, inclusive, the normal winter weather pattern prevailed, except for 14 to 16 February, inclusive. In this latter period the Asiatic high cell was centered far to the north and the polar trough was north of the mean winter position resulting in an easterly to northeasterly air flow over the operating area. During this period the weather in the operating and target areas were non-operations.

a. Communications:

(1) Facsimile (Aerology Laboratory):

The facsimile reception was more satisfactory than during January, but is still poor much of the time.

(2) Radioteletype:

Reception was average.

(3) Radio (CW Radio I):

CW reception of weather was only fair.

(4) Recommendations:

b. Equipment and Supplies:

(1) Radiosonde:

The radiosonde was frequently inoperative for short periods of time due to mechanical trouble and local interference. Interference from the tractors on the flight deck frequently cut the sounding out entirely, and it is recommended that these tractors have suppressors installed to eliminate this source of interference.

Other aerological equipment operated satisfactorily.

3. Combat Information Center:

a. Radars:

(1) General:

The performance of all radars was considerably better than during the preceding period on the line. There were no serious maintenance problems.

b. Specific:

SX - The SX radar is still considered the best all-purpose radar and was in use continuously except for the regular maintenance checks.

SPS-6B - The SPS-6B radar is best for long range air search, especially for small groups of jets and aircraft at high altitudes. Returning strike groups of jet aircraft were normally detected and tracked from 70 to 85 miles out. As has been noted in the reports of other ships this radar is adversely affected by high relative winds.

SU - The SU radar gave excellent performance during the entire period and is the most reliable of our surface search radars.

XSG-7 - The XSG-7 radar is very good for medium and short range surface search but is not completely dependable because of the blind spot on the starboard bow due to the location of the antenna.. There also has been considerable trouble as a result of halyards becoming entangled in the SG antenna.

c. Communications:

Considerable improvement was noted during this period in ship-to-aircraft communications. Some difficulty is presently being experienced with the AN/ARCs located in CIC which could possibly be due to the location of the antenna. The URD in CIC has been of little or no value during this period because it is not reliable beyond 35 miles. It has been determined that this is due largely to the constant vibration of the antenna in its present location.

d. Flag Operations:

CIC served as the Flag CIC for Task Force 77 during this

The continued operation of all available transmitters again reduced the opportunities for routine maintenance and required restoration of breakdowns under great pressure, as in the preceding operating period.

The same comments as to the Communications complement and as to changes in equipment which were set forth in the last action report are still applicable. The shortage of qualified radio operators is keenly felt, although the school-graduate strikers are progressing very satisfactorily. The non-school-graduate strikers are showing creditable progress, but cannot be given as adequate training as would be liked due to the heavy work load of operations.

b. Visual:

No comments.

5. Air Intelligence:

The often-reported defensive tactic of the use of mobile flak, has been again observed. Different flights over the same assigned track sector reported new positions and photo analysis substantiated these reports. The type of weapon noted has been predominantly the 37mm. Small arms fire continues to be used effectively against low-flying aircraft. An analysis of flak damage sustained during this operating period is included in the ATG-1 section of this report.

The primary assignment during this period has been rail cutting. This mission has been successfully carried out. The rapidity with which rails all along the East Coast have been repaired indicates an increasingly flexible and efficient repair organization.

a. Survival:

The following recommendation is made with regard to the debriefing of aviators who have been forced to ditch in the Korean area:

> Upon arrival in Yokosuka the pilots should be sent to COMNAVFE, Tokyo for further interrogation by Navy-Air Force survival personnel and comprehensive reports routed by means of the distribution list to all interested United Nation Commands.

ATG-1 pilots have been partially fitted with the new Mark III Exposure Suit which has been a great improvement over the old type suit. Some difficulties have been experienced with the Mark III, and an elaboration on these points are included in the ATG-1 section of this report.

6. Photo Interpretation:

Thirty-four photo missions were flown against the enemy during the operating period. The missions were flown for route condition,

The construction of mosaics required considerable time. The use of previously constructed mosaics in the plotting of flak from more recent photography proved satisfactory and resulted in a large saving of time. It was found desirable that the mosaics be constructed so that the north arrow remained constant in succeeding pages in the touraid booklet. Coordinates to six digits have been added for all major targets along the route.

The addition of a P.I. Report on each route study or Touraid was provided during this period. The report contains a brief and concise statement of each target, major flak concentration and recommended targets for strikes when possible. Such a report is believed highly desirable for aid in the selection of targets, ordnance, and in the planning of strikes.

Ten route studies were produced during this period representing the production of over 500 individual booklets and the use of approximately 4,200 8x10 photographs.

Thirty-three target studies were made, the majority of which required the preparation of a mosaic and the location of all flak positions. A P.I. report was made on four of the studies to properly identify and describe the targets located on the mosaics. All target and route studies were given full distribution to all carriers and carrier division staffs.

The ship's P.I. target file was developed further and now contains photography on more than 600 individual targets in Korea.

Preparation of flak studies require a minimum scale of 1/5000. To obtain the necessary coverage over high-intensity flak areas K-38 photography accomplished by the USS ESSEX F2H photographic planes has proven far superior to the K-17 limited to the 12° cone. It is recommended that future photo detachments be equipped with planes capable of carrying cameras with cones giving more desirable photo coverage. Although it is realized that later models of the F9F will be so equipped, it is believed that the K-18 (24") camera can be installed in the F9F-2 with O and R assistance. As the F9F-2 will continue to fly many missions over defended enemy territory from CV9 type ships, this installation should be undertaken without delay.

7. Photography Laboratory:

During the last operating period the Photo Lab experienced a great increase in the copying of large maps and charts in support of aerial reconnaissance and for use in making up "Touraid" booklets for pilots.

Though this was a large scale operation requiring rapid accomplishment this was obtained by a simple modification of our copying equipment. The lamps for illuminating the copy were placed on arms attached on either side to the camera bed and fully justable to height and spread of illumination. This arrangement proved very efficient in obtaining even lighting on a wide variety

C. Gunnery:

1. Replenishment at sea:

In an attempt to increase the rate at which ammunition can be transferred from the ammunition ship to this vessel two new methods were tried during this operating period. During ammunition replenishment on 13 February, a wire highline was rigged from the number 4 hatch of USS CHARA (AKA-58) to the Hangar deck opening at frame 74 starboard. Five and a half tons of bomb fuzes, rocket motors and rocket heads were transferred in 70 minutes.

On 20 February an attempt was made to use the Housefall method for transferring ammunition between these same two stations. The rig was not successful. The starboard forward accommodation ladder is normally stowed across the lower portion of the opening at frame 74. In this position the ladder seriously interfered with the Housefall rig. Also, presently installed padeyes at this station are so positioned that chafing occurs against the upper edge of the Hangar deck opening.

In order to provide an additional ammunition transfer station at frame 74 the following steps have been or will be taken: (a) stow the accommodation ladder in the overhead of the Hangar deck, (b) relocate the padeyes at frame 74, and (c) install a roller along the upper edge of the Hangar deck opening to prevent chafing. With these improvements it is believed that an addition to the overall loading rate of about 20 tons per hour can be obtained by the addition of the Housefall or hghline rig at frame 74.

2. Training:

Two anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted during the period of this report, one while enroute to the operating area and the second while returning to Yokosuka. It is recommended that more frequent opportunities for firing be provided in order to stimulate interest and increase the proficiency of gun and control personnel.

3. Material:

On 2 February an F4U-4 aircraft crashed into five inch mounts two and four and burned. It struck mount No. 4, pivoted and struck mount No. 2, then came to rest supported by mount No. 2 and the outboard side of the gun sponson. Gasoline fires in the area were brought under control and extinguished by the use of fog foam. The rammer assemblies of both mounts, the pointer's and trainer's telescopes on mount No. 4, the pointer's telescope of mount No. 2, and the firing and lighting circuit on mount No. 4 were so damaged as to require replacement. Other damage to the mounts was superficial.

D. Supply:

1. Aviation Supply:

2. Ship's Stores:

Data are being furnished ComAirPac and AirPac CV's, via separate correspondence, of the Ship's Store service facilities supplies recommended for a six months' cruise.

E. Engineering:

No comments.

F. Medical:

No comments.

G. Dental:

It is strongly recommended that a prosthetic unit be installed aboard CV's. The large number of patients requiring prosthetic treatment, and the short time in port where such treatment is available to our personnel, results in a highly unsatisfactory arrangement.

The ability to render prosthetic treatment aboard when indicated, would constitute a positive morale factor, and in some measure afford relief to the already over-burdened land-based prosthetic clinics. Such service would be also of much value to smaller ships in company.

OSCAR PEDERSON

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CVG 19

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U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
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San Francisco, California

CV45/A9-4
Ser 096

7 April 1952

~~DECLASSIFIED~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, FAR EAST
(4) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 3 March 1952 through 4 April 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV Instruction 3480.5 dated 1 July 1951

Encl: (1) Commander, CATG ONE conf ltr ser 07 of 7 April 1952 p. 13

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period of 3 March through 4 April 1952 is hereby submitted:

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

In compliance with CTF 77 dispatch 280118Z of February 1952, the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), CAPTAIN OSCAR PEDERSON Commanding, with ComCarDiv FIVE (REAR ADMIRAL F. W. MC MAHON) embarked departed Yokosuka, Japan, for the operating area on 3 March 1952.

On 5 March 1952 the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) joined Task Force 77 close to the 38th Parallel on the east coast of Korea. The Task Force was commanded by REAR ADMIRAL JOHN PERRY, ComCarDiv ONE, aboard the USS ESSEX (CV-9) and operating under Task Force 77 Operation Order 22-51 (2nd Revision) dated 6 December 1951. It was composed of USS ESSEX (CV-9), USS ANTIETAM (CV-36), USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), USS ST PAUL (CL-73), USS ROCHESTER (CA-124), USS J. A. BOLE (DD-755), USS LOFBERG (DD-759), USS BUCK (DD-761), USS B. BASS (DD-887), USS STICKELL (DD-888), USS CHEVALIER (DDR-805) and USS A. J. ISBELL (DD-869).

On 2 April 1952 the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) departed Task Force 77 in accordance with CTF 77 dispatch 280236Z of March 1952 and arrived in Yokosuka, Japan 4 April 1952 for a period of maintenance and upkeep.

The mission of Task Force 77 was as follows:

(1) Conduct air operations from an operating area off the east coast of Korea to provide close air support of friendly troop operations, interdiction to enemy routes of movement and supply, and armed reconnaissance of enemy installations and lines of communications.

(2) Provide air cover for replenishment ships and other friendly naval surface forces when necessary.

(3) Protect the force against air, surface and subsurface attacks.

[redacted] SECURITY INFORMATION

Commander Carrier Air Task Group ONE is CDR C. H. CRABILL, Jr., USN. The Group had the following on-board count of pilots and aircraft at the beginning of flight operations on 4 March 1952.

SQUADRON	NO. OF PILOTS	NO. OF AIRCRAFT
VF 52	20	12 F9F-2
VF 111	23	11 F9F-2
VF 194	26	10 AD2(3), 2 AD-2Q
VF 653	25	16 F4U-4
VC 3 (Detachment)	5	3 F4U-5N
VC 11 (Detachment)	4	3 AD-4W
VC 35 (Detachment)	5	3 AD-4NL
VC 61 (Detachment)	4	3 F9F-2P
HU 1 (Detachment)	2	1 HO 3S-1
TOTAL	114	64

PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

3-3-52: Departed Yokosuka, Japan for the operating area. Conducted training exercises and routine ship drills.

3-4-52: Conducted refresher air operations in Area FOX during the afternoon. The ship conducted training exercises and battle problems.

3-5-52: Air operations were conducted during the morning in preparation for combat operations. Planes transferred from the USS "SSEX (CV-9) were landed aboard during the morning operation which brought the on-board count of aircraft to 81.

3-6-52: Air operations were conducted aimed at the destruction of the North Korean rail net. The morning hecklers sighted a total of 6 locomotives to which flights were diverted throughout the day. Two locomotives were completely destroyed and the 4 others severely damaged. 50 rail cuts were made, 46 boxcars destroyed and 22 boxcars damaged. A total of 87 sorties were flown.

3-7-52: Routine air operations continued. A total of 91 sorties were flown and a total of 124 rail cuts were made. This score set a record for rail cutting for the VALLEY FORGE to date.

3-8-52: Air operations were hampered due to bad weather. Our morning hecklers and one flight of 4 F4U's were the only planes over Korea today. A total of 30 sorties were flown and the damage amounted to 3 trucks, 8 rail cars, 3 supply buildings and rails were cut in 8 places.

3-9-52: Routine air operations were conducted as scheduled. A total of 5 planes suffered flak damage, although only one, LTJG R. KOMEROFF, VF 194, was forced to land at King 50, an emergency field. All the others returned safely aboard. A total of 87 sorties were flown scoring 70 rail cuts.

3-10-52: Replenished at sea.

3-11-52: Air operations resumed as scheduled. LT H. L. WRIGHT, VF 653, flying an F4U, was hit by flak while flying an inland reconnaissance route. The

3-12-52: Routine air operations continued as scheduled. A total of 6 planes suffered flak damage. Two, LTJG J. M. THAYER, VF 194 and LT H. A. BORGERDING, VF 194, were forced to land at King 18 and King 50, respectively. All the others returned safely aboard. A total of 90 sorties were flown scoring 97 rail cuts, destroying 11 trucks and 2 railroad cars.

3-13-52: Routine air operations continued. A total of 4 planes suffered flak damage. Two, LCDR R. S. SCHREIBER, VF 194, and LTJG N.J. JOHNSON, VF 194, were forced land at King 18. All the other planes returned safely aboard. The night hecklers were launched 50 minutes early to lend Air Support to TE 95.21 which was under fire from shore installations. Pilots reported the mission successful, having been given a "Well Done" by the USS MANCHESTER (CL-83). A total of 100 sorties were flown, scoring 71 rail cuts, destroying 3 trucks and 3 shore batteries.

3-14-52: Replenished at sea.

3-15-52: Air operations resumed as scheduled. A total of 10 planes suffered flak damage, but all returned safely aboard. A total of 90 sorties were flown scoring 84 rail cuts, destroying 2 locomotives, 5 trucks and 3 rail bridges.

3-16-52: Routine air operations continued as scheduled. A total of 7 planes suffered flak damage, but all returned safely aboard. A total of 91 sorties were flown scoring 118 rail cuts.

3-17-52: Routine air operations continued as scheduled. LCDR H. L. BASLEE, Commanding Officer, VF 52, flying a F9F-2, was hit by AA at CU 515520. The pilot did not bail out, and his burning plane exploded on impact. There was no chance of survival. A total of 6 planes suffered flak damage. One, LT R. P. TAYLOR, VC 3, was forced to land at King 18. All the other planes returned safely aboard. A total of 90 sorties were flown scoring 88 rail cuts.

3-18-52: Replenished at sea.

3-19-52: Air operations were cancelled because of inclement weather.

3-20-52: Air operations resumed as scheduled. A total of 6 planes suffered flak damage. LTJG C. GARDNER, VF 653, and LT R. S. GEFFEL, VF 653, were forced to land at King 50. LTJG J. E. GRAY, VF 653, and LT E. L. KEARNS, VF 653, were forced to land at King 18. All the other planes returned safely aboard. A total of 88 sorties were flown scoring 108 rail cuts and destroying 4 railroad cars and 11 trucks.

3-21-52: Air operations were continued as scheduled. LTJG C. G. STRAHLEY, VF 52, received major flak damage while flying a routine reconnaissance mission. LTJG STRAHLEY made a conventional bail out over water near Hungnam. Upon the arrival of the rescue helicopter the body was sighted under the surface entangled in the shroud lines. There was no chance of survival. An unsuccessful attempt was made to recover the body. LTJG S. W. BERRY, VF 194 and LTJG J. P. COOPER, VF 194, were forced to make emergency landings at King 18 and King 50 respectively. LTJG COOPER suffered minor wounds about the face. Other planes received flak damage but returned safely. A total of 89 sorties were flown scoring 74 rail cuts, destroying 2 railroad bridges and 6 trucks.

3-22-52: Air operations were continued as scheduled. The night heckler flight was cancelled due to inclement weather. ENSIGN K. A. SCHUCKTER, VF 194, received lacerations about the face when a AA shell penetrated his cockpit. The rail t

3-24-52: Air operations were cancelled due to inclement weather.

3-25-52: Air operations resumed, but weather conditions allowed only one event. A total of 20 sorties were flown destroying 25 buildings and starting fires in a lumber storage area.

3-26-52: Air operations resumed as scheduled. Two planes suffered flak damage, but returned safely aboard. A total of 88 sorties were flown scoring 113 rail cuts.

3-27-52: Air operations continued as scheduled. A total of 6 planes suffered flak damage. ENSIGN J. L. AKAGI, VF 194, hit by AA, was forced to land at King 18. A total of 90 sorties were flown scoring 99 rail cuts, destroying 9 trucks and 10 buildings.

3-28-52: Air operations continued as scheduled. A total of 4 planes suffered flak damage but all returned safely aboard. 89 sorties were flown scoring 62 rail cuts, destroying 10 trucks, 7 gun positions and 7 railroad bridges and by-passes.

3-29-52: Replenished at sea.

3-30-52: Air operations were resumed as scheduled. A total of 6 planes suffered flak damage. Dur to such damage, ENSIGN N. E. STERRETT, VF 653 was forced to ditch his F4U in Wonsan Harbor. The pilot was immediately rescued by the helicopter from BELTING (LST-799) and suffered no injuries. ENSIGN F. C. JOHNSON, VF 194, was forced to land at King 18. All the other planes returned safely aboard. A total of 89 sorties were flown scoring 144 rail cuts. This is claimed as a record number of cuts scored by one carrier for one day's operations. One locomotive, 19 trucks, 3 rail by-passes and 1 rail bridge were destroyed.

3-31-52: Air operations continued. The night heckler flight was cancelled due to inclement weather. Two planes suffered flak damage but both returned safely aboard. A total of 85 sorties were flown scoring 111 rail cuts and destroying 3 trucks, 22 buildings, 10 rail road bridges and 4 rail by-passes.

4-1-52: Air operations were hampered due to inclement weather conditions. However, 54 sorties were flown scoring 27 rail cuts and destroying 5 railroad by-passes. A total of 3 planes suffered flak damage, but all returned safely aboard.

4-2-52: Replenished at sea. Departed Task Force 77 for port at Yokosuka, Japan.

4-3-52: The ship conducted two damage control battle problems plus engineering, CIC, and communications drills while enroute to port.

4-4-52: Arrived at Yokosuka, Japan for a period of maintenance and upkeep.

PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

A. Ammunition Expended:

Napalm	127
20mm Ammunition	200,300
.50 Cal. Ammunition	245,480
5"/38 Cal. AA	136
40mm Cal. AA	807

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Damage to Ship:

Heavy weather encountered 23 thru 25 March 1952 caused the following damage:

a. 40mm Mounts 1 & 2:

Both radar antennas were ripped off and broken. One ring sight was broken. Loading platforms were bent.

b. Directors 1 & 2 (for 40mm Mounts 1 & 2):

Director stations were flooded and radar sets damaged. Some of the equipment is salvageable.

c. Flight Deck Supports:

The riveted doubler plates, which secure the port forward "H" beam stanchion to the under side of the flight deck girder, all the way forward on the forecastle, were sheared. This "H" beam supports the forward port corner of the flight deck. The two forward transverse bents on the forecastle had their webs dished aft appreciably on the starboard side.

d. Miscellaneous:

Two ports were stove in in officer's country. Several small sections of flight deck catwalk were carried away or badly twisted. Limit switches on the port jet blast deflector shorted and allowed the motor to over-run, breaking the hoist cable. Gasoline piping between stations 1 and 2, Flight Deck, was torn loose from its supporting brackets.

B. Damage to Aircraft:

No. of Planes	Types	Causes
32	F9F-2	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
1	F9F-2P	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
16	F4U-4	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
4	F4U-5N	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
18	AD-2(3)	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
1	AD-4L	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
4	AD-4NL	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.

C. Loss of Aircraft:

Date	Squadron	Type	Bu. No.	Causes

D. Damage inflicted on Enemy:

	Destroyed	Damaged
Trucks	120	7
Tanks	2	2
Oxcarts	120	
Hiway Bridges	6	2
Supply Dumps	7	4
Fuel Dumps	2	4
Ammo Dumps	2	
Factories	4	6
Barracks and Buildings	152	190
Warehouses	5	23
Gun Emplacements	42	2
Lumber Piles		25
Wagons	2	
Oxen	76	
Boats	155	240
Bunkers	5	
Marshalling Yards		20
RR Bridges	36	15
RR Cars	170	132
RR By-Passes	35	9
Highway By-Passes	6	
Roundhouses		2
Bulldozers		2
Rail Cuts	1,615	
Crane	1	
Repair Depot	2	
Mines		1
Troops	601	

The above mentioned table represents a conservative estimate of the actual damage inflicted on the enemy during this operational period. Only those instances where the damage could be assessed by the pilot were used in compiling this table. There were many attacks where the results were obscured and could not be assessed. There was no close air support flown during this period.

PART V

PERSONNEL

A. Performance:

During this operating period the average-on-board count of personnel was 1965, which number was satisfactory. The total losses for various reasons were 24; this was offset by 73 gains. Twenty (20) men were away on temporary additional duty and 8 absent on leave.

The critical shortage of petty officers continues in the Gunnery, Communications, Electronics, and Engineering ratings. Every effort is being made to prosecute a vigorous on-board training program to train lower ratings to perform the assignments of these higher rates which are and will remain critical.

B. Morale:

Sunday, in addition to daily Roman Catholic Mass and the evening prayer, are now conducted.

Mail service has been satisfactory. It has been improved for this period on the line by the addition of delivery of second class matter, enabling the enjoyment of relatively recent periodicals.

The use of the 1 MC circuit to broadcast through the ship a summary of the day's combat operations, which practice this ship inaugurated in 1950 and found to be highly successful is being continued. In this way members of the ship's company not engaged in flight deck operations are made acquainted with the result of the strikes carried out by members of the Air Group. In addition, the RBO system offers continuous programs throughout the day and evening over two channels. One channel carries Armed Forces Radio Programs, the other live and transcribed programs originating in the ship's broadcasting booth. An officer with experience in broadcasting has been assigned the collateral duty of supervising these programs. The inadequacy in number of RBO speakers available (23 for the entire ship) limits the effectiveness of this program. Correspondence is being prepared to recommend to BuShips that more RBO outlets be provided.

In port the ship offers opportunities for athletics, motion pictures, and a generous liberty policy. Personnel are afforded leave privileges at rest hotels to the fullest possible extent.

D. Public Information Office:

It is recommended that, while the ship is deployed, a Journalist rating serve aboard to assist the PIO. It is considered that this professional assistance is necessary to keep the public adequately informed of the numerous events occurring aboard a carrier. Correspondence to recommend this provision in the enlisted personnel allowance will be submitted.

E. Casualities:

LT Hull Leroy WRIGHT, USNR, 325815/1315, VF 653. On 11 March 1952, while flying an F4U, purpose 1T1, cause TARE, he parachuted from the plane at low altitude and struck the ground with partially opened burning parachute. LT WRIGHT was reported killed in action.

LTJG Alan (n) HOFF, USN, 466541/1310, VF 111. On 11 March 1952, while flying an F9F-2P, purpose 1V1, cause TARE. The plane rolled over after being hit by AA fire and dove into ground, exploding on impact. LTJG HOFF was reported killed in action.

LCDR Herbert Lester BASLEE, Jr., USN, 165577/1310, VF 52. On 17 March 1952, while flying an F9F-2, purpose 1T1, cause TARE, his plane was hit by AA fire while attacking an AA position. The aircraft crashed into side of hill in shallow dive, exploding on impact. LCDR BASLEE was reported killed in action.

LTJG Charles Glasgow STRAHLEY, USN, 513261/1310, VF 52. On 21 March 1952, while flying an F9F-2, purpose 1T1, cause TARE. Shortly after being hit by AA fire the aircraft caught fire. The pilot parachuted over water, but failed to clear chute after a water landing. LTJG STRAHLEY was reported killed in action.

[redacted] SECURITY INFORMATION

On 22 and 23 March, the strongest winds and highest seas of the period were encountered, with maximum winds of 50 to 55 knots with gusts to 65 knots. These winds resulted from a weak low center moving into the Sea of Japan from southern Manchuria on 22 March, deepening rapidly, and accelerating. Early on 24 March the low center had moved eastward out of the Sea of Japan and the winds decreased to near normal, but a northeasterly swell of 5 to 10 feet continued throughout the day, decreasing to 2 to 5 feet on the 25th.

(1) Communications:

Facsimile (Aerology Laboratory): The reception has continued to improve over that of the first and second operating periods.

Radioteletype: Reception was average.

Radio (CW Radio): CW reception of weather was fair to average.

(2) Recommendations:

Same as submitted in Action Report of 7 December 1951 thru 19 January 1952.

b. Air Intelligence:

During the period of this report an increased number of 37mm positions were noted on the main rail lines between Hamhung and Wonsan. Comparison of photography indicates that these additional guns (approximately 8 37mm positions) were removed from rails running immediately west from Kowon. Generally, 37mm positions are located on opposite sides of the rails and spaced from 2 to 3 miles apart. Latest photographs show the concentration to be on the rail lines from Yonghung south to Wonsan and at the railroad bridge immediately south of the city of Hamhung. As the previous reports indicate mobility of these positions point out the necessity of obtaining late photographic coverage on all heavily defended rail lines prior to strikes.

Coordinated events were scheduled designed to suppress flak along certain selected sectors of rail in advance of a rail-cutting event. Consideration was given to (1) the best section of track to be hit, (2) varying type of ordnance, (3) annotated photographs pin-pointing flak positions within effective range of the selected sector of track, and (4) the air space involved over the area. Results have been satisfactory, and indications are that more use of coordinated strike type of flak suppression will be utilized as the situation dictates.

The establishment of the Air Navigation Office, located at ComFairJAP, Atsugi, has greatly aided in matters of supply. It is recommended that Air Intelligence personnel, upon arrival in the forward area, become personally acquainted with this facility and the services it affords.

c. Combat Information Center:

(1) Radars:

During this period all radars operated normally and were available

(2) Communications:

Communications were generally satisfactory and range on FAD nets was excellent. There is still a considerable amount of cross-talk on the AN/ARCs in CIC and also on primary and secondary tactical and CI primary. It has been observed that upon joining the Task Force for the first time or rejoining from port all ships, including this one, have considerable communications trouble which results in a general delay in passing of information when speed in most important. This occurs in spite of in-port preventation maintenance.

(3) Flag Operations:

CIC functioned as Flag CIC for Task Force 77 during this period.

d. Communications:

Radio communications continued to be satisfactory in the main. As in preceding periods, the volume of traffic taxed the capacity of available personnel and equipment. A total of 22,847 messages were handled in Radio I during the period 5 March through 1 April, of which 3,838 were transmitted and 19,009 were received. Numerous frequency shifts were required daily, a total of 280 for the period being accomplished by Radio II and 359 by Radio III.

The wear and tear on equipment from constant usage is beginning to be manifested in more frequent breakdowns and failures of equipment. In-port periods permit only the accomplishment of emergency repairs and replacements of worn-out elements.

The problem created by the shortage of qualified personnel remains critical and will be intensified by additional losses during the next two months. Non-rated men are showing constant and satisfactory improvement. However, it will be impossible for them to obtain sufficient training and experience to become qualified watch standers to replace losses of rated personnel as they occur.

The following recommendations are made in the interest of improving communications and adapting message traffic to the limitations of personnel and equipment.

(1) Sending speed of Radio Guam on the GEORGE FOX should be slowed to 18 words per minute. Strikers are unable to copy FOX schedules at the present speed which varies from 22 to 28 words per minute, but they can qualify very quickly to copy the recommended speed. At present many operators in smaller ships are unable to copy at the existing rate of sending and request numerous retransmissions or repetitions from this ship and other larger ships.

(2) Division of long daily summary reports into several short messages sent at intervals would increased accuracy, security and speed. If this method of handling is not feasible, such long reports should be broken into parts, each of which parts should be sent as a separate message. The daily OPSUM encrypted and transmitted by the communications organization of this ship as flagship for CTF 77 has to be re-encrypted or retransmitted in full or in part an average of 5 or 6 times daily as a result of request for services received from addressees.

(3) CTF 77 should be assigned a RATT circuit with Radio Guam. All ships

e. Photo Interpretation:

The purposes of aerial photography flown during the operating period were for (1) flak studies, (2) damage assessment, (3) target search, and (4) call photography.

The production of flak studies or "Touraids" continued during this period. The preparation of a route flak study necessitates several runs along the route at a preferable scale of 1/5000 to 1/6000. The number of runs required vary with the route under study. Generally, routes with heavy flak will require three runs, while two runs are adequate for routes of light flak. A small scale strip along the route has proven to be necessary in the preparation of mosaic for flak studies. This is due to difference in scale of the parallel large scale strips and the sometimes lack of necessary side lap.

Coverage at least once a week along the heavy flak routes in considered the minimum necessary to maintain flak studies up-to-date. Recent studies are necessary whenever flak suppression strikes are planned.

Most 37mm A/W positions are in two or four-gun positions strategically located for commanding fire over the target area. The pattern of the gun arrangement is governed by terrain and insofar as possible will be in a box or diamond arrangement. Four gun positions invariably show a director position.

Large numbers of empty positions for A/W guns are present. There is little difficulty in determining that an A/W position is empty but careful study is necessary to locate new A/W positions when camouflage is practiced. Track activity and difficulty in adequately hiding an A/W gun should made location of all such guns possible.

Location of active light AA positions present the greatest problem. Other than noting the gun in a position, track activity is most important in indicating that the position is active.

More thorough training in flak identification is recommended for all photo interpreters prior to assignment to this theater.

Increasing attention has been given to target search. The use of civilian and damage shop and factory type buildings for military purposes is most often indicated by track activity. Increasing attention should be given to track activity indicative of a military target.

The F9F-2P is restricted to the K-17 camera carrying a maximum cone of 12". This necessitates the pilot flying at low altitudes to obtain necessary coverage adequate for flak interpretation. The loss of one F9F-2P and photo pilot during this operation period occurred on such a mission. Prior to the assignment of the F2H (Banshee) for photo reconnaissance work, it is strongly recommended that an modification of the F9F-2P be carried out to enable the plane to carry cameras of greater focal length, reducing the necessity of the planes flying at lower altitudes where their vulnerability to AA fire is much greater. In addition a view finder, such as was provided the F6F-5P in World War II, should be provided the F9F-2P. Although newer models of photographic VF configurations will carry cameras of greater focal length and be equipped

of readiness which would be difficult or impossible to attain under a less vigorous training program. Every effort should be made to exploit opportunities for this type of drill before entering a combat area. When this ship first arrived in the combat area for this tour (the ship's third) difficulty was experienced in acquiring jet targets.

Two AA firing exercises were conducted during the period of this report. On 3 March 1952 firing exercises were conducted by the 5"/38 and 40mm batteries against a towed sleeve making UNCLE type turns with good results. On 2 April 1952 firing exercises were conducted by the five inch and 40mm batteries against a towed sleeve making GEORGE type runs with excellent results. Three out of eight sleeves were destroyed, hits were scored on two other runs.

b. Material:

Considerable storm damage was received by 40mm mounts one and two, located on the bow, and their associated fire control equipment during a period of heavy weather 23-24 March 1952. Both radar antennae, Mk 4 Mod 1 were broken off their mounts, requiring eventual replacement of the antennae and the Mk 25 antenna mounts. The radar sets in the radar control rooms were damaged by salt water and most of the wiring between the radar rooms and the mounts was damaged. All electrical equipment on the mounts was damaged, and minor structural damage was incurred. All damage except to the radar was repairable by ship's company, but the radar repair will require replacement equipment not readily available. It is recommended that consideration be given to replacing the Mk 51 Mod 6 (Mk 63 director) GFCS on these mounts with Mk 51 Mod GFCS. Storm damage to equipment in this location must expected, the simpler non-blind firing system will suffer less damage and be easier to repair than the present equipment, thereby resulting in a major saving of money and the time of skilled electronic technicians. The system, also, would be out of commission for a shorter time after damage, resulting in a higher degree of readiness. This will be the subject of special correspondence.

c. Replenishment at Sea:

The third replenishment station between ammunition ship and carrier—a wire highline from #4 cargo hatch to the hangar opening at frame 74—was used successfully during each replenishment. The rig was strengthened at the carrier end by rigging a five point bridle with two legs to heavy padeyes inboard in the hangar overhead, two legs to the regular highline padeyes, and one leg to a deck padeye. It is estimated that this rig is safe for 2000 pounds loads. The most successful transfer of 29 March added 11.7 short tons per hour to the overall loading rate.

C. Navigation:

a. Ship Control:

In addition to the Officer of the Deck and Junior Officer of the Deck this ship has used a third officer as part of the underway bridge watch who acts as TACTICAL COMMUNICATOR. Among his duties are: (1) prompt delivery of all incoming TBS traffic as received on primary and secondary tactical circuits, (2) preparation and transmission of outgoing signals, (3) translation of all general and tactical signals received, (4) maintenance of a complete log of all transmissions, (5) custody of tactical publications, voice call

[redacted] SECURITY INFORMATION

D. Air Group:

The ship concurs with the comments contained in enclosure (1) in their entirety.

2. During the first two weeks of operations light winds prevailed throughout the period. This necessitated considerable high speed running and maneuvering of the Task Force. CTF 77 sent to TF 77 the following message:

"THE PAST TWO WEEK PERIOD OF OPERATIONS HAS BEEN AN EXCELLENT ONE. WHILE LOW WINDS DURING ALMOST THE ENTIRE PERIOD FORCED MUCH HIGH SPEED RUNNING THERE WAS A COMMENDABLE LACK OF STEAMING CASUALTIES. REPLENISHMENT OPERATIONS WERE SMARTLY CONDUCTED. THE RESULT OF AIR OPERATIONS IN TERMS OF DAMAGE TO THE ENEMY REACHED NEW HIGHS. SURFACE GUNFIRE SUCCESSFULLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE TOLL. WELL DONE TO ALL HANDS."

Oscar Pederson
OSCAR PEDERSON

Distribution List
CNO (2 advance)
CINCPACFLT (5 advance)
COMAIRPAC (10 advance)
COMFAIRALAMEDA
CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP
CONSEVENTHFLT (1 advance)
CTF 77 (2 advance)
COMCARDIV ONE
COMCARDIV THREE
USS ESSEX (CV-9)
USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)
USS ANTIETAM (CV-36)
USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)
USS PRINCETON (CV-37)
USS BOXER (CV-21)
USS KEARSARGE (CV-33)
CVG 2
CVG 5
CVG 11
CVG 15
CVG 19
CVG 101
CVG 102
ATG 1
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE (2)
COMFAIRJAP
COMSERPAC

U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV45/A9-4
Ser 0118

19 May 1952

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Op-55)
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division FIVE
(2) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, FAR EAST
(5) Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 14 April thru 16 May 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV Instruction 3480.5 dated 1 July 1951

Encl: (1) Commander, CATG ONE conf ltr ser 08 of 19 May 1952 p. 9

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period of 14 April through 16 May 1952 is hereby submitted:

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

In compliance with CTF 77 confidential dispatch 280236Z of March 1952, the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), CAPTAIN OSCAR PEDERSON commanding, with ComCarDiv FIVE (REAR ADMIRAL F. W. MC MAHON) embarked departed Yokosuka, Japan for the operating area on 14 April 1952.

On 16 April 1952 the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) joined Task Force 77 close to the 38th Parallel on the east coast of Korea. The Task Force was commanded by REAR ADMIRAL A. SOUCEK, ComCarDiv THREE, aboard the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) and operating under Task Force 77 Operation Order 22-51 (2nd Revision) dated 6 December 1951. It was composed of USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47), USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), USS MANCHESTER (CL-83), USS BOXER (CV-21), and various DD's of the screen.

On 23 April 1952, REAR ADMIRAL F. W. MC MAHON, USN was relieved as ComCarDiv FIVE and Commander, Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN by REAR ADMIRAL JOHN PERRY, USN.

On 14 May 1952 the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) departed Task Force 77 in accordance with CTF 77 confidential dispatch 122350Z of May 1952 and arrived in Yokosuka, Japan 16 May 1952 for a period of maintenance and upkeep.

The mission of Task Force 77 was in accordance with CTF 77 OpOrd No. 22-51 (2nd Revision).

Commander Carrier Air Task Group ONE is CDR C. H. CRABILL, Jr., USN. See enclosure (1) for the on-board count of pilots and aircraft at the beginning of flight operations on 14 April 1952.

PART II

[redacted] SECURITY INFORMATION

4-16-52: Joined Task Force 77. Completed air group refresher training.

4-17-52: Conducted combat air operations. The aircraft of CDR C. H. CRABILL, Jr., CATG-1 was hit by AA fire causing him to ditch his AD off the coast near Songjin. CDR CRABILL was recovered in good condition by an AMS.

4-18-52: Conducted combat air operations.

4-19-52: Conducted combat air operations.

4-20-52: Conducted combat air operations. LT J. C. WORKMAN, VF 194, while flying an AD was hit by small arms fire near Wonsan. A fire in the cockpit forced him to bail out. His parachute did not open. LT WORKMAN is listed as killed in action.

4-21-52: Replenished at sea.

4-22-52: Conducted combat air operations.

4-23-52: Conducted combat air operations. LCDR D. E. BRUBAKER, VF 194, received minor head injuries when a bullet penetrated his cockpit, grazing his left temple. LCDR BRUBAKER received medical treatment upon return from mission.

4-24-52: Conducted combat air operations.

4-25-52: Replenished at sea.

4-26-52: Conducted combat air operations. LT G. N. WILSON, VF 653, lost control of his F4U on take-off and crashed at sea. The pilot was recovered in good condition.

4-27-52: Conducted combat air operations. LT W. C. SHEPARD, VC 35, ditched his AD-4NL in Wonsan Harbor after being struck by AA fire. The pilot and crewman, LOVELL, E. F., AD3, were recovered in good condition.

4-28-52: Conducted combat air operations.

4-29-52: Conducted combat air operations.

4-30-52: Replenished at sea.

5-1-52: Conducted combat air operations.

5-2-52: Conducted combat air operations. LT J. Z. CARROS, VF 52, crashed near the Choshin Reservoir having been hit by small arms fire. The pilot is listed as killed in action. LTJG W. S. PARR, Jr. and LTJG R. J. LEAR ditched their planes at sea. LTJG PARR and LTJG LEAR were recovered in good condition by a crash boat from King 18 and helicopter from USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45).

5-3-52: Replenished at sea in the morning. Conducted combat air operations in the afternoon.

5-4-52: Conducted combat air operations.

5-9-52: Conducted combat air operations.

5-10-52: Conducted combat air operations.

5-11-52: Replenished at sea.

5-12-52: Conducted combat air operations. ENS R. G. BUSH, VF 653, received a small arms bullet in the cockpit which started a flash fire. ENS BUSH received second degree burns about the face, however, the fire soon extinguished itself and ENS BUSH returned aboard without further incident.

5-13-52: Conducted combat air operations. LT J. D. SANKO, VF 653 received a direct hit by 37mm fire just north of Munchon. His plane crashed and burned. LT SANKO is listed as killed in action.

5-14-52: Replenished at sea.

5-15-52: Departed Task Force 77. Enroute to Yokosuka, Japan for maintenance and upkeep.

5-16-52: Arrived in Yokosuka, Japan.

PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

A. Ammunition Expended:

See enclosure (1).

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Damage to Ship:

On 7 May 1952, while alongside USS FIREDRAKE (AE-14) for rearming, the following damage was incurred when USS FIREDRAKE lost all electrical power, cuasing her to sheer out of control to port striking the VALLEY FORGE.

a. A hole was torn in the hull plating between main dock and 01 deck levels, frames 33-37 starboard. The forecastle deck in the same area was torn and buckled, and frames were slightly warped as far down as the first platform deck. The hole has been temporarily patched by ship's force, and it is expected that permanent repairs will be accomplished prior to return to the states.

b. Starboard accommodation ladder and platform were buckled. This damage has been repaired by ship's force.

c. The loading platform at the forward replenishment station was buckled and the supporting brackets were twisted and bent. This damage has been repaired by ship's force.

B. Damage to Aircraft:

PART V

PERSONNEL

A. Performance:

Personnel performance continued to be excellent.

During this operating period the on-board count of personnel averaged a satisfactory total of 1996. The total losses for various reasons was 46, but these were numerically offset by 64 gains. There were 18 men absent on temporary additional duty and 10 absent on emergency leave. The petty officer shortages were somewhat alleviated by 42 advancements from PO2 to PO1, 77 advancements from PO3 to PO2, and 168 advancements from non-rated grades to PO.

Despite the recent advancements in rating, there remain critical shortages of petty officers in gunnery, communications and engineering ratings. The vigorous training program, which resulted in the aforementioned large number of advancements, continued unabated, integrated with the ship's work.

B. Morale:

a. Although Air Task Group ONE continued to augment its distinguished combat record, some evidence of pilot fatigue was noted during this period on the line due to the nature of operations and the substantital number of operating days since the ship's arrival in the Western Pacific last December 4th. This fatigue was accentuated by the lack of replacement pilots to offset pilot losses in combat. The average number of pilots available during this period was 95, which frequently required each pilot to fly at least once each operating day, and in some cases, two missions per operating day per pilot were necessary. Once the pilot per plane ratio drops below 1.5 for props and 1.2 for jets the law of diminishing returns becomes evident, as some of the pilots became grounded for various medical reasons requiring the remainder to fly more, thereby heightening in turn their fatigue level.

Replacement pilots should be on their way automatically as soon as casualty reports are received. It was noted that replacement pilots after being requested were delayed because of inoculations. It is recommended that replacement pool pilots receive required immunization well in advance of any expected deployment, and that they have their personal affairs adjusted in order to permit prompt transfer when required. It is also recommended that the practicability of establishing a replacement pilot pool under ComFairJapan be studied. Their carrier landing proficiency could be maintained by the ready carrier stationed at Yokosuka.

b. The morale of the crew continued high, fostered by pride in the accomplishments of the ship and Air Group, and by the following factors:

(1) Excellent mail service contributed substantially.

(2) Recreational opportunities were improved. Milder weather encouraged more hangar deck and shore-side athletics.

(3) The Hobby Shop was very busy. In April, $1200 worth of materials were sold to hobbyists.

(4) An excellent "stateside" [illegible]

(6) The Air Intelligence Office continued effective use of the IMC circuit to present summaries of each day's combat activities.

(7) A "Happy Hour" held on the eve of a mid-tour replenishment was highly successful. The Navy Relief Society drive was furnished unusual impetus by this kick-off.

(8) The band performed at the in-port show and at the "Happy Hour". On replenishment days, the band's performances from the hangar deck were enthusiastically received, both by VALLEY FORGE personnel and by ships alongside. An orchestra made up from the band played once a week during the evening meal in the wardroom, the CPO Mess and the First Class Petty Officer's Mess.

C. Chaplain:

Religious activities were numerous, and they were well supported. Protestant, Catholic, and Latter Day Saints services were held on Sundays. There were daily Roman Catholic Mass and Rosary services, and evening prayer over the IMC circuit by the Protestant Chaplain.

Three memorial services were held for pilots who were lost during this period.

The daily mimeographed news sheet was supplemented by a "Sunday Supplement", consisting of shipboard feature news. This supplement is suitable for scrap book use or for sending home.

Bus tours arranged for the last period in port were successful. An effort will be made to conduct these again, adding trips around Tokyo.

The number of reservations for officer and enlisted rest hotels was curtailed because of release of hotels to Japanese owners. Only Air Group pilots and less than three percent of all enlisted personnel on board will be able to enjoy rest hotel facilities for the next in-port period.

D. Public Information Office:

The Public Information Office covered, home-town news releases, awards presented to personnel of the embarked Air Group, advancement in rating of enlisted personnel attached to the ship; and, in news releases, pictures, Talent Show and Happy Hour held on board. Lack of rated journalists to assist the officer assigned collateral duty as PIO continues to prevent full news coverage of shipboard events.

F. Casualties:

LT John Charles WORKMAN, 433757/1315, USNR, VF 194. On 20 April 1952, while flying an AD, purpose 1T1, cause TARE, bailed out of his burning plane too low over the water for his parachute to open. His body was recovered by the USS ST. PAUL (CA-73). LT WORKMAN was reported killed in action.

LT John Zaphyr CARROS, 424278/1310, USN, VF 52. On 2 May 1952, while flying a F9F-2, purpose 1T1, cause TARE, was hit by AA fire and crashed into a hilltop while making a strafing attack. The plane exploded and burned on impact. LT CARROS was reported killed in action.

PART VI

GENERAL COMMENTS

1. Operations:

a. Aerology:

During the period 16 April to 13 May 1952, normal weather prevailed. The air flow was divided between the northwesterly continental polar and the southwesterly maritime polar.

b. Air Intelligence:

Rail interdiction continued as the primary mission. Assigned target areas ranged over the entire eastern rail system. Little change was observed in the number of 37mm AA guns along the heavily defended rail lines between Hamhung and Wonsan. The placement of these positions however, are in constant change as indicated on each new flak analysis. The enemy's tactics of shifting or repositioning the 37mm guns, points up the importance of constant photo surveillance for flak studies if this section of rails is to remain under attack. The number of active machine gun positions and small arms fire has increased along the rail lines, particularly north of Hamhung.

c. Combat Information Center:

Failures of gears in both the SPS-6B and SX radars resulted in outages of several days in each instance. The necessary repair parts were Tender spares and not carried aboard this ship. Restoration of service was delayed until these parts were manufactured in the ship's machine shop. The loss of these two radars was not concurrent, but failure of a tube in the SPS-6B while the SX was inoperative did result in the loss of both for a short time during an SAR.

Lack of spare sealed mercury relays for the drive unit of the Mark V slave antenna necessitated placing the unit in an emergency use status. Therefore the SPS-6B set was used almost exclusively.

Bureau of Ships has advised that no additional Mark V parts will be procured when present stocks are exhausted.

Unusual propagation was observed frequently during this period. In many instances it was impossible to pick up air targets beyond twenty five to thirty miles while surface contacts were tracked at ranges up to ninety miles and land return out to two hundred and ten miles. On one occasion there was an unusual presentation through 360° at an average range of twenty miles extending out to twenty five to thirty miles. It resembled the return presented by weather and formed an irregular ring, remaining on the scope for several hours. It was not believed to be jamming or interference from other radars. Photographs were made at various intervals for future reference and study.

Communications during this period were satisfactory.

CIC again operated as Force CIC during this period.

d. Communications:

The wear and tear on equipment from constant usage continued to be manifested in more frequent breakdowns and failures of equipment.

The training of personnel was intensified. Additional training and experience have resulted in an overall improvement in the speed and efficiency of operating personnel in all job assignments.

e. Photographic Interpretation:

A total of 81 photographic reconnaissance missions were flown during the operating period. The photography was flown for flak analysis along routes, damage assessment, route surveillance, target search and call photography.

An extremely large amount of interpretation work was produced during this period. A flash interpretation report was made on all photographic coverage and sent out by dispatch. Thirty flak studies of routes or the commonly called "Touraids" were produced; the largest number distributed by a carrier during any period on the line. This represents the production of approximately 1600 booklets requiring 7300 8x10 prints from the photo lab. By far the largest amount of time required of the interpretation unit was in the interpretation, preparation and assemblying of the route flak studies.

In addition to the flak studies, detailed target overlays were prepared of Wonsan and Chongjin and reproduced by the ozalid method in quantity for distribution. Additional target studies with overlays were prepared, reproduced and given distribution. Continued services were rendered to the Air Intelligence Office.

The melting of snow introduced new problems in detection of enemy military installations. Track activity remained a prime method of identification. A definite increase in enemy efforts at camouflage of anti-aircraft positions was noted particularly in regards to 37mm positions. Brush was planted about the gun revetment and apparently used to cover the gun in an effort to blend the position in with the surrounding vegetation. However, the brush is usually of the same size and will present a vegetation pattern which differes from the surrounding area. All 37mm positions are characteristically composed of two or four guns in the east coast area unless a gun has been destroyed. While the effort is toward a box or diamond arrangement of guns, the terrain and target location will modify the pattern. The location of all 37mm positions are accessible to motor vehicles; in several cases a road having been constructed to the position located on a small ridge. After the guns were moved into position the road was replanted in brush to hide it.

While the number of 37mm guns on the routes studies have remained relatively constant, a shift of guns is continually being carried out.

Most of the 37mm positions are placed to protect important bridges, marshalling yards and sections of track which have been subject to a heavy rail cutting effort. Continuous operation against a particular bridge, marshalling yard, or track will result in the addition of guns to protect the target area but necessarily meaning a reduction of guns elsewhere. Obviously, prompt location of such addition or subtaction of guns is of prime importance to safety and planning or operations.

Location of machine gun positions is much more difficult

DECLASSIFIED

[redacted]
SECURITY INFORMATION

3. The following dispatch was received from CTF 77 on 13 May 1952:

"TODAYS LOCOMOTIVE ROUNDUP WAS A FITTING CLIMAX TO THE FINE PERFORMANCE VALLEY FORGE AND AIR TASK GROUP ONE HAVE BEEN STAGING DAILY DURING THE THREE WEEKS I HAVE BEEN ABOARD X WELL DONE X PERRY".

Oscar Pederson
OSCAR PEDERSON

Copies to:
CNO (2 advance)
CINCPACFLT (2 advance)
CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP (1)
COMNAVFE (1 advance)
COMNAVFE EVALUATION GROUP (1)
COMSEVENTHFLT (1 advance)
CTF 77 (1 advance)
COMAIRPAC (5)
COMSERVPAC (1)
COMFAIRALAMEDA (1)
COMFAIRJAPAN (1)
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE (1)
COMCARDIV ONE (1)
COMCARDIV THREE (1)
COMCARDIV FIVE (1)
CO, FAIRETUPAC (2)
CO, USS ESSEX (CV-9)(1)
CO, USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)(1)
CO, USS ANTIETAM (CV-36)(1)
CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)(1)
CO, USS PRINCETON (CV-37)(1)
CO, USS BOXER (CV-21)(1)
CO, USS KEARSARGE (CV-33)(1)
CVG 2
CVG 5
CVG 11
CVG 15
CVG 19
CVG 101
CVG 102
ATG 1
ATG 2
VC 3
VC 11
VC 35
VC 61

U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV45/A9-4
Ser 0141

18 June 1952

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Op-55)
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division FIVE
(2) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, FAR EAST
(5) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 24 May thru 13 June 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV Instruction 3480.5 of 1 July 1951

Encl: (1) Commander, ATG ONE conf ltr ser 08 of 17 June 1952 p.16

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period of 24 May through 13 June 1952 is hereby submitted:

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

In compliance with CTF 77 conf dispatch 210222Z of May 1952, the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), Captain OSCAR PEDERSON, commanding, with ComCarDiv FIVE, Rear Admiral JOHN PERRY, embarked departed Yokosuka, Japan for the operating area on 24 May 1952. On 26 May 1952 the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) joined Task Force 77 close to the 38th Parallel on the east coast of Korea.

On 11 June 1952, the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) departed Task Force 77 in accordance with CTF 77 conf dispatch 091100Z of June 1952 and arrived in Yokosuka, Japan 13 June 1952 for a period of maintenance and upkeep.

The mission of Task Force 77 was in accordance with CTF 77 OpOrd No. 22-51 (2nd Revision).

Commander Air Task Group ONE is CDR C. H. CRABILL, JR., USN. See enclosure (1) for the on-board count of pilots and aircraft at the beginning of flight operations on 24 May 1952.

PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

5-24-52: Departed Piedmont Pier, Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, Japan. Underway for the operating area.

5-25-52: Enroute to the operating area. Conducted refresher training of air group pilots. Held damage control, CIC, gunnery and communications

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SECURITY INFORMATION

5-27-52: Conducted combat air operations. ENSIGN STERRETT was believed to be sighted late in the afternoon. ENSIGN R. BUSCH, VF 653, crashed into a hill side while participating in the rescue operation. He is listed as killed in action.

5-28-52: Replenished at sea. Launched photo planes on a special photo mission. Received helicopters from HMR-1, Marine Transport Helicopter Squadron to assist in rescuing ENSIGN STERRETT.

5-29-52: Conducted combat air operations. Rescue operations were res[illegible] Marine helicopter, Major D. L. LENGEL, pilot, crashed at scene; all person[illegible] escaped uninjured. Inclement weather prevented further rescue operations. LTJG C. GARDNER, VF 653, crashed into the sea on take-off and was not recovered.

5-30-52: Replenished at sea in the morning. Conducted combat air operations in the afternoon. Inclement weather over downed personnel prevented further RESCAP. ENSIGN G. GALLOWAY, VF 653, while flying a "test flight", was seen to crash into the water near the Task Force. His body was recovered.

5-31-52: Conducted combat air operations. Rescue operations were continued. The downed helicopter crew were picked up uninjured and returned to the ship. In view of the fact that no further contact had been made with ENSIGN STERRETT rescue operations were discontinued. He is listed as missing in action.

6-1-52: Conducted combat air operations.

6-2-52: Conducted combat air operations.

6-3-52: Replenished at sea.

6-4-52: Conducted combat air operations.

6-5-52: Conducted combat air operations.

6-6-52: Conducted combat air operations.

6-7-52: Replenished at sea.

6-8-52: Conducted combat air operations.

6-9-52: Conducted combat air operations.

6-10-52: Conducted combat air operations. LCDR C. CLELAND, VF 653, ditched his F4U in Wonsan Harbor. He was recovered in good condition by helicopter.

6-11-52: Replenished at sea. Departed Task Force 77 for Yokosuka, Japan.

6-12-52: Enrouted to Yokosuka, Japan.

6-13-52: Launched aircraft for transfer to FacRon 11 at NAS [illegible]

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Damage to Ship:

None

B. Damage to Aircraft:

See enclosure (1)

C. Loss of Aircraft:

See enclosure (1)

D. Damage inflicted on Enemy:

See enclosure (1)

PART V

PERSONNEL

A. Performance:

Personnel performance continued to be excellent.

During this operating period the on-board count of personnel averaged a satisfactory total of 1964. The total losses for various reasons were 26 and for this period there were no gains. There were 21 men on temporary additional duty and 15 absent on emergency leave. The critical shortage of petty officers continues in the gunnery, communications and engineering ratin A vigorous training program is being continued for training lower-rated personnel to perform assignments of higher rates. This has enabled the shi to operate without loss of efficiency.

As this is the last action report for the current deployment, it is considered appropriate to comment upon the effectiveness of the Air Task Group concept. An Air Task Group is a carrier air group composed of trained squadrons equipped with specific aircraft to accomplish required operations in the theater to which deployed. Besides allowance and types of assigned aircraft it also differs from the conventional air group in that the air group commander has a minimum administrative staff composed of collateral duty officers from the squadrons. This plus ship assistance in administrative matters permits him to give maximum attention to operations. With this new type of organization, Air Task Group ONE has operated in an outstandingly effective manner during the ship's present deployment. Prior to deployment the group did not train or operate as a group. This group showed that an Air Task Group can be organized on short notice and deployed as an effective combat unit. The air group concept is considered sound in that it provides carrier aviation with important additional flexibility which must be available if Naval Aviation is to continue to progress.

B. Morale:

[redacted]
SECURITY INFORMATION

With the advent of warmer weather, the trend toward outdoor recreational activities showed a marked increase. The ship's baseball team played teams from other units during the in-port period, and numerous inter-divisional softball games were scheduled. The physical training rooms (Decontamination spaces) continued their high usage by officers and men.

The Hobby Shop had its largest month in May during which $1,460.00 worth of supplies were sold to hobbyists. The excellent response to hobbying activities and the worthwhile opportunities of wholesome recreation afforded thereby point up the need for an assignment of adequate space to the Hobby shop which is presently housed in the Squadron Service Room (02 deck).

On the ship's last night in port, members of the WAC Detachment from Camp Yokohama presented a stage show on the hangar deck. The performance was much enjoyed by the ship's company.

Movies continued to be offered every night in a number of locations while underway and on the hangar deck in port. The ship-originated radio programs were even more popular than before. With the acquisition of V-Discs, it was possible to present full half hour canned radio shows.

Each day the intelligence summary over the 1MC briefly recapitulated the activities of the Air Group.

The band continued to play at replenishment stations and the orchestral group performed in the CPO, First Class Petty Officers' and Wardroom Messes during the evening meal once a week.

C. Religious Activities:

The religious services mentioned in the last report were continued during this cruise. Religious counsel, training, and services continued to enjoy the advantage of having two chaplains assigned to the ship.

The Roman Catholic Holy Name Society sponsored a Mass and Communion Breakfast at the U. S. Naval Base, Yokosuka, on 22 May which was a feast day of that faith. Over 150 men attended the services at which Bishop John Ross officiated. The cooperation extended the ship by the base P. O. Club was much appreciated and contributed to the success of the affair.

D. Public Information Office:

The work of the officer assigned collateral duty as Public Information Officer continued as before. In order to provide even minimum coverage of newsworthy events, it became necessary to assign a rated man from another department to this work. His helpfulness therein, and the increasing amount of public information office activity shows again the desirability of having enlisted journalists assigned to the ship. A recommendation to Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet to this effect has been submitted.

E. Casualties:

See enclosure (1)

net by concentrated and repeated efforts directed against rails, rolling stock, marshalling yards, rail bridges and rail by-passes. The eastern rail system is connected to the western rail network by the Samdong-Ni - Yongdok-Kowon route. The importance of the Kowon connecting point had been established and soon became increasingly important to the enemy as manifested by the increased activity in the Kowon marshalling yard and the intensity of anti-aircraft defenses encountered. Continued attacks have been made throughout combat operations on the rail lines to the west, north, and south of Kowon to effect the greatest possible interruption of this vital rail traffic. The rail line from Hamhung South to Wonsan and the line running west and south from Kowon to Yangdok became priority targets. In direct proportion to the intensity of our attacks, the enemy countered by increasing the number of heavy caliber AA guns along these lines, constantly re-positioning the emplacements for more effective defense. Addition of active machine gun emplacements have increased and the percentage of hits suffered by our planes, particularly props, attests to their growing accuracy. The repair of damaged rail facilities is immediate and bears the stamp of excellent organization and planning. Ties, rails, road bed material, ready-built supporting sections of bridges, pre-cut piling, and cranes, located along the rail lines have been much in evidence. Unless sectors of track and roadbeds are obliterated, rail cuts, despite the number or location, are repaired during the night and it is unusual if the line is not operational and in use before daylight. Severely damaged locomotives disappear to repair shops or tunnels or are dragged to graveyards where salvaged parts are utilized. There are approximately 45 damaged locomotives in a graveyard located in Chongjin and about 15 damaged locomotives in the marshalling yard and repair area in Wonsan. Spur lines are being utilized for repair of the main lines. Car-counting on various spur lines has indicated that approximately 400 good rail cars have been fed back in to main line operations. This has been substantiated by photos taken two months apart.

Recco assignment on the routes as presently designated have been carried out to gain information on supply and troop movements. It is suggested that all recco routes be re-evaluated to establish the active supply routes. A suitable photographic run of these routes would indicate targets such as bivouac areas, camouflage truck parking areas and refueling stations.

Daily analysis of flak consisting of caliber, range, intensity, type of control, location by coordinate and terrain and relationship of all probable and active positions within radius of assigned target is mandatory as a basis for operational flight planning. Flights with elements of flak suppression have been flown utilizing napalm, strafing, VT fuzed bombs and general purpose bombs on well defended targets with satisfactory results.

The photographic section has efficiently supported the squadron AIO's, by making available photographs for all types of briefings through the medium of a complete photographic library.

b. Communications:

Radio communications continued to be satisfactory in the main. No new problems were encountered. A total of 13,312 messages were handled in Radio I during the period 26 May through 10 June, of which 2,219 were transmitted and 11,093 were received. The total traffic handled in Radio I during

the West Coast all communication equipment should be thoroughly checked and re-aligned. New modifications to equipment should be incorporated during yard availability.

The problem created by the shortage of qualified personnel remained critical. Strikers who were required to replace rated men showed constant and satisfactory improvement. A continuous educational program has been maintained in order to qualify non-rated personnel for watch standing on circuits.

As the shortage of qualified electronics personnel become more acute during the coming months, it is recommended that the Communication Officer for the Task Force Commander keep up-to-date records of communications personnel on board each carrier and other heavy ships present in the Task Force and assign guard assignments with careful consideration of the capabilities and limitations of personnel of individual ships. To the greatest extent practicable, the heavy ships other than carriers should be required to bear a proportionate share of the guard on circuits other than Task Force Common frequencies.

c. Photography:

During the current period, 26 May to 11 June 1952, the Photographic Laboratory turned out the following: 6,142 miscellaneous prints consisting of RUDM's, PI, I.D., Legal and Flight Deck Operations. These ranged in size from 1"x1" to 20"x24"; 2,040 damage assessment prints, 8"x10"; and 303, 798 sonne prints for a total of 368,988 prints. 82,050 feet of 16mm motion picture film was also processed during this period.

Cameras and equipage of this carrier are among the most valuable items on board, many cameras costing up to $4000.00. Cribs, lockers, and spaces are provided for much less costly items in other departments, but few provisions are made for stowing photographic equipment. It is recommended that ready lockers be provided squadrons for film magazines, cameras and equipment that are in their custody. At present, although they sign custody cards, the items involved must be stowed in the photo lab when not in use.

Suitable lockers or spaces should be provided in the laboratory for the proper stowage of ready film and printing paper to cut down on wastage caused by chemical deterioration and destruction.

It is recommended that the matte dryer be eliminated. Very little matte work is done and this amount can be dried on the glossy dryer.

The one big bottleneck experienced in the past deployment period, in the photo lab, has been the drying of sonne prints. It is felt that two sonne dryers are a minimum for required results. Also necessary are two sonne printers. The current allowance list calls for only one.

d. Photo Interpretation:

A total of twenty-nine photographic reconnaissance missions were flown during the operating period utilizing the F2H2 Banshee photographic plane. Cameras used in the Banshee were the K-17 with the 6, 12 and 24 inch cones, the K-18 with the 24 and 36 inch cones and the K-38 with the 36 inch cone.

A number of missions were flown using infra red film. The results were quite satisfactory and continued use is recommended.

A larger amount of photography was devoted to target search especially in the build up area south of Wonsan in the foothills west of Ason-Ni. One days photography alone disclosed well over 800 camouflaged barracks and storage buildings plus many caves and revetments. Considerable effort at camouflage has been carried out by the enemy in concealing barrack and storage buildings. Generally, the buildings are located in valleys off the main road and hidden among the trees. The buildings will often be revetted, sometimes covered with earth or brush. Every effort is made to blend the buildings in with the surrounding terrain. However, the lack of understory vegetation results in track activity which tends to make the overall area conspicious. A training program in identification of camouflaged military areas and individual buildings is recommended.

Continued work on flak analysis was carried out during the period resulting in the production of six (6) flak studies or "Touraids". Considerable flak was noted and received from pilot reports over the camouflaged military areas indicating the need for thorough flak analysis on such targets.

B. Summary of Entire Cruise:

a. Air Operations:

Operating data for the period from 11 December 1951 to 10 June 1952:

Missions assigned	7,290
Missions accomplished	7,113
Percentage completed	97.5%
Total days of air operations	95 days
Average daily hours flown	166.2 hours

Sorties by type:

F9F	Photo	F4U	F4U-5N	AD	ADN	ADW
3371	296	1326	199	1418	237	266

the above figures are based on combat missions.

During the Korean conflict to date the VALLEY FORGE based aircraft have flown 15,411 combat sorties. An interesting comparision between World War II and the present Korean conflict is noted. During World War II the USS ESSEX Air Groups expended 4,688 tons of bombs. CATG-1 has dropped 4,045 tons and fired 1,722,333 rounds of ammunition during their present tour.

From the period 3 July 1950 to 13 June 1952, the VALLEY FORGE has completed 20,853 landings.

b. Photography and Photo Interpretation:

The Photo Interpretation Unit aboard the VALLEY FORGE utilized space made available in the Air Intelligence Office. Working space was restricted and filing space was at a minimum. The unit began its work with one LCDR. Additional personnel were assigned and during most of the operating period [illegible] one LCDR, one LTJG, one QM2, and one AN. The P. I. unit was

The greatest work load was in the preparation of route flak studies or "Touraids". The flak studies required the detailed study of two or three large scale photo runs along a route usually at a scale of 1/5,000 to 1/6,000. A series of mosaics, usually four to six, were prepared from small scale photos of 1/12,000 to 1/15,000 scale. Proper legends were placed on the mosaics plus six digit coordinates of all targets. Flak positions obtained from stereo study of the large scale photos would be properly placed on the small scale mosaics by appropriate symbols. The mosaics were reproduced on 8x10 prints and assembled into the Touraid booklets. The VALLEY FORGE produced approximately 75 Touraid studies using over 28,000 8x10 prints. Approximately two thirds of the Touraid studies used by the Task Force during the last three months were produced by the VALLEY FORGE.

A considerable amount of time was spent in target search. All targets located were reported by dispatch and, whenever possible, an annotated mosaic and report would be distributed to the force. Damage assessment, route surveillance, and flash interpretation of call photography was reported by dispatch.

c. Recommendations:

That the F2H2 Banshee photo plane be used for aerial reconnaissance purposes on all CV-9 type carriers.

That the shore-based photo interpretation unit be rapidly established within air carrier distance of the operating area to reduce in as much as possible the work load on the carrier photo lab and interpretation unit. A close coordination between P. I. units in Korea, Japan and aboard ship is deemed essential.

A program of pilot identification from aerial photos of gun positions, camouflaged military areas and use of photographic aids be carried out prior to the arrival of a new squadron in the operating area.

The inexperienced ship's photo interpreters be sent to the forward area prior to the arrival of the carrier for a period of indoctrination.

C. Air Department:

a. Aircraft Handling:

Nylon Tie-down - The nylon tie-down developed and tested under actual conditions by this ship is considered to be the answer to aircraft securing problems. The nylon tie-down can be manufactured locally and possesses the advantages of strength, quick action, lightness and durability. It is superior in every respect to the tie-down reel and 21 thread line.

The locally designed shuttle used in place of the change 30 shuttle arrangement has been superior in all respects. Complete data on the locally designed shuttle arrangement and bridle catcher will be reported by separate correspondence.

b. Aircraft Maintenance:

Sperry Engine Analyzer - The Sperry Engine Analyzer on board was not

the tank top and the pressure gauge. A pet cock was installed under each gauge to bleed off this entrapped air which gave an accurate reading of the tank top pressure. An overall improvement in the fueling rate was noted and a rate in excess of 60,000 gallons per hour was realized when pumping into the outer tanks.

d. Personnel:

The Air Department complement as recommended in USS VALLEY FORGE letter serial 1353 dated 23 May 1952 has continued over the past 18 months to prove the most effective and efficient complement for a CV-9 class carrier. While this complement efficiently supports 90 to 100 sorties per day plus short periods of high tempo operations, it is not adequate for extended "around the clock" operations.

D. Dental Department:

The Dental Department rendered outstanding service to the ship's company during the entire tour. Major equipment is adequate and in fair condition, and no critical shortage in supplies exist.

The need for a prosthetic unit on all ship's of this class has been recognized, and recommended by the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. The outstanding cooperation of the prosthetic clinic in Yokosuka Naval Hospital provided means of mastication for all our edentulous patients.

E. Supply Department:

a. Summary Data:

(1) Aviation spare parts and material:

Number of individual requests from squadrons per month	1582
Number of such requests filled from stock on board per month	1472
Number of such requests passed to other sources supply:	
Allowance list items	25
Non-allowance list items	84
% efficiency, over-all	93.1%
% efficiency for allowance list items	98.3%
Major components issued during operating period:	
Engines	32
Wings	17
Propellers	25

(2) General Stores and non-aviation repair parts:

Individual issues per month	1650
Monthly average of items received aboard from all sources:	
General stores	950
Ship's repair parts	200
Electronics parts	150

(3) Commissary:

Receipts at sea	647 tons

Evaluation of area sources of supply and related transportation methods was included in reply to ComAirPac's Supply Support Questionnaire by this ship.

Photographic supplies represented a recurring source of trouble in a sensitive area of operations. This ship's itemized recommendation regarding six months' requirements of photographic supplies for a CV flagship operating in the Korean action has been forwarded to ComAirPac.

F. Gunnery Department:

a. Air Defense:

Air Defense drills "Warning Magenta" were conducted by the task force frequently during the period 12 December 1951 to 11 June 1952. Records were kept of acquisition results and are available for 124 separate raids up to 2 June 1952. These raids break down into 90 jet raids and 34 prop raids. Tabs (1) and (2) present the results obtained by the Mk 37 directors in graphic form. Records were also kept for the Mk 56, Mk 63 and Mk 51 directors, but uncontrolled factors, such as blanking on certain bearings which precluded attempts at acquisition until minimum range had been reached, make the data difficult to present graphically.

The results of the Mk 37 director acquisition effort is presented for two periods. The first period, 12 December 1951 to 11 February 1952, represents a learning stage, and the results, in general, could be rated as unsatisfactory. This assessment is based on only 26% of the jet raids and 60% of the prop raids being acquired early enough for maximum fire to have been delivered at maximum open fire range at 10,000 yards advance range. The second period, 5 March to 2 June 1952, roughly represents the performance which can be expected from an average, well trained, director crew. This performance is considered satisfactory in that 70% of the prop raids were acquired early enough to have delivered maximum fire at maximum range.

These minimum acquisition ranges are based on the range at which the director must pick up the target and still have time to get a solution, get the guns into automatic, and open fire before advance range reaches 10,000 yards. If the gun mounts are kept in automatic during the latter part of the designation phase several seconds can be saved and satisfactory acquisition phase several seconds can be saved and satisfactory acquisition made at a shorter range. Under these conditions 78% of the jet raids and 81% of the prop raids were acquired at a wholly satisfactory range during the second period. It is noted that if a raid had not been acquired by 10,000 yards (a partially satisfactory acquisition range) it was usually not fired on at all.

The Mk 56 and Mk 63 directors complemented the Mk 37 directors on five occasions, which increases the total satisfactory acquisitions by a percentage point or two. In general, the Mk 56 director performance was about the same as that of the Mk 37 directors. It probably should have been better, in that the equipment is of a better design for acquisition work.

It is concluded that frequent task force acquisition drills were vitally important in reaching a satisfactory state of training in the gun batteries. Without these drills improvement could have been expected, but would probably not have reached the level indicated for the second period.

at sea was accomplished on 10 occasions and 950 short tons of fresh and dry stores were received. Mail received by high line from tankers while refueling totaled 1,845 bags. 433 personnel were either received or transferred by high line to ships of the replenishment group.

Occasionally is was necessary to refuel destroyers of the screen. 24,952 barrels of fuel oil were transferred to destroyers during 24 destroyer refueling operations.

Although the helicopter has relieved the escorting ships of much of the routine transfer of guard mial, personnel, and freight between ships, it was necessary to receive destroyers along side on 65 separate occasions in order to effect transfers of this type.

2. The comments and recommendations made by Commander, Air Task Group ONE in enclosure (1) are concurred in.

3. The following dispatch was received from Com7thFlt on 18 June 1952:

"COMMANDER 7TH FLEET SENDS HEARTY WELL DONE TO COMCARDIV 5, VALLEY FORGE AND AIR TASK GROUP 1 ON OCCASION OF YOUR DEPARTURE FROM KOREA WATERS X YOU COMPILED AN OUTSTANDING RECORD DURING 6 LONG AND DIFFICULT MONTHS OF RELENTLESS ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY IN NORTH KOREA X YOUR TIRELESS DEVOTION TO DUTY AND YOUR WILLINGNESS TO CARRY OUT ANY ASSIGNMENT NO MATTER HOW DIFFICULT HAS BEEN INSPIRATION TO ALL X GOOD LUCK AND BON VOYAGE X VADM CLARK"

Oscar Pederson

OSCAR PEDERSON

Copies to:
CNO (2 advance)
CINCPACFLT (2 advance)
CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP (1)
COMNAVFE (1 advance)
COMNAVFE EVALUATION GROUP (1)
COM7THFLT (1 advance)
CTF 77 (1 advance)
COMAIRPAC (5)
COMSERVPAC (1)
COMFAIRALAMEDA (1)
COMFAIRJAPAN (1)
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE (1)
COMCARDIV ONE (1)
COMCARDIV THREE (1)
CO, FAIRBETUPAC (2)
CO, USS ESSEX (CV-9)(1)
CO, USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)(1)
CO, USS ANTIETAM (CV-36)(1)
CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)(1)
CO, USS PRINCETON (CV-37)(1)
CO, USS BOXER (CV-21)(1)
CO, USS KEARSARGE (CV-33)(1)
CVG 2
CVG 5
CVG 11

U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45)
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CVA45/ A9-4
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From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander, Naval Forces FAR EAST
(4) Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for period 30 December 1952 through 25 January 1953

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4 of July 1951

ANNEX (1) Cold Weather Photographs

Encl: (1) Air Group FIVE Action Report

1. In compliance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period 30 December 1952 through 25 January 1953 is submitted herewith.

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

In accordance with Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN Confidential Dispatch 260936Z of December 1952 the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45), CAPTAIN ROBERT E. DIXON USN, Commanding, REAR ADMIRAL APOLLO SOUCEK USN, ComCarDiv THREE and CVG-5 embarked, departed Yokosuka Japan for the Operating area at 0700I on 30 December 1952.

On 2 January 1953 the USS VALLEY FORGE joined Task Force 77. At various times during this operating period other ships in company were the USS ESSEX (CVA-9), the USS ORISKANY (CVA-34), the USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33), the USS MISSOURI (BB-63), with Commander SEVENTH FLEET VADM J.J. CLARK embarked, and various cruisers and screening destroyers.

On 5 January 1953 Commander Carrier Division THREE RADM APOLLO SOUCEK USN, embarked in the USS VALLEY FORGE, assumed duties as Commander Task Force 77. The USS KEARSARGE with Commander Carrier Division FIVE embarked, departed the Task Force.

On 21 January 1953 Commander Carrier Division FIVE RADM R.F. HICKEY USN, embarked in the USS KEARSARGE rejoined Task Force 77 and assumed duties as Commander Task Force 77 on 22 January 1953. Commander Carrier Division THREE embarked in the USS VALLEY FORGE departed Task Force 77 and the Operating Area for Yokosuka, arriving there 25 January 1953.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

The MISSION of this force is that assigned to the Carrier Group in Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN Operation Order No. 2-52.

PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

12-30-52: At 0700I the ship departed Yokosuka, Japan for the operating area, with RADM A. SOUCEK USN ComCarDiv THREE and Air Group FIVE embarked. Training exercises and routine ship drills were conducted. The U.S.S. HIGBEE was escort.

12-31-52: Enroute operating area. Conducted refresher air operations in the vicinity of Southern Kyushu. Routine Ships training exercises were held.

1-1-53: Conducted AA firing in the morning and refresher air operations during the afternoon. Took delivery of replacement fleet spare HO3S-1 from K-3. The helicopter crew was flown in by AD's and escorted by them on return to ship.

1-2-53: The Valley Forge was back once again having joined Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN at 0700I to begin her fourth Korean Tour. To celebrate her homecoming the "Valley", starting at 1145, launched a total of seventy-two (72) offensive sorties, striking warehouses, troop billeting and supply areas. Fourteen (14) buildings, two (2) bunkers and a power sub-station were destroyed. LTJG KRAMER, VF 51 started the fireworks by being the first pilot launched.

1-3-53: The first full day of operations saw the "Valley" launching a total of ninety-six (96) sorties at the enemy. Targets ranged from supply concentrations at the bomb line to power installations in the Northern most section of Northern Korea. Part of the days results showed a supply area completely destroyed, a powerplant and factory knocked out along with many other buildings and warehouses. LTJG E. RAWSTHORNE, VF 92 was forced to ditch his Corsair when his engine failed while on his way to the target. He was recovered by helicopter badly shaken and suffering from exposure. On the last recovery of the day LT RUSSEL, VF 51 ditched his F9F along side the ship when on a wave off, his plane experienced an internal explosion and burst into flames. He was picked up almost immediately by the plane guard helicopter and suffered no ill effects from exposure

1-4-53: No air operations were held this date as the Task Force replenished.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

1-5-53: The morning hecklers opened the days operations with a successful attack on truck parking areas destroying three trucks and seven (7) buildings, while damaging three (3) more trucks and five (5) buildings. Added to this tally was a road cut and two (2) railcuts. What started to be a promising day was cut short due to non-operational weather. The balance of the days flights was confine to a Jet recco and a CAS mission.

1-6-53: Non-operational weather limited todays air operations to eight (8) sorties.

1-7-53: No air operations were held this date due to weather.

1-8-53: The first good flying weather in three days found the Valley Forge unleashing destruction at various targets in North Korea. Principal targets were Cherokee targets in the vicinity of the front lines, which were hit repeatedly by Jets and Props from the Valley Forge. Although the Cherokee strikes were successful it was the CAS missions that provided the fireworks for the day. With AD's and F4U's working together four-hundred (400) yards of trenches, ten (10) bunkers, and two (2) artillery positions were destroyed and the pilots were rewarded with a well done by the forward air controller. During this attack ENS BURKEMPER flying an AD from VF 54 was hit by flak and forced to land wheels up at a friendly emergency strip. He was picked up in good condition, and returned to the Valley Forge via COD flight from K-16.

1-9-53: The morning hecklers kicked off the days operations by destroying three (3) trucks, one (1) gun position and getting six (6) rail cuts. This mission was followed by three (3) Jet reccos and a strike, which proved the most successful Jet attacks of the cruise to-date. The marshalling yard at Hyesanjin was severly damaged, one (1) truck and five (5) buildings were destroyed, two (2) rail cuts made along with heavy damage to a round house, one (1) highway bridge, six (6) trucks, several gun positions and buildings. Due to bad weather a CAS mission, the last offensive mission flown, attacked its weather alternates. With the exception of CAP and ASP all further air operations were cancelled. LCDR FICHMAN, Commanding Officer of VF 92 was forced to ditch his F4U due to engine failure just East of Yo-Do Island and was recovered uninjured by a helicopter from the LST 735 after spending 20 minutes in his raft.

1-10-53: No air operations were held as the Task Force replenished. Rough weather prevented completion of replenishment.

1-11-53: Continued replenishment. No air operations were held.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

All afternoon sorties were cancelled due to weather over the beach and an undetermined number of floating mines in the operating area. On the only Prop strike of the day thirty-nine (39) buildings were destroyed. On that launch ENS KORSGREN VF 54 was forced to ditch his AD due to engine failure. He was recovered by helicopter uninjured in four and one half (4½) minutes. The rescue, though a routine helicopter operation was unique in that it was the first rescue from a helicopter affected with a hand operated block and tackle which was fabricated to substitute for the non-operational hoist on the helicopter.

1-19-53: No air operations were held. The Task Force replenished at sea.

1-20-53: Routine air operations continued as a total of ninty-seven (97) sorties were flown, seventy-nine (79) of them offensive, destroying fifty (50) buildings, eight (8) trucks, two (2) oxcarts, while scoring six (6) railcuts and two (2) highway cuts.

1-21-53: The pre-dawn hecklers found many targets of opportunity in the Wonsan-Hungnam areas. They destroyed eleven (11) trucks and damaged twenty-six (26). Our Jets were assigned storage and supply buildings, while the Props attacked factory buildings, supply shelters and flew Cherokee and close air support missions. A total of eighty-two (82) sorties were flown accounting for the reported destruction of forty-four (44) buildings, thirty-six (36) supply and personnel shelter, twelve (12) trucks, and two (2) railroad cars. In addition to this, they reported damaging twenty-eight (28) buildings, eighteen (18) supply and personnel shelter, thirty-two (32) trucks, two (2) highway bridges, two (2) gun emplacements, and three (3) bunkers.

1-22-53: In the first of the three events scheduled, our hecklers bombed the enemy in the North Korea area. Several trucks and buildings were destroyed. Our Jets flew a recco and made strikes against supply shelters and underground warehouses. Several buildings were destroyed and many left burning. The Props combined forces to knock out another Cherokee target. While flying a F9F-5 Panther Jet, LCDR J.E. MULLIGAN, Executive Officer, of VF 53, experienced a power failure forcing him to ditch his aircraft soon after take-off. The Valley Forge helicopter effected a speedy rescue of the ditched pilot. The Valley Forge departed Task Force 77 at 1142I for Yokosuka. Replenishment was condutec upon leaving the Task Force.

1-23-53: Enroute Yokosuka. Conducted AA firing in area George.

1-24-53: Enroute Yokosuka. Conducted AA firing in area Love.

1-25-53: Arrived Yokosuka 1011I.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

1-12-53: No air operations were held due to non-operational weather.

1-13-53: Continued bad weather cancelled all air operations for the day.

1-14-53: No air operations were held this date due to adverse weather conditions and rough seas.

1-15-53: For the first time in five days operational weather prevailed and forty-two (42) sorties were launched at the enemy over North Korea. All targets for the day were in the vicinity of the bomb line with supply shelters and supply concentrations as the main objectives. Controller reported "80 percent coverage, excellent results", on all targets. All afternoon strikes were cancelled when the weather closed in once again.

1-16-53: A full day of air operations was held as the "Valley" launched eighty-five (85) sorties, sixty-one (61) of them offensive missions. The morning prop strike on supply shelters and vehicle repair areas was a success with fourteen (14) buildings and two (2) highway bridges destroyed. One rail bridge two (2) buildings and a rail car were destroyed by VF 53 on a Jet recco. The second Prop strike of the day was diverted to attack one-hundred-sixty (160) rail cars in Wonsan marshalling yard. Four Corsairs from VF 92 and four (4) Skyraiders from VF 54 destroyed twenty (20) cars while damaging forty (40) more. Night hecklers were unable to locate the remaining good rail cars due to atmospheric haze. They did however find heavy truck traffic in the area and destroyed three (3) trucks and damaged seventeen (17) more.

1-17-53: The Valley Forge launched seventy-five (75) sorties including regular CAP and ASP missions. The high standards of the previous day continued as the early Corsair-Skyraider strike destroyed over twenty (20) buildings in their attack on a mill and storage area. Four (4) medium tanks were sighted by VF 51 on a recco mission. Although damaging two (2) of the tanks they were unable to make the kill due to shortage of ammunition. Two-hundred (200) yards of trench were knocked out with six (6) bunkers by twelve (12) Corsairs and Skyraiders. To close out the day, night hecklers raided the marshalling yards in Wonsan, and reported destroying thirty-six (36) rail cars and damaging four (4) more, as well as destroying seven (7) trucks and damaging nine (9) before returning to the "Valley".

1-18-53: Air operations for the day were limited to forty-eight (48) sorties, thirty-four (34) of which were offensive sorties.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED

PART III

ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. The following ordnance was expended during this operating period

SHIP

5"/38 Caliber	305
40 MM	4501

AIRCRAFT

BOMBS		
1000#GP	179	
500#GP	491	
250#GP	1009	
100#GP	1064	
220/260 Fragmentation		317
ROCKETS		
3.5" Solid	24	
ATAR	73	
GUN AMMUNITION		
20 MM	85370	
50 Caliber	102325	

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

1. The ship was not attacked during this period and sustained no battle damage.

2. Damage inflicted by the ship's air group is included in enclosure (1), and Part VI of this report.

3. Damage inflicted on the air group by the enemy is included in enclosure (1), and Part VI of this report.

PART V

PERFORMANCE OF PERSONNEL AND CASUALTIES

A. PERFORMANCE

Performance during this first tour in the combat area was somewhat handicapped by inexperience and non-operational weather. Performance rapidly improved to the degree that the Task Force

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Commander commented in a message on 9 January:

"IT IS A PLEASURE TO SEE YOUR SHIP AND AIR GROUP DEVELOPING IN SUCH A SPLENDID MANNER X IN MY OPINON YOUR PROGRESS THUS-FAR HAS BEEN EXCEPTIONALLY FINE X MY HIGHEST COMPLIMENTS"

Intermittent operations due to weather assisted the inexperienced personnel on board in developing to the extent required for full scale operations. The number of officers with no previous combat area experience is significant. Of an average of 112 ship's officers on board, only 61 were on board for a full month or more of the ship's last tour in the area. Further, 35 percent of the officers now attached to the ship have been aboard less than six months.

There was an average of 1965 enlisted ship's personnel actually aboard during this period, although an additional 96 were attached and absent from the ship on temporary additional duty and emergency leave. This number of personnel was considered adequate, except in some special skills. The following are urgently required: Chief Fire Control Technician, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Specialis and a Ground Camera Repairman (PH-3992). These requirements have been the subject of separate requests.

Personnel in the Air Department will be well balanced in number when all the 40 AN/AA presently ordered to the ship are received.

Morale was considered excellent, and was stimulated further when actual operations proved the proficiency of the ship and air group as a team. There was marked improvement in morale following the receipt of a significant amount of mail.

B. CASUALTIES.

Although several pilots were compelled to ditch their planes, there were no casualties during this operating period. Weather deck personnel performed with efficiency and safety-consciousness and thereby suffered no casualties despite icy deck conditions and periods of extreme cold and rough seas.

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PART VI

GENERAL COMMENTS

OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

CIC (Radar Countermeasures)

I. Shipboard RCM

A. Equipment. This ship is equipped with the RDO, SPR-2 and APR-9 intercept receivers, the DBM direction finder, RDJ pulse analyzer, and RDP Panoramic Adapter.

B. Operation. Normally, a twenty-four hour watch was maintained by CIC personnel on the RCM intercept equipment, however, occasionally the watch was secured during daylight periods while conducting air operations if this ship was not assigned an ECM intercept guard for the day. This was done when the shortage of personnel forced their use at other stations in CIC. No unfriendly radars were intercepted. However personnel received valuable operator training by intercepting and analyzing the radars of the force.

C. Comments.

1. The ship's electronics technicians have done an excellent job of restoring the RCM equipment to an operating condition and installing the APR-9 receiver.
2. The APR-9 is not yet used to maximum advantage as the received signal can not be fed to the RDJ and DBM for pulse and D/F analysis.
3. The presence of own ship's and many friendly radar signals makes interception of enemy radars doubtfull and their analysis extremely difficult in the affected frequency bands.
4. The results with the DBM equipment have been disappointing so far, probably due to a combination of operator technique and the above mentioned interference.

II. Airborne RCM

A. VC 35 det. B has four AD-4N aircraft equipped with APR-9 receivers and APA-70 D/F gear. Two of these planes also have APR-1 receivers and APA-64 pulse analysis equipment.

B. Operation. These aircraft were operated during the day with RCM as the primary mission and at night as hecklers and gators. RCM results were as follows:

1. Very few unfriendly radars were detected during daylight hours.
2. On night heckler flights, many radars signals were received but the aircraft could not bediverted from the primary mission to analyze the signals and take bearings.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

All intercepts not identified as friendly were reported in accordance with ComNavFe Instruction 003521.1. The detachment is also experimenting with several methods for pinpointing enemy radar positions.

COMMUNICATIONS (CIC)

1. Communication difficulties existing in CIC were principally those of feed-over on the various circuits. This condition was caused by the lack of spread between channels. Those affected most were the Air Control and FAD nets. The outstanding example is 142.56 (CAP CONTROL) and 142.74 (ASP CONTROL). The secondary tactical net, (145.Ø8) and the strike control net, (143.64) also affected each other. It is believed that much of this difficulty may be eliminated by careful antenna positioning and the assignment of greater frequency separation in the VHF channelization.

2. The YE transmitter caused a great deal of interference on 143.64 MCS, requiring strike control assignment on days when the YE guard was assigned to another ship. This condition exists because the two (2) transmitters are located in the same space. This can be remedied by a physical separation of the two. The noise level from various sources on 142.56 MCS. was excessive. Some of this was in the form of CW key clicks, originating from within the confines of the ship and the remainder in a form resembling precipitation static which came from the automotive equipment on the flight and hangar decks. It is believed that the installation of shielded distributors and spark plugs in all such equipment will eliminate this. As a result of this excessive noise level, communication with the CAP beyond 3Ø to 4Ø miles became quite difficult, rendering it almost impossible to maintain positive control of the aircraft. Investigation disclosed salt-water corrosion on the antenna insulators. A thorough cleaning of the insulators and antenna coupling reduced the CW interference to a satisfactory level.

RADARS (CIC)

1. During this period the SX, SU and XSG-7 radars operated normally and were available for continued use except when necessary to secure them for regular maintenance.

XSG-7 radar is still not completely dependable because of the blind spot on the starboard bow due to the location of the antenna.

SPS-6B. Two failures in the IFF co-axial line in the AN/SPS6-B antenna pedestal reduced the range considerably in the Mark V IFF.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Correction of these difficulties and a temporary arrangement to drive the ANUP-11 slave antenna permitted excellent use of the Mark V IFF with ranges up to 204 miles being obtained.

The SPS-6B radar still gives considerable spurious responses within close land range, almost nullifying it's air search possibilities.

2. The effect of temperature inversion of the effective ranges of the various radars was of particular interest. On several occasions when an inversion was reported by aircraft in the area, aircraft were detected and tracked at ranges up to 100 miles on the SX without use of IFF. Under the same conditions G-Band IFF was tracked to ranges of 115 miles and Mark X to 150. At the same time surface targets were detected and tracked to ranges of 43,000 yards on the SU radar.

PHOTOGRAPHIC LABORATORY

PERSONNEL

1. Nineteen (19) men are assigned the photo laboratory as ship's company force, of which seven (7) are petty officers and two (2) are designated PHAN's. Personnel desiring to strike for photographic ratings were canvassed, and ten (10) were accepted to make up the complete team. Intensive on-the-job training with key men in charge of the new strikers has proved satisfactory for maintaining quality and production rate. Maintenance, and repair of equipment has proved to be difficult without an assigned qualified camera repairman. A recommendation for assignment of a qualified repairman to all CVA's has been submitted to BUPERS.

PRODUCTION

2. Twenty (20) photographic sorties were flow during this period. Eight thousand forty-eight (8048) 9x18", four-hundred-seventy-seven (477) 9½x9½, and seven hundred fifty-four (754) 8x10" prints were made from the photographs obtained for target studies. No unusual production problems were encountered.

AEROLOGY

1. On the tenth of January a depression formed in the East China Sea, moving Northeastward, through the Tsushima Straits and South of the Task Force.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

On the eleventh, high winds accompanied by rain which after a short interval turned to snow along with increasing seas caused the curtailment of operations. Winds from the North Northeast exceeded fifty (50) knots at times, and the seas reached an estimated height of twenty-five (25) feet. Snow continued to fall almost continuously until early on the fourteenth. Heavy icing was encountered due to the extremely low temperatures which prevailed in all portio of the Sea of Japan. The minimum temperature of 10.2°F was recorde on the thirteenth. Sea Smoke was present on the water surface duri most of the heavy weather, and on the morning of the fourteenth, it was thick enough to restrict visibility to two (2) to three (3) miles for a period of four hours. (See photographs Annex 1)

AIR INTELLIGENCE

1. Organization

The organization of the intelligence department as set up when first reporting to Task Force 77 proved satisfactory and was not changed. Responsibility for reports was divided among the Air Intelligence Officer, the assistant Air Intelligence Officer, CAG Air Intelligence Officer and the Squadron Air Intelligence Officers. That Officer which could most easily obtain the required information was given the responsibility of making the reports. The ship's Air Intelligence Officer acted as coordinator.

2. OPERATIONS

Operations of the Air Intelligence Office have functioned on a twenty-four hour basis during the period of this report. The use of standard forms by both the squadron Air Intelligence Officers and the ships Air Intelligence Officers has greatly helped in the processing of information within the prescribed time limits. Daily brief notes were published nightly and included all changing intelligence.

3. SPACES

The problem of storing the many charts required was solved by filing only a small number of each type and scale in the storage room in the rear of the Air Intelligence Office. The excess was stored in the fan room 2-65-2. A running inventory was kept and all shortages were noted. Delivery of maps and survival gear from COMFAIRJAPAN and the Air Navigation Office at Atsugi was excellent.

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Proper stowage space for voluminous classified materials received, such as target dossiers and Air Objective folders, is entirely inadequate.

4. CHARTS

Charts originally issued to each pilot included AMS Series 1:250,000 and AF charts 1:1,000,000, 1:5,000,000 and 1:250,000 of all North Korea. The 1:50,000 scale charts were issued to the pilots prior to each Naval Gunfire Spot, Close Air Support or Strike mission as necessary and were collected by ship's AIO upon pilot's return.

5. ESCAPE AND EVASION

COMNAVFE sent an Officer on TAD orders to the Valley Forge just prior to departure from Yokosuka for the purpose of lecturing on Escape and Evasion doctrines and procedures. In addition two naval aviators who were recent evadees gave excellent lectures on their experiences. This method of presentation proved very satisfactory.

6. PHOTO

Because close co-operation of the Intelligence section and the photographic interpretation section is necessary to produce photographic material for reproducing purposes, our present system of having them both in the same office has proved very satisfactory except for the resultant crowding.

PHOTO INTERPRETATION

1. A total of twenty (20) photographic reconnaissance missions were flown during the operating period utilizing three F9F-5P photographic planes mounting the following cameras: K-38 24 inch, 26 inch, K-17 6 inch, 12 inch, 24 inch, K-17-B 6 inch, S7 (Sonne) 100 mm. The efforts of the Photo Interpretation Office have been directed toward target search, flak studies, damage assessment, and touraid preparation with the emphasis on target search. Mosaics of suitable targets, prepared from flash prints, were forwarded to the carrier division staff. The end result was a photograph of the target for each pilot on each target strike. This system has proven highly successful for pilot orientation.

2. The photo interpretation office is located in the Air Intelligence Office. This is a satisfactory arrangement in all respects except for the lack of space required to lay out prints. One officer and two enlisted men are assigned, with one additional officer, an assistant Photo Interpreter, under orders to report.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

It is considered that two officer, photo interpretors, and two assistants will be sufficient for the task assigned.

3. DAMAGE INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY

Target	Destroyed	Damaged
Tanks		2
Oxcarts	9	3
Marshalling Yards		1
Roundhouses		1
Railroad Cars	67	87
Railroad Bypasses	1	
Railroad Bridge	1	
Highway Bridges	4	5
Trucks	40	79
Warehouses	6	
Barracks & Buildings	237	284
Gun Emplacements	4	8
Power Installation		4
Factories	1	1
Bunkers	12	11
Loading Ramps		1
Supply Shelters	33	4
Personnel Shelters	14	37
Sawmills	1	
Lumber Piles	1	
Conveyors	1	
Rail Cuts	46	
Troops Killed	5	
Highway Cuts	9	
Trenches	900 Yards	
Sorties Flown	972 (Includes 110 training sorties enroute)	

The above mentioned table necessarily represents an estimate of the actual damage inflicted on the enemy during this operational period. Only those instances when the damage could be assessed by the pilot, or confirmed by controllers were used in this table. There were numerous camouflaged targets identified as troop billeting areas, supply dumps, ammunition dumps etc. which were attacked with heavy damage, but no confirmed results could be tabulated.

AIR DEPARTMENT

1. During the period of this report no difficulty was experienced in operating the F9F-5 aircraft from a conventional CVA-9 type carrier with H4B catapults installed.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

However, temperatures have been lower (about 40°F) and wind velocities higher than can be expected in the present operating area during the summer months. Air craft were launched at weights ranging from 17,800 to 19,100 pounds with an average catapult pressure of 3,800 pounds. The ordnance load had to be decreased on three occasions because of low wind. A shuttle velocity recording instrument and an accurate relative wind reading on the flight deck level would provide an accurate end airspeed reading and would be of great value. Aircraft could then probably be launched with greater ordnance loads and a more positive margin of safety maintained.

2. Valley Forge experienced five (5) barrier and barricade engagements due to broken hookpoints on the F9F-5. On two occasions the cracked hookpoint cut the cross-deck pendants permitting the taut wire to whip across the catwalks. Luckily no personnel were injured nor were the purchase cables damaged.

3. An extremely high attrition rate on manila tiedown lines has been experienced, due largely to failure of the manila under exposure to freezing and thawing in winter operations. This fortifies the conclusion that the nylon tiedowns, originated by this ship and found to stand up well under this strain, are superior for all-weather operations. Hooks for the nylon tiedowns manufactured on the west coast prior to deployment proved to be unsatisfactory. It is hoped that about 600 of the nylon tiedowns will have been completed by Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, when the ship returns from this first tour on the line.

4. Extreme cold weather operations required constant attention to flight deck. Snow removal was begun three hours before first launch time. On one occasion the temperature reached a low of 10.2°F with a relative wind across the deck of 45 knots and gusts to over 50 knots. Although spray was freezing on the deck and aircraft, no attempt was made to clear the ice until the ship was turned downwind to reduce the hazard of personnel sliding over the side and to avoid frost bite exposure. Operating temperatures of 25°F were not uncommon. Deck ice was cleared by scrapers and shoveled over the side. Ice formation in catapult tracks was quickly cleared by directing the blast from a jet aircraft down the track. Intermittant operation of barriers, and the exercise of arresting gear and catapults prevented freezing of sheaves. Yielding elements were freed by melting the ice with blow torches. Ice was removed from aircraft surfaces by hand.

5. The deck edge elevator, the life-blood of a respot, is presently taxed beyond its operating capacity. The elevator's designed working load is 18,00 pounds; design load limit, 20,000 pounds; test load, 30,000 pounds.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

In order to meet operating schedules, it is frequently necessary to load the elevator to 23,000 pounds (F9F-5 and tractor), and occasionally to increase the load to 24,000 pounds if the F9F-5 is fully armed. The hoisting cables have elongated under these conditions; compared with an original diameter of 1.150", the minimum diameter is now 1.065". All possible slack has been taken up at the pump room end of the cables, and only approximately 1" remains at the elevator ends.

6. The electric hoist of the embarked helicopter became inoperative and an emergency block and nylon tackle was installed. A successful rescue was made with this emergency gear although twisting of the nylon line prevented raising the rescued pilot sufficiently to permit his entrance into the helicopter.

SUPPLY DEPARTMENT

1. Aviation Supply

The USS CHOURE (AKV-1) replenished aviation stores on 19 January 1953. 60 percent of items requested were supplied. Requisitions for this replenishment were transmitted to the USS CHOURE by dispatch, as weather precluded the employment of a COD flight to forward Forms 220/125.

Two ACOG's were experienced during the tour. The causes were:

(1) R17-SFIC-162, DETECTOR, Item E225, Section "B", F9F-5 is applicable only for certain Bureau Numbers. It is recommended that both this item and the new item, R17-SFIC-181AR-2, DETECTOR, be carried in stock to assure availability for all F9F-5 aircraft.

(2) R82-ARBN-R118M11, ACTUATOR, Item E830, Section "B", F9F-5. Twelve each were shipped from the contractor on 12/17/52 but had not been received on board. A suitable substitute, R82-ARBN-R252M2, was furnished by USS CHOURE.

The aviation stores divisions aboard the carriers comprising Task Force 77 effected interchange of aviation spare parts frequently. This program provided a valuable source of high priority items and was supported to the extent of reducing stock balance aboard the transferring vessel to zero when necessary.

The latest Section "B" for HO3S-1 on board, dated December 1951, lists as Item E790, R86-EC-30E01-1A, GENERATOR. This generator cannot be used on the HO3S-1. The correct generator and stock number is R86-LN-3-24506.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Cold weather experienced during this operating period proved conclusively that squadrons were not adequately outfitted with winter clothing prior to deployment overseas. As a result, the replenishment allowance carried on board was immediately depleted. It is, therefore, strongly recommended that every squadron be thoroughly inspected for compliance with fulfillment of cold weather clothing allowance prior to departure from CONUS.

2. Provisions Replenishment

This vessel replenished provisions twice during this tour on the line.

On 10 January 1953, the USS GRAFFIAS (AF-29) supplied the first replenishment. Some 112 tons were requisitioned with 95 tons being delivered in 1 hour 30 minutes. The availability of fresh and fresh frozen provisions was not plentiful; many desirable items were not in stock.

On 19 January 1953, the second replenishment was accomplished, again from the USS GRAFFIAS. Approximately 120 tons were requisitioned; 102 tons were delivered in 1 hour 10 minutes. An ample supply of fresh and fresh frozen provision was included among the replenished items.

GUNNERY DEPARTMENT

1. Material

Rough seas and icing conditions encountered on 12-14 January combined to make 40mm mounts #1 and #2 (forecastle) inoperative. During this period the mounts were protected to a limited extent by overall canvas covers and separate loading mechanisim and muzzle covers. However, the weights of sea water and ice to which the covers were subjected eventually caused canvas failure and consequent icing of the mounts themselves. The trainer's open ring sight on #1 mount was broken and the trainer's handwheels were sprung Mk 34 radar wave-guides on both mounts were so twisted as to be useless. The power motors of both mounts were completely grouned out. Further assessment of electrical and/or electronic damage has not yet been completed.

2. Deck Evolutions

a. Three replenishments were conducted while with Task Force 77. A fourth was conducted enroute Yokosuka after leaving the the force. A brief summary of replenishment data follows:

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Fuel Oil and Aviation Gasoline

Date	Ship	Quantity	
4 January	USS CHEMUNG (AO-30)	9472.7	bbls oil
		134800	gals gasoline
10-11 January	USS MISPILLION (AO-105)	5175	bbls oil
		73700	gals gasoline
19 January	USS GUADALUPE (AO-32)	9710	bbls oil
		158046	gals gasoline
22 January	USS GUADALUPE (AO-32)	3721	bbls oil
		87284	gals gasoline

AMMUNITION

Date	Ship	Quantity	Transfer rate
4 January	USS ST. MARY'S (AE-16)	75 tons	100 tons/hr
11 January	USS VIRGO (AKA-20)	170 tons	*45.7 tons/hr
19 January	USS CHARA (AKA-58)	205 tons	91.1 tons/hr
22 January	USS CHARA (AKA-58)	137 tons	**80

* Using one burtoning whip and quarterdeck modified housefall rig only because of jammed roller curtain at forward burtoning station.
* Two burtoning whips only used due to weather - wind up to 45 knots.

Provisions

Date	Ship	Quantity	Transfer rate
10 January	USS GRAFFIAS (AK-29)	99 tons	79.2 tons/hr
19 January	USS GRAFFIAS (AF-29)	88 tons	66 tons/hr

Aviation Supplies

Date	Ship	Quantity	Transfer rate
19 January	USS CHOURRE (AKV-11)	12 tons	40 tons/hr

b. On 10 occasions destroyers were alongside, 1 for refueling, 4 for personnel transfers, and 5 for guard mail or material transfers. High-line transfers of 42 men were made to or from the ship during the period of this action report.

c. All replenishment evolutions and personnel transfers were accomplished without incident. Various officers were qualified in keeping station along side.

3. Gunnery Exercises

AA firing at towed sleeves was conducted in area GEORGE on 1 January while enroute Yokosuka to the Task Force and in areas

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GEORGE AND LOVE on 23-24 January while enroute Yokosuka. These periods were of 2 hours duration each. Although screening vessels and support ships were provided opportunities to fire at towed sleeves on replenishment days, the replenishment requirements of this ship precluded such exercises.

ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT

1. Recreation.

Movies proved to be the most popular form of recreation. Nightly showings were held in the Flag Mess, Wardroom, Warrant Officer's mess, CPO mess, PO1 Mess, and compartments B-301-L and B-318-L. There was a total 144 showings during this period.

The Hobby Shop has again proved to be a worthwhile source of recreation. Sales at cost during the operating period amounted to $600.00, while personnel continued working with the more than $1,000.00 worth of handicraft items they had purchased during the month of December. Leather purse kits and boat and airplane models were the most popular items. Japanese model planes are easily obtainable and afford a great deal of pleasure.

A press newspaper taken from the national press service reports was furnished daily. In addition, the Sunday paper "VALLEY FORGE TAKE OFFS" was published weekly and covered the local news picture.

A full scale radio station was operated over the ship's RBO system. Two channels were always available: Channel #1, AFRS broadcasts, and channel #2, local programs. Programming extended daily from 0615 until taps, and included disk jockeys, sports and news broadcasts, and AFRS transcriptions.

The library and lounge have been filled to capacity daily during off-dury hours.

2. Religious Activities.

The Protestant Chaplain conducted 8 Sunday Divine Services and 48 Daily Devotional Services. A weekday Bible Class was held each Tuesday evening. 9 Mormon (Latter Day Saints) services were conducted by LTJG M.E. HARDY USN.

The Catholic Chaplain conducted 14 Sunday Masses and 24 weekday Masses, serving Holy Communion to 564 persons. He held 48 Sunday School and Bible Class sessions.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

The two Chaplains alternated in presenting a series of illustrated lectures to the officers and crew. The BuPers Character Guidance Series was used and the movie "To Be Held in Honor" was shown to groups attending 27 lectures.

3. Training.

The major part of the shipboard training consisted of "on-the-job" instruction and general drills. However, formal instruction in the ship's training room was afforded whenever possible. Among the activities were a daily coxswain's class, a nightly Aviation Boatswain class, and numerous divisional training classes.

Information and Education activities were stimulated by the curtailed flight operations. A total of 214 GED test sections was administered with 42 men completing the high school test and 5 men the college level test. Personnel applied for 29 USAFI and college extension courses during this period, as well as 45 enlisted correspondence courses.

4. Legal.

The first tour on the line produced considerable legal assistance activity principally relating to domestic problems.

Mast cases and Court Martials dropped appreciably. However, such Court Martial cases as arise, immediately prior to departure from Yokosuka are neccessarily delayed for long periods of time due to non-receipt of signed charges and unavailability of witnesses.

5. Public Information.

The Staff Public Information Officer and his journalists on board handled most of the operational material. The ship's Public Information Officer concentrated on material for the Fleet Home Town News Center. These releases are broken down categorically as follows: 30 feature stories, 55 Hometowners (Roster), 65 form stories, and 23 still photographs. In addition, approximately 600 letters from the Commanding Officer have been forwarded direct to the next of kin of personnel serving on board.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

1. During this operating period, 1,176 treatments were given by the medical department; 99 patients were admitted to the sick list, 11 for surgery.

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19

[redacted]
SECURITY INFORMATION

2. 19 pilots were temporarily grounded. Only one pilot required admittance to sick bay for any length of time because of exhaustion from cold incident to flight operations. A complete recovery was made.

3. 40 personnel were inoculated against cowpox; 23 for tetanus; 11 for typhoid; 48 for cholera. There were no untoward reactions noted.

4. There were 9 cases of venereal disease aboard, 7 of which were urethritis due to gonococcus, and 2 of which were chancroid. There were no admissions due to syphilis. It is felt that this low rate of incidence, particularly following the recent holiday in-port period in Yokosuka, is the direct result of the medical department' intensive continuing ship-wide VD educational program. All phases of this program are scheduled, conducted and supervised by the medical department.

5. With the abrupt advent into cold weather, the expected rise in upper respiratory infections was evident among all levels of the ship's company and air group personnel. This was especially true during the first phase of the operating period, followed by a gradual decline in the number of cases, until now there are none on the sick list. Many of these cases were treated in an ambulatory status, and those requiring admittance to the ward were usually released after 2 days.

R. E. DIXON

Distribution List:

CNO (advance)	2
CinCPacFlt (advance)	2
CinCPacFlt Evaluation Group	1
ComNavFE (advance)	1
ComNavFE Evaluation Group	1
ComSEVENTHFlt (advance)	1
CTF SEVENTY SEVEN(advance)	1
ComAirPac	5
ComServPac	1
ComFAIRAlameda	1
ComFAIRJapan	1
Naval War College	1
COFAIRBETUPAC	2

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

VC 3	1
VC 11	1
VC 35	1
VC 61	1
CO, USS ESSEX (CVA-9)	1
CO, USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33)	1
CO, USS ORISANY (CVA-34)	1
CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47)	1
CO, USS TARAWA (CVA-40)	1
CO, USS PRINCETON (CVA-37)	1
CO, USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)	1
CO, USS WASP (CVA-18)	1
CO, USS YORKTOWN (CVA-10)	1
CO, USS BOXER (CVA-21)	1
NLO JOC Korea	1
ComCarDiv 1	1
ComCarDiv 3	1
ComCarDiv 5	1
ComCarDiv 15	1
ComCarDiv 17	1
ATG-1	1
ATG-2	1
CVG-2	1
CVG-7	1
CVG-9	1
CVG-15	1
CVG-19	1
CVG-101	1
CVG-102	1
CVG-11	1
ComFairHawaii	1
USS BATAAN (CVL-29)	1
USS RENDOVA (CVE-114)	1
USS BAIROKO (CVE-115)	1
USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)	1
USS SICILY (CVE-118)	1
USS GILBERT ISLANDS (CVE-107)	1
USS POINT CRUZ (CVE 119)	1
USS TRIPOLI(CVE 64)	1

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ORIGINAL

U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45)
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CVA45/ A9-4
Ser 0129

19 MAR 1953

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH FLEET
(3) Commander Naval Forces FAR EAST
(4) Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for period 8 February 1953 through 19 March 1953

Ref: (a) OPNAV Instruction 3480.4 of July 1951

Encl: (1) Air Group FIVE Action Report

1. In compliance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period 8 February 1953 through 19 March 1953 is submitted herewith.

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

In accordance with Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN Confidential Dispatch Ø2Ø8Ø4Z of February 1953 the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45), Captain Robert E. DIXON Commanding, Rear Admiral Apollo SOUCEK Commander Carrier Division THREE, and CVG-5 embarked, departed Yokosuka, Japan for the Operating Area at 0700I on 8 February 1953.

On 11 February 1953 at 0700I the ship joined Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN in Area Sugar.

The MISSION of this force is that assigned to the Carrier Group in Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN Operation Order No. 2-52.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

2-8-53: The Valley Forge departed Yokosuka, Japan [illegible]OOI for the Combat Area in accordance with CTF-77 Confidential [illegible] of ØZØ8Ø4Z of February 1953.

2-9-53: Enroute to Combat Area. Anti-aircraft firing and general drills were held. Air operations were conducted in the afternoon in the vicinity of southern Kyushu for refresher training of pilots.

2-10-53: Enroute to Combat Area. In the vicinity of the Tsushima Straits a joint air defense excercise was conducted with the 43rd Air Division of the Japanese Air Defense Force. A message received from the 43rd Air Division (1ØØ53ØZ of February) at the conclusion of this exercise is quoted:

APPRECIATE YOUR PARTICIPATION IN JT EXERCISE TODAY WHICH

PROVIDED EXCELLENT TNG IN ALL PHASES AIR DEF.

While attempting to bring aboard his AD with a rough running engine, ENS D.D. POULSON, of VF-54, was forced to ditch when, short in the groove, his engine failed completely. ENS POULSON was recovered uninjured almost immediately by the Valley Forge helicopter. In addition to flight operations general drills were also conducted.

2-11-53: The ship joined Task Force 77 in Area Sugar at 0700I. RADM A. SOUCEK relieved RADM R.F. HICKEY as Commander Task Force 77. Ships present were the carriers U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45), U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33), U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47), U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34), the cruiser U.S.S. LOS ANGELES (CA-135), and various destroyers of the screening force, and the replenishment force. No air operations were held as the Task Force replenished.

2-12-53: The Valley Forge celebrated her return to action by launching 84 sorties, 61 of them offensive missions. Pre-dawn hecklers started the days fire works by destroying 4 trucks and damaging 12, destroying or damaging 6 buildings plus several highway and rail cuts. Meanwhile, Jets from VF-51 on a reconnaissance flight destroyed 7 supply shelters and made 3 highway cuts. The morning propeller flights although scheduled for a Close Air Support mission and a strike, were diverted due to bad weather in their target areas, and hit targets of opportunity destroying 15 buildings and damaging 9 more.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

The afternoon Jet strike was cancelled. Later in the day a Propeller Close Air Support mission and strike were launched reporting destruction on 10 barracks, 9 buildings, a highway bridge and 3 railroad cars. RADM R.F. HICKEY, COMCARDIV FIVE transfered his flag from the U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33) to the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34). The U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) was detached from Task Force 77 and departed for Yokosuka, Japan.

2-13-53: The dawn hecklers, though hampered by bad weather, located a gasoline truck convoy destroying 7 trucks and damaging 3 more. Snow and freezing rain forced the curtailment of all further air operations for the day. General drills were conducted.

2-14-53: Hecklers resumed operations early this morning attacking trucks along the Main Supply Routes, destroying 8 and damaging 5 more. The morning Jets on 2 reconnaissance missions and Cherokee strikes, destroyed 5 buildings, 3 railroad cars, a supply shelter and made 1 rail cut. These were followed by a full scale Propeller strike which destroyed 12 buildings. The afternoon Panter strike along with strike and Close Air Support missions by Corsairs and Skyraiders brought the highest total destruction for the ship during its present tour. The following dispatch from ComCarDiv-3 was received relative to todays operations.

> WEATHER REPORTS FROM MORNING HECKLERS WERE EXCELLENT X
> WELL DONE TO PILOTS AND COMMUNICATIONS
>
> I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN AWARE OF FACT THAT ADMINISTRATIVELY
> MY DIVISION WAS FINE X AFTER RECENT SPLENDID
>
> PERFORMANCE ESPECALLY TODAYS AM SATISFIED THAT I ALSO HAVE AN
> OUTSTANDING TACTICAL DIVISION X AM HIGHLY
>
> PLEASED WITH EACH SHIP AND AIR GROUP

2-15-53: No air operations were held this date as the Task Force replenished.

2-16-53: The morning hecklers found truck traffic heavy and their attacks accounted for more than 20 destroyed or damaged. They also destroyed 15 buildings and made several rail cuts. The morning Jet launch hit a Cherokee strip opposite the II ROK Corps with resultant destruction of several barracks and trucks. This event was closely followed by a Propeller Close Air Support mission and a strike in the front line area. In the afternoon, Jets flew a reconnaissance mission against a marshalling yard in the Kowan area making several railcuts and damaging 6 railroad cars and 10 buildings. In the last

Corsair, Skyraider launch of the day, Corsairs of VF-92 on a Close Air Support mission across from the X Corp area, had 95 per cent coverage of their target area, destroying 6 buildings with 6 secondary explosions and leaving many fires. Skyraiders and Corsairs on a Cherokee strike were equally successful damaging and destroying 15 buildings. A total of 109 sorties were launched from the Valley Forge today including routine CAP and ASP flights.

2-17-53: Dawn Hecklers led off the days attack by destroying 9 buildings and a highway bridge. The early Jet reconnaissance flight destroyed 5 buildings and damaged 5 more. At the same time a Jet strike on a Cherokee strip destroyed 2 small supply dumps, 5 supply shelters and 5 buildings. The morning Propeller strike hit coastal guns in the Wonsan area, silencing all guns. A Close Air Support flight received a score of 95 per cent coverage and a Cherokee strike 85 per cent coverage for a total destruction of 25 buildings, 25 supply shelters with many secondary explosions and fires, all controller confirmed. A total of 93 missions were flown, 81 of them offensive sorties.

2-18-53: Todays strikes were aimed entirely at the North Korean rail system. A total of 50 rail cuts were scored including 2 railroad bridges and one railroad bypass destroyed and 7 railroad bridges damaged. 89 Sorties were flown, 73 combat missions.

2-19-53: Replenished at sea. No air operations were held.

2-20-53: The morning Jet and Propeller strikes were aimed at supply buildings in the areas north of the bombline, destroying 25 buildings and damaging 12. At the same time a Close Air Support mission, by Corsairs of VF-92, in the areas across from the II ROK Corps, knocked out 6 bunkers and destroyed 100 yards of trenches. Corsairs and Skyraiders on a strike destroyed 4 buildings and 5 railroad cars in a raid on a Cherokee strip. The night hecklers found the Main Supply Route crowded with truck traffic and before returning to the Valley Forge had destroyed 14 trucks and damaged 4. In addition they destroyed 4 railroad cars and made 1 rail cut and 4 highway cuts. A total of 99 sorties were launched including routine CAP and ASP flights.

2-21-53: No air operations were held due to bad weather over the target area.

2-22-53: The days air operations were launched with a Jet Cherokee strike and reconnaissance hop which destroyed 3 rail cars and made 3 rail cuts.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

The Cherokee strike had 27 hits in the target area with 27 bombs. In the meantime, Corsairs and Skyraiders were on a Close Air Support mission, strike and Cherokee strike. The combined destruction for the three missions include 8 supply shelters, 4 buildings, 7 bunkers and 2 coastal batteries. The remainder of the afternoon missions were cancelled. The night hecklers were launched, however, destroying 4 trucks and 6 buildings. A total of 59 sorties were flown. VADM J.J. CLARK, Com7thFlt, visited the Valley Forge this day. The U.S.S KEARSARGE (CVA-33) was detached from TF-77 and departed for Yokosuka enroute to CONUS. The U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-36) joined the Task Force.

2-23-53: No air operations were held as the Task Force replenished. Ships present were U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-36), U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45), U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47), U.S.S. LOS ANGELES (CA-135), and various ships of the screening force and replenishment force. AA firing at a drone was conducted after replenishment was completed.

2-24-53: Air operations were resumed with the morning hecklers destroying 6 buildings, 1 truck, and a factory. The early morning Jet reconnaissance and Propeller strikes were diverted to their Weather Alternates due to weather over the target area. Later, strikes on a Close Air Support mission and Cherokee strikes destroyed 46 buildings and 2 morter positions. While making a run on a group of buildings in the Wonsan area, LTJG MC ARTHURS' AD was hit by AA. He managed to reach Wonsan Harbor where he ditched his airplane and was recovered uninjured by a helicopter from Yodo Island within 15 minutes. LTJG HAYWARD of VF-51 was forced to ditch his Panter Jet on take off when a power failure occured. He was picked up immediately by the helicopter from the U.S.S. ROCHESTER (CA-124). The Valley launched a total of 87 sorties today including ASP and CAP.

2-25-53: A 0415 heckler launch started the days air operations by attacking trucks along the east coast from Wonsan to Hamhung. Their efforts resulted in destroying or demaging, at least, 19 trucks and 20 buildings. At 0700, two Jet reconnaissance flights, a Cherokee strike and a Close Air Support mission were launched. When the final results of these missions were tabulated the Red forces were short 35 troops, a power sub-station, and 17 supply buildings. The afternoon strikes, both Jet and Propeller were aimed primarily at supply buildings along the Main Supply Routes, of which 26 were destroyed and 23 damaged. Many secondary explosions and large secondary fires were observed at the targets. 85 Sorties were launched, 52 of them offensive missions.

2-26-53: A total of 92 sorties were launched today.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Starting with pre-dawn heckler flights which destroyed 7 buildings and a truck, the air group experienced a successful day. The morning Jet reconnaissance hops and strikes accounted for 7 more buildings and 8 supply shelters. The first Propeller launch sent Corsairs and Skyraiders on a Close Air Support mission and a Cherokee strike. Both assignments directly across the front lines from the II ROK Corps, resulted in the destruction of 15 vehicle shelters, 3 mortar positions and 25 yards of trenches. An afternoon Close Air Support mission in the same area accounted for 8 personnel shelters and 75 yards of trenches destroyed and 6 bunkers damaged.

2-27-53: No air operations were held as the Task Force replenished.

2-28-53: Though hampered by non-operational weather in the afternoon the Valley launched a total of 86 sorties. All strikes for the day were diverted from their primary targets and Weather Alternates and targets of opportunity were hit. A total of 47 buildings and 1 power plant destroyed were the results of the days activity.

3-1-53: The days air operations were initiated with a Jet reconnaissance and Cherokee strikes which destroyed 5 buildings and 1 truck. This was followed by a Propeller Cherokee strike and Close Air Support missions. On return they were assigned a special mission to silence coastal defense guns in the Wonsan Area. Due to intense smoke and dust the exact results could not be assessed. The afternoon Jet and Propeller hops accounted for many cave entrances being blocked or destroyed and a coastal battery being knocked out. The night hecklers found truck traffic exceptionally light destroying only 4 trucks and 2 buildings.

3-2-53: No air operations were held this date due to non-operational weather.

3-3-53: No air operations were held this date as the Task Force replenished.

3-4-53: Morning hecklers commenced air operations with strikes over the coastal Main Supply Routes from Wonsan to the border destroying 8 buildings, 6 railroad cars and 8 trucks. The major part of the days air operations were devoted to leaflet drops on the east coast of Korea from the bombline to the Yalu River. The leaflet drop was the first major drop by carrier based planes during the Korean Conflict.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

3-7-53: No air operations were held this date as the Task Force replenished.

3-8-53: A total of 107 sorties were flown this date commencing with a Jet flak suppression mission at 0800. This event was coordinated with Skyraiders and Corsairs from the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) and was carried out successfully. The morning Propeller strikes were a Close Air Support mission in the X Corps area and a Cherokee strike in the II ROK Corps area. The afternoon missions saw Panthers from VF-51 and VF-53 providing flak suppression for both Air Group Five and One Hundred Two. The Propellers once again were called in on Close Air Support, this time in the X Corps area; there they destroyed 8 bunkers and 8 supply buildings. Skyraiders and Corsairs at the same time were over a Red supply dump in the Wonsan area where they destroyed 35 buildings, started 5 large fires. Two large secondary explosions were also observed.

3-9-53: Morning Propeller strikes centered all their efforts on special strikes on military and personnel shelters in the area just south of Wonsan. Panther Jets at the same time were providing flak suppression for Corsairs and Skyraiders from the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34). Two morning Close Air Support mission were flown; one in the IX Corps area, the other for the II ROK Corps. These same missions were repeated again in the afternoon, in the same Corps area. The Close Air Support missions accounted for a total destruction of 22 personnel shelters, 8 heavy mortar positions,75 yards of trenches and several large secondary explosions. An arternoon Cherokee strike by Corsairs and Skyraiders destroyed 32 military buildings, all of which resulted in several large secondary explosions. Quote the controller of this mission "Superior Strike" LTJG R.C. GEDNEY, VF-51, while flying his Panther Jet on a strike just south of Wonsan was killed in action when he failed to recover from his bombing run. A total of 114 sorties were flown including regular CAP and ASP flights.

3-10-53: Due to bad weather all air operations were cancelled except CAP and ASP flights. A total of 16 sorties were flown.

3-11-53: No air operations were held as the Task Force replenished at sea.

3-12-53: No air operations were held this date as the Task Force replenished at sea.

3-13-53: With snow showers and generally bad weather throughout the day air operations were limited to 61 sorties including regular CAP and ASP missions.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

On the morning Propeller launch Corsairs and Skyraiders hit a North Korean rest camp, used for heroes of the Chinese Communist Forces and North Korean Forces who have shot down an allied plane. After the strike a new rest camp was in order and undoubtedly many heroes would shoot no more, the camp was completely destroyed. In the meantime other Skyraiders and Corsairs on a Close Air Support mission in the II ROK Corps area destroyed supplies and personnel shelters.

3-14-53: Morning hecklers on an Electronic Counter Measures mission resumed air operations at 0415. The hecklers found very little truck traffic due to the heavy snow fall of the previous day. Panther Jets flew flak suppression for the morning Propeller strike on a troop billeting area in Hongwon, destroying 10 buildings. In the afternoon Skyraiders and Corsairs flew a Cherokee mission in support of the X U.S. Corps, destroying supply shelters and personnel shelters. Several Naval Gun Fire missions were flown during the day. A total of 111 sorties were flown, 101 of them combat missions.

3-15-53: No air operations were held as the Task Force replenished. At approximately 1536I the USS VALLEY FORGE with ComCarDiv-3 embarked, and the USS MADDOX (DD-731) in company was detached from Task Force 77 to proceed to Hong Kong via Sasebo in accordance with CTF-77 dispatch 120612Z. RADM F. HICKEY USN ComCarDiv-5 on board the USS ORISKANY (CVA-34) relieved RADM A. SOUCEK USN, ComCarDiv-3 as CTF-77.

3-16-53: Arrived Sasebo at 0856I, detached the USS MADDOX (DD-731). Departed Sasebo for Hong Kong at 1300I.

3-17-53: Enroute Hong Kong.

3-18-53: Enroute Hong Kong. Rendezvous was effected with the USS PHILLIP (DDE-498) at 0500H and elements of Patron 46 at 0700H, who are to escort the Valley Forge to Hong Kong. Captain R.E. DIXON conducted Personnel Inspection in the forenoon. Memorial services for LTJG DAVENPORT and LTJG GEDNEY were conducted by the ships Chaplain following the personnel inspection. A smoker was held in the afternoon

3-19-53: Arrived Hong Kong 1402H.

PART III

ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. The following ordnance was expended during this operating period:

SHIP

5"/38 Caliber	179
40MM	2031

AIRCRAFT

Bombs	
2000# GP	22
1000# GP	375
500# GP	1,038
250# GP	3,586
100# GP	1,469
220#260 Frag	799
100# Incendiary	132
Rockets	
3.5" Solid	19
3.5" Smoke	16
HVAR	364
ATAR	282
A/C Para. Flares	272
Napalm	13
Leaflet Bomb	215
Depth Bomb 350#	4
Gun Ammunition	
20MM	228,310
50 Caliber	200,970

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

1. The ship was not attacked during this period and sustained no battle damage.

2. Damage inflicted on Communist forces by the ship's air group is included in enclosure (1) and Part VI of this report.

3. Damage inflicted on the air group by Communist forces is included in enclosure (1) and Part VI of this report

[redacted]
SECURITY INFORMATION

PART V

PERFORMANCE OF PERSONNEL AND CASUALTIES

Performance of personnel during this second tour in the operating area was excellent. Commander Task Force 77 message 141120Z of March 1953, addressed to the Valley Forge is quoted:

THIS HAS BEEN A LONG HARD TOUR BUT YOU HAVE WITHSTOOD IT LIKE THE TRUE VETERAN THAT YOU ARE X VALLEY FORGE WITH HER FINE AIR

GROUP IS NOW THE HUB OF THIS BIG WHEEL AND CTF 77 PROUD TO FLY HIS FLAG FROM A SPOKE X MY COMPLIMENTS ON YOUR EXELLENT PERFORMANCE

LAST FIVE WEEKS X WISH YOU GOOD TIME FORTHCOMING VISIT

The ship's company, consisting of 648 petty officers and 1398 non-rated men, proved adequate. During this period only 24 enlisted personnel were transferred, 10 to be absent only temporarily on leave. 22 Men were received aboard for duty, 10 of whom returned from temporary additional duty. The relative permanency of personnel that these figures indicate is one of the blessings and advantages of being in the Combat area.

A critical shortage is developing in the electronic technician rating, particularly is senior supervisory personnel. A ground camera repairmen (PH-3992) is still urgently required.

Morale continued to be excellent. A minority of the crew was affected by a slight increase noted in the number of divorce cases and domestic problems. Emergency leave requests posed a major morale problem since they were received in a relatively large number during this operating period. All were carefully screened and in 8 cases approval was recommended and granted. 9 other requests were disapproved since they failed to fulfill the Commanding Officer's interpretation of the criteria established by the Area Commander. Those emergency leave requests rejected were marginal cases and the men involved are potential sources of discontent and dissatisfaction in spite of explanations of policy and all the factors considered.

LTJG Howard Maurice DAVENPORT, JR., USN, 5034/1310, VF-54. On 4 March 1953, while flying an AD4, flight purpose 1T3, he received AA damage which set his plane afire. Attempting to effect landing on an emergency air strip, he lost control of his plane and crashed into the water at high speed. His body was not recovered. LTJG DAVENPORT was reported killed.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

LTJG Kendall Courtney GEDNEY, USN, 532820/1310, VF-51. On 9 March 1953, while flying an F9F-5, flight purpose 1T1, LT GEDNEY was apparently hit by AA for he was last seen in his dive and was not heard from again. A hot-burning fire, resembling a crashed aircraft, was spotted after the flight leader's recovery. LTJG GEDNEY was presumed killed in the crash for a further search disclosed no survivors in the vicinity and confirmed the fact that an aircraft had crashed.

ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT

Recreation Motion pictures continued to be the most popular form of shipboard entertainment. Six to eight films, shown in different locations about the ship, were scheduled nightly to provide the maximum availability.

The stock of Hobby-craft supplies, replenished during the last in-port period, was almost exhausted again as the crew purchased over $2000.00 worth of model boats ships and airplane kits. Japanese manufactured model kits proved as satisfactory and popular as the U.S. product, and are much cheaper.

The two-channel shipboard radio station, operating over the RBO system, continued its contribution to morale. One channel is tuned to AFRS programs, and the other furnishes live shows, from 0615 to taps, featuring musical talent in the crew, disk jockeys and sport and news roundups.

The Crew's Lounge and Library have been opened during normal working hours, in addition to the regular after-hours periods, as a result of the extended and irregular operating hours required of the ship. Both have been utilized to a much greater extent. The stock of magazines is good, and replenishment by mail has been reasonably prompt.

Religious Activities The religious program consisted of Protestant devotions at 0700 and 2130, and Catholic Mass at 0630, with Rosary Services at 1830 each week day. Bible classes were held on Monday, Wednesday and Friday at 2000. Protestant Choir practice was held on Tuesday at 1930. Sunday Services consisting of Protestant Divine Services at 0900, 1430 and 2030, and Sunday School at 1000; and of Catholic Masses at 0630, 0900, and 1430, and Rosary Services at 1830.

The Catholic Chaplain heard regular confessions on Saturday evening and at any time on request. Regular office hours were observed daily by each Chaplain and daily visits were made to the sick bay and to the brig. The lecture, "Marriage and Family Life", has been presented to about half the crew and will be continued until all have had an opportunity to hear it.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Training. The ship's training room was in constant use for lectures, demonstrations and projection of training films. Most of the training program has been conducted on the division level by division officers; however, classes in beginning and advanced algebra, and a class in beginning German, have been inaugurated. 198 GED Test Sections were administered during this operating period, and 40 USAFI courses applied for.

Public Information. Activities during this period are summarized as follows:

5 News feature stories and layouts.
11 News Photo releases.
1 Magazine article and layout
30 Hometowners (roster and form stories)
109 Feature Stories to FHTNC
38 Hometowner photographs
305 "Letters Home" from the Commanding Officer.

PART VI

GENERAL COMMENTS

OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

CIC (Combat Information Center)

The phenomenon of trapping or ducting of radar energy has been prevalent on a number of days during this period on the "line". Extremely long ranges have been noted on the air search radar. In one instance a PB-1W was detected and tracked from a range of 110 miles at an altitude of 3000 feet. On the same day land appeared at a range of 125 miles.

Difficulty still exists in detecting and tracking Jet aircraft without IFF. Fair results have been obtained on days when ducting was evident.

Video returns on Jets in groups of four and six have been obtained at maximum ranges of 50 miles at altitudes between 15,000 and 30,000 feet using the height system of the SX fed into the PPI. Targets were detected first on the RHI scope due to the better definition. Since the sweep on the PPI was generated by the height system, it is relatively easy for a skilled operator to detect proper bearings by checking the position of the sweep at the instant the target appears on the RHI. Due to the high Pulse Repetition Rate of the height system, all contacts on the PPI are blurred.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED

This procedure enabled detection when the SX search system and the DRS-6B showed nothing. No intercepts have been tried following this procedure to date due to the lack of time to perfect the technique, however the results attained thus far indicate that further examination is merited.

PHOTOGRAPHY

During this operating period 49 photographic sorties were flown. The following numbers and types of negatives and prints have been processed by the ships photographic laboratory in support of these sorties:

Negatives

9 x 18	4,362
9½ x 9½	577

Prints

9x 18	24,383
9½ x 9½	3,180

Processed negatives and prints of reconnaissance flights are now being forwarded to the NAS Atsugi from CVA-77 via COD airplanes the day after the flight is made. This time-table requires that the laboratory processing be done as expeditiously as possible. Steps are being taken to improve the laboratory efficiency without sacrificing quality wherever possible.

A Type B-6 developing outfit has been received for evaluation. Since receipt, this unit has been in almost continuous use. A report of its operation will be submitted to ComAirPac when sufficient operational data has been accumulated to warrant a complete report.

The time required to dry aerial film has been substantially increased by the addition of two 1000 watt heating elements and a roller squeegee to the A-10-A dryer. A report will be submitted on the results obtained when evaluation has been completed.

AIR INTELLIGENCE

Flak. During the period of this report no noticeable increase or movement of A/W or Heavy AA positions were noted. Photography and pilot reports indicate that the old practice of moving AA guns has diminished considerably.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Wonsan, Hamhung, Hungnam and several other main rail and transportation centers still continue to be heavily defended as are all the major MSR's south and west of Wonsan. Coordinated events were designed to suppress flak in certain selected areas for Cherokee strikes. These events were significant in that the coordination was between the Air Groups of the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45) and the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34), each flying flak suppression for the other. These events proved highly successful though carried on without the benefit of joint briefings.

Weekly Meetings. Periodic meetings between the Staff Intelligence Officers and the Ship's Intelligence Officers have clarified many of the small details of daily operations. It is recommended that weekly meetings be held between all the Intelligence Officers on the operating carriers, thus clarifying the Staff's desires as to Strike Flash Reports, damage assessments, target selections, coordinated strikes, flak, and any other currently important intelligence matters.

Damage Assessment. The primary missions during the period of this report have been Cherokee strikes and close air support. Damage assessment has been very difficult on Cherokee strikes due to the nature of the targets and the fact that there is no air controller. Air controllers on Close Air Support missions have heretofore been giving the damage assessment as a percentage effectiveness and a percentage coverage of the target area. Fifth Air Force is now trying to standardize their method of damage assessment so that we can get a more accurate picture of actual damage done. This will be a great aid in making a more accurate strike flash report and a great morale builder for the pilots.

Daily Intelligence Summary. A daily intelligence summary is given by the Ship's Intelligence Officer over the IMC circuit to all officers and men. It includes a summary of the days operations, a short schedule for the next day, and any intelligence information that has been cleared for common usage. This has been a great help in keeping everyone interested in the overall picture.

Hong Kong. A twenty page general information Hong Kong booklet was prepared by this office on our impending visit to that port. It was found that the print shop can give excellent service on large quantity production and that enough booklets should be printed so that all hands have an individual copy.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Recommendation. It is strongly recommended that the ship's Intelligence Officer board the current operating carrier each time the ship joins CTF-77 after its period of upkeep. This procedure will insure that the ship has the very latest intelligence information and will facilitate a smooth first day of operations.

DAMAGE INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY

	DESTROYED	DAMAGED
OXCARTS	15	13
SUPPLY DUMPS	0	4
AMMO DUMPS	1	0
RR CARS	39	124
LOCOMOTIVES	1	4
RR BYPASSES	1	1
RR BRIDGES	2	10
HIWAY BRIDGES	4	1
TRUCKS	86	60
HIWAY BYPASSES	0	15
WAREHOUSES	2	4
GUN EMPLACEMENTS	34	16
POWER INSTALLATIONS	1	1
FACTORIES	1	0
BUNKERS	33	25
BARRACKS AND BLDGS	766	179
SUPPLY SHELTERS	68	58
PERSONNEL SHELTERS	42	0
VEHICLE SHELTERS	20	8
CAVES	24	3
MINE AREAS	1	0
TROOPS KILLED	40	
HIWAY CUTS	39	
RR CUTS	111	
YARDS OF TRENCHES DESTROYED	637	
TOTAL SORTIES	1,830	

PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Forty-nine photographic missions were flown during the operating period with target search as the primary mission. Camouflage is being used effectively by the enemy. Buildings are hidden in valleys, under trees or are revetted. Many are earth covered with shrubs planted on the roofs. Installations of this type are usually dispersed to preclude destruction of more than one buildings in a single strafing or bombing attack.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Increased use of small villages for storage has been observed. Attacks on these villages have resulted in large secondary explosions and gasoline or oil fires. Villages of this type are frequently found near a main supply route and are further identified by heavy track activity and lack of clutter observed in a typical Korean village.

An effort to acquaint pilots with the capabilities and limitations of photo interpretation has been made. It is recommended that all pilots become familiar with the function of photographic interpretation prior to their departure from the U.S.. In almost every case, assigned targets are discovered through photography, the pilots are briefed from photography and supplied photographs of the target for use during the actual attack. In several cases, pilots familiar with photo interpretation have easily identified installations unfamiliar to the photo interpreter, thus increasing the value of the photography.

Enlargements (19x24) of 8x10 target mosaic negatives are being used to brief pilots. These enlargements have proven to be of great assistance in the case of small or camaouflaged targets. This ship maintains a file containing the latest photographic coverage of each area. The plotting system used is an acetate overlay on a 1:250,000 chart with the UTM grid. Since this system is common in the Far Eastern Area; it is recommended that plot sheets be copied at a 1 to 1 scale on a chart utilizing the UTM grid to facilitate plotting.

During the operating period, photographic interpretation dispatch reports averaged 1,000 characters per dispatch. This includes numerals and letters. In the encrypting process, each letter and number is spelled out to prevent garbles. This further increases the length of the dispatch. There are ten regular addressees to this dispatch in addition to the other carriers which are in the operating area. The first phase photographic interpretation dispatch report is primarily for tactical information. However, during inspection of the photography, strategic information is also obtained and reported in conjunction with tactical information. The reporting of strategic information is a function of second phase photographic interpretation. Current photographic interpretation publications require the dissemination of second phase interpretation reports by mail. It is therefore believed that the communication load could be considerably reduced by the use of a mailgram which would contain all strategic information.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Visual. Visual communications were highly satisfactory except during inclement weather when visibility was seriously restricted. A summary of messages handled by signal personnel follows:

METHOD	RECEIVED	TRANSMITTED	TOTAL
Flashing light	683	207	890
Nancy	149	81	230
Flaghoist	4	54	58
Total	836	342	1178

AIR DEPARTMENT

Air Department operations during this operating period have been routine.

Present scheduling calls for four to twenty Jet aircraft to be launched for flak suppression fifteen to thirty minutes after the strike launch is begun. With the Task Force conventionally turning out of the wind immediately after the strike is launched, the attendant heel of the ship causes movement of Jet aircraft with wings folded to be extremely hazardous. Consequently, the deck spot is committed to "dead packing" the flak suppression Jets aft of the Props. When wind across the deck or the size of the Prop launch makes the deck run critical, catapulting of the first few Props is required. On only a few occasions has this been necessary but the low-wind summer months will dictate this type of launch more frequently. To prevent "blowing down" both catapults one cat is used for Jets and one for the first Propellers, launching both types simultaneously. One aspect of this type of spot is that it reduces the use of the deck-edge elevator in bringing 19000 pound Jets to the flight deck.

Difficulty has been experienced in obtaining "live" bungee for fabrication of forged-eye pendant arrestors. One day's operation was carried out utilizing used F9F inner tubes as a substitute for bungee. Three inner tubes with two nylon webbing grommets and nylon seizing holding the tubes together were used. Eight to twelve successful arrestings of the pendant were obtained.

Two F9F hook point failures were experienced resulting in strike damage to the aircraft. The annealed hook points have not yet been received.

For the first time this deployment, an HO3S-1 equipped with metal rotar blades has been assigned. A full allowance of fabric blade spares is aboard but no metal blade spares are stocked.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

The assignment to carriers of helicopters equipped with fabric rotor blades is considered desirable for two reasons: (1) it is the opinion of Valley Forge pilots that greater pilot fatigue is induced when flying a helicopter equipped with metal blades, and (2) the engaging and disengaging of the rotor is much more hazardous with metal blades.

GUNNERY DEPARTMENT

Deck Evolutions. Nine replenishments were conducted. A brief summary of replenishment data follows:

FUEL OIL AND AVIATION GASOLINE

DATE	SHIP	QUANTITY	
2-11-53	USS MISPILLION (AO-105)	8281.85	Bbls Oil
		45000	Gals Gasoline
2-15-53	USS GUADALUPE (AO-32)	5647.16	Bbls Oil
		107000	Gals Gasoline
2-19-53	USS KASKASKIA (AO-27)	4497.83	Bbls Oil
		203660	Gals Gasoline
2-23-53	USS MISPILLION (AO-105)	6605.28	Bbls Oil
		96030	Gals Gasoline
2-27-53	USS MISPILLION (AO-105)	7123.60	Bbls Oil
		159700	Gals Gasoline
3-3-53	USS GUADALUPE (AO-32)	5588.31	Bbls Oil
		104000	Gals Gasoline
3-7-53	USS GUADALUPE (AO-32)	5608.83	Bbls Oil
		186130	Gals Gasoline
3-11-53	USS MANATEE (AO-53)	4690.19	Bbls Oil
		111000	Gals Gasoline
3-15-53	USS KASKASKIA (AO-27)	5294	Bbls Oil
		11430	Gals Gasoline

AMMUNITION

DATE	SHIP	QUANTITY	TRANSFER RATE
2-11-53	USS RAINIER (AE-5)	80 Tons	66.6 tons/hr.
2-15-53	USS RAINIER (AE-5)	140 Tons	118.7 tons/hr.
2-19-53	USS VIRGO (AKA-20)	298 Tons	119.2 tons/hr.
2-23-53	USS CHARA (AKA-58)	130 Tons	111.1 tons/hr.
2-27-53	USS RAINIER (AE-5)	165 Tons	97.1 tons/hr.
3-3-53	USS RAINIER (AE-5)	154 Tons	136.3 tons/hr.
3-7-53	USS VIRGO (AKA-20)	130 Tons	113.4 tons/hr.
3-11-53	USS CHARA (AKA-58)	203 Tons	166 tons/hr.
3-15-53	USS CHARA (AKA-58)	108 Tons	132 tons/hr.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

20

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SECURITY INFORMATION

PROVISIONS

DATE	SHIP	QUANTITY	TRANSFER RATE
2-11-53	USS ALUDRA (AF-55)	51.5 Tons	60 tons/hr.
2-19-53	USS ALUDRA (AF-55)	47 Tons	56 tons/hr.
3-3-53	USS ALUDRA (AF-55)	39 Tons	78 tons/hr.
3-15-53	USS ALUDRA (AF-55)	113 Tons	108 tons/hr.

AVIATION SUPPLIES

DATE	SHIP	QUANTITY	TRANSFER RATE
2-15-53	USS CHOURRE (ARV-1)	15 Tons	33.3 tons/hr.

On 17 occasions destroyers came alongside for high-line transfers of personnel, light freight and guard mail.

Gunnery Exercises. AA firing at towed sleeves was conducted in area LOVE on 9 February while enroute Yokosuka to the Task Force. The period was of 2 hours duration. Firing was conducted on 3 replenishment days using condition 3 watch personnel. This procedure provides excellent training for those who will be called upon to fire the first rounds in event of a surprise attack. The interest and competitive spirit stimulated between the sections of the condition 3 watch are evident and gratifying.

During this period on the "line" all Line Heads of Departments have been qualified in replenishment ship approaches.

SUPPLY DEPARTMENT

Aviation Supply. During this period, non-allowance list spares continued to be the primary cause of ACOG. The 17 non-allowance list items requested on an ACOG basis will be reported in the quarterly usage report to AMC Oakland.

Ten items of aviation spares were furnished to other carriers, seven for ACOG.

Provisions Replenishment. During this period provisions were replenished three times with a total of 137.5 tons being supplied of the 196.5 tons requisitioned.

The policy of the reefers to deliver a mixture of dry, frozen and chill items in the same sling precludes expeditious stowage on the receiving ship as considerable time is wasted in segregation into proper categories. Likewise, surveys of thawed items are considered excessive due to the reefers "breaking out" in early morning with ultimate delivery in late afternoon.

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21

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

The general health of the air group and ship's company has been good. There were ninety admissions to the sick bay during the period of this report which were classified as medical. During the first few days of operations after the last in-port period, there were a considerable number of upper respiratory infections, influenza-like in character, accompanied by gastroenteritis. Most of these were handled as outpatients, only two being severe enough to require admission to the ward. No further incidence of these cases has arisen. Other acute upper respiratory infections (common cold, etc.) however, continue to lead in the number admitted to the sick list, and comprise the greatest percentage of cases seen and treated as outpatients at sick call.

The number of casualties due to shipboard accidents has been very low. Minor seven (7); major one (1).

There were three patients received from other ships for treatment. Included in this number is a pilot of Fighter Squadron NINETY-THREE, rescued by a Canadian DDE. The other two cases were contusion, right wrist; and appendicitis, acute, nec, both received from destroyers.

Medical department personnel shortage continues to be an acute problem. It has been an arduous task to perform the requirements of the department with only 60% of allowance on board.

Venereal Disease

The following is a tabulation of venereal disease incidence for the period 25 January 1953, to 10 March 1953. During this period the ship had its second in-port period in Yokosuka, from 25 January to 8 February 1953.

Syphilis	0
Chancroid	15
Urethritis, acute, due to gonococcus	16
Urethritis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec	124
Prostatitis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec	7

For comparative purposes, venereal incidence during the last reported period, from 1 January 1953, to 25 January 1953, was as follows:

Syphilis	0
Chancroid	2
Urethritis, acute, due to gonococcus	7
Urethritis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec	46
Prostatitis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec	3

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SECURITY INFORMATION

It is noted that the incidence of urethritis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec, for the present operating period is roughly three times what it was in the previous action report embracing the dates 1 January to 25 January 1953. There have been twice the number of admissions for urethritis, acute, due to gonococcus; and prostatitis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec, in comparison to the corresponding admissions of the last operating period.

This does not reflect an increasing incidence of VD among all personnel aboard. It can be attributed to two factors:

a. The in-port period in Yokosuka, preceeding the present cruise was twice as long as the first in-port period in Yokosuka, preceeding the previous cruise.

b. There are nineteen cases of resistant urethritis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec, and prostatitis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec, included in the present action report stemming from from sexual contacts made during the first Yokosuka in-port period in December 1952.

When these factors are considered, it becomes apparent that venereal incidence has not increased, but has remained at its former low level, which is considered a favorable commentary on the effectiveness of the VD educational program to-date.

Air Group

Twenty-eight (28) pilots and three (3) aircrewmen were grounded. Two (2) pilots for short periods, and two (2) for long periods. The aircrewmen were being grounded for an extended time.

ACCIDENT SUMMARY

ENS D.P. POULSON, 400956/1325, USNR, ditched an AD-4 off the port quarter due to engine failure when attempting an emergency landing on 10 February 1953. He escaped with minor lacerations of head and neck, and was rescued by helicopter.

LTJG T.B. HAYWARD, 498206/1310, USN, sustained a severe laceration of his tongue, contusion over his left eye, multiple contusions of his right shoulder and rib cage, when his F9F-5 crashed into the water immediately after being catapulted. He was soon rescued by helicopter on 24 February 1953.

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23

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SECURITY INFORMATION

LTJG K.V. MC ARTHUR, 521674/1310, USN, escaped uninjured following his ditching an AD-4 in Wonsan Harbor on 24 February 1953, following engine failure due to being hit by enemy gunfire.

LTJG H.M. DAVENPORT, JR., 503413/1310, USN, was mission and presumed drowned as he was seen entering the water in his AD-4 which had been hit by enemy gunfire North West of Wonsan, Korea, on 4 March 1953.

LTJG J.B. OVERTON, 496981/1315, USNR, sustained first and second degree burns on his face, hands and thighs, and ruptured quadriceps tendon on 4 March 1953. His F4U caught fire due to enemy gunfire near Wonsan. He parachuted and landed on the beach, however, his parachute only partially opened. He was rescued by helicopter from the USS LOS ANGELES (CA-135) while his wingman, LT L.A. HENKE, 406945/1315, USNR, flew RESCAP.

ENS D.A. BRYLA, 408037/1325, USNR, sustained a simple strain-fracture of the left ischium on 5 March 1953, when his F4U flipped over on its back as he was pulling out of a dive. The ailerons froze and he was unable to roll out to an upright position. Recovery was accomplished by then pulling through a half-loop or split "S". He was transferred to the U.S. Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, Japan.

LTJG K.C. GEDNEY, 532820/1310, USN, was missing in action on 9 March 1953, as his plane apparently failed to pull out of a dive in the presence of heavy enemy anti aircraft fire over Korea.

In was noted that symptoms of chronic fatigue developed after the first twenty-one days on the line. Morale, motivation, were markedly lowered during the latter part of the cruise. Although pilot performance was not measurably affected, it is believed that continued extension of tours over three weeks may result in a significant drop in performance not only of pilots, but also of flight and hanger deck personnel. This observation has also been made by other carriers in their previous action reports.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

CVA45/ A9-4
Ser 0129

19 March 1953

PART VII

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are made in this report.

a. Weekly meetings of Air Intelligence Officers be held. Page 15 paragraph 2.

b. Ships Air Intelligence Officers to board an operating carrier when rejoining CTF-77 in order to obtain current intelligence. Page 16 paragraph 1.

c. Pilots be familiarized with the functions of photographic interpretation prior to departure for the Combat Zone. Page 17 paragraph 2.

d. Plotting sheets be copied at a 1:1 scale. Page 17 paragraph 3.

e. Mailgram be substituted for dispatch method of reporting of strategic information to certain addressees. Page 18 paragraph 1 and 2.

R. E. DIXON

Distribution List:

CNO (advance)	2
CINCPACFLT (advance)	2
CINCPACFLT Evaluation Group	1
COMNAVFE (advance)	1
COMNAVFE Evaluation Group	1
COMSEVENTHFLT (advance)	1
CTF SEVENTY SEVEN (advance)	1
COMAIRPAC	5
COMSERVPAC	1
COMFAIRALAMEDA	1
COMFAIRJAPAN	1
Naval War College	1
COFAIRBETUPAC	2
VC 3	1
VC 11	1
VC 35	1
VC 61	1
CO, USS ESSEX (CVA-9)	1

CVA45/ A9-4
Ser 0129

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SECURITY INFORMATION

19 March 1953

CO, USS KEARSARGE (CVA-9)	1	
CO, USS ORISKANY (CVA-34)	1	
CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47)	1	
CO, USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39)	1	
CO, USS TARAWA (CVA-40)	1	
CO, USS PRINCETON (CVA-37)	1	
CO, USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)	1	1
CO, USS WASP (CVA-18)	1	
CO, USS YORKTOWN (CVA-10)	1	
CO, USS BOXER (CVA-21)	1	
NLO JOC Korea	1	
COMCARDIV ONE	1	
COMCARDIV THREE	1	
COMCARDIV FIVE	1	
COMCARDIV FIFTEEN	1	
COMCARDIV SEVENTEEN	1	
ATG-1	1	
ATG-2	1	
CVG-2	1	
CVG-5	5	
CVG-7	1	
CVG-9	1	
CVG-15	1	
CVG-19	1	
CVG-101	1	
CVG-102	1	
CVG-11	1	
COMFAIRHAWAII	1	
USS BATAAN (CVL-29)	1	
USS RENDOVA (CVE-114)	1	
USS BAIROKO (CVE-115)	1	
USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)	1	
USS SICILY (CVE-118)	1	
USS GILBERT ISLANDS (CVE-107)	1	
USS POINT CRUZ (CVE-119)	1	
USS TRIPOLI (CVE-64)	1	

U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA45)
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CVA45/A16-13
Ser 0162
17 May 1953

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA45)
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Op-55)
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces FAR EAST
(4) Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 20 April 1953 through 17 May 1953; report on

Ref: (a) OPNAV Inst 3480.4 of July 1951

Encl: (1) Carrier Air Group FIVE Action Report

1. In compliance with reference (a), the Action Report for this command for the period 20 April 1953 through 17 May 1953 is submitted herewith.

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

On 22 April 1953, the USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA45) Commanded by Captain Robert E. DIXON, USN, with RADM Apollo SOUCEK, USN, Commander Carrier Division THREE, and Carrier Air Group FIVE, embarked; joined Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in accordance with CTF 77 dispatch 160953Z of April 1953. Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN, when joined by the USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA45), was composed of the USS ORISKANY (CVA34), USS PRINCETON (CVA37), USS NEW JERSEY (BB62), USS LOS ANGELES (CA135) and various ships of the Screening Force.

The mission of this Force in general terms is to conduct air and surface operations off the coast of Korea in order to support U.N. forces in Korea, and to support the policy of the United States in the Far East.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

In order to reduce duplication, the chronology normally included in enclosure (1) is contained in the following:

4-20-53: At 0700I, departed Yokosuka, Japan for the forward area. Conducted general drills.

4-21-53: Enroute to forward area. Rendezvoused with USS ERBEN (DD631). Conducted refresher air operations and general drills.

4-22-53: Joined Task Force 77 in area Sugar. No air operations were conducted as the Task Force replenished. RADM A. SOUCEK, COMCARDIV THREE, relieved RADM R. F. HICKEY, COMCARDIV FIVE as Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. This ship replenished from the USS ALSTEDE (AF48), USS MANATEE (A058), and USS MOUNT BAKER (AE4). The USS ERBEN (DD631) was detached. The USS ORISKANY (CVA34) with COMCARDIV FIVE embarked, departed Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

4-23-53: Air operations commenced at 0230 with the launching of the hecklers and DASP. Hecklers bombed a railroad tunnel at Songjin and strafed supply buildings at Iwon. The main effort of the day was against a Cherokee target north of the I U.S. Corps. A total of 51 jet and propeller planes bombed and strafed personnel and supply shelters in this area. Skyraiders hit coastal gun positions at Wonsan and teamed up with Corsairs to fly Close Air Support for the IX and X U.S. Corps. The USS LOS ANGELES (CA135) and USS NEW JERSEY (BB62) departed the Task Force. A total of 109 sorties were flown.

4-24-53: Pre-dawn hecklers bombed and strafed a small marshalling yard and storage buildings at Sinp'o, trucks at Kowon, storage buildings, a locomotive and boxcars in the vicinity of Tanch'on. Panther jets bombed and strafed a supply area 5 miles south of Pukch'ong, a vehicle storage area 10 miles north of Hamhung and storage buildings 4 miles south of Kowon and 14 miles west of Tanch'on, propeller planes bombed a storage area south of Pukch'ong and flew Cherokee and Close Air Support Missions for the IX and X U.S. Corps. A total of 118 sorties were flown.

4-25-53: Early morning hecklers bombed and strafed storage buildings northeast of Hamhung and rail facilities in the Kilchu area. Panther jets bombed and strafed supply buildings on Hodo-Pando, at Tongch'on, northwest of Songjin, a mine disposal area on Songjon-Pando, barracks buildings and supply shelters southeast of Wonsan and flew a Cherokee strike north of the I ROK area. Propeller planes flew Cherokee and Close Air Support strikes for the IX and X U.S. Corps, Naval Gunfire spot for the USS ST PAUL (CA73) and bombed and napalmed a coastal defense complex on Hodo-Pando. The USS MANCHESTER (CL83) joined the Task Force. A total of 119 sorties were flown.

4-26-53: No air operations were conducted as the Task Force replenished. This ship replenished from the USS RAINIER (AE5) and USS MANATEE (A058). AA firing was conducted after replenishment.

4-27-53: Air operations commenced at 0630. Panther jets bombed and strafed a railroad bridge 20 miles northwest of Songjin, barracks 6 miles northwest of Wonsan and at Sang-ho on the coast south of Wonsan and Storage buildings at Tongch'on. Propeller planes bombed billeting areas southwest of Wonsan and 15 miles south of Tanch'on, caves and automatic gun positions south of Wonsan, a supply area south of Kojo and flew Close Air Support for the IX U.S. Corps. LT H. W. ENGEL (VF92) ditched his Corsair outside of the destroyer screen, due to engine failure after take-off. He was rescued, uninjured, by the PRINCETON's helicopter. A total of 89 sorties were flown.

4-28-53: Low ceilings and poor visibility limited air operations to targets near the coast. Strikes were flown against gun positions and a military area at Hodo-Pando, and supply buildings and shelters in the coastal towns below Wonsan. A total of 70 sorties were flown.

4-29-53: Although a full day's air operations were scheduled, lowering ceilings over north Korea limited sorties to ASP and Weather Recco. The USS MANCHESTER (CL83) departed the Task Force. A total of 4 sorties were flown.

4-30-53: No air operations were conducted, as the Task Force replenished. This ship replenished from the USS VIRGO (AKA20) and USS NOVASOTA (A0106). The USS MANCHESTER (CL83) joined the Task Force.

5-1-53: Air operations commenced at 0315 with the launching of the hecklers and DASP. Pre-dawn hecklers hit storage tanks and factory buildings at Ch'ongjin and supply stacks at Tanch'on. Panther jets bombed and strafed storage buildings on Hodo-Pando, a billeting area south of Wonsan, the Hamhung west air field, and flew flak suppression for the propeller planes. Corsairs flew Naval Gunfire spot for the USS NEW JERSEY (BB62) while Skyraiders flew Close Air Support for the X U.S. Corps. Both teamed up to hit coastal defenses on Kalma-Pando, Hodo-Pando and at Wonsan and on a Cherokee strike in support of the X U.S. Corps. The USS BREMERTON (CA130) joined the Task Force. A total of 108 sorties were flown.

5-2-53: Pre-dawn hecklers bombed and strafed locomotives, railroad cars and trucks along their recco routes. Panther jets hit Chosen #1 power plant, a warehouse at Ch'iltong-ni, east of Yonghung, supply buildings south of Wonsan and flew flak suppression for the Cherokee strikes in support of the X U.S. Corps. Propeller planes bombed and strafed coastal positions on Hodo-Pando, boxcars southwest of Kilchu, storage buildings at Tanch'on and the coastal area south of Wonsan and flew Cherokee strikes for the X U.S. Corps. The USS MANCHESTER (CL83) and USS BREMERTON (CA130) departed the Task Force. A total of 103 sorties were flown.

5-3-53: Pre-dawn hecklers hit Chosen #1 power plant and rail facilities. Panther jets bombed and strafed supply and storage areas at Hungnam and Hamhung, a power relay station at Hungnam and flew Cherokee and flak suppression missions. Propeller planes hit coastal gun positions on Hodo-Pando, a billeting area at Hamhung, an ammunition storage area southeast of Kilchu and flew Naval Gunfire spot for the USS NEW JERSEY (BB62) and Close Air Support and Cherokee strikes for the X U.S. Corps. A total of 107 sorties were flown.

5-4-53: No air operations were conducted, as the Task Force replenished. This ship replenished from the USS VIRGO (AKA20), USS MISPILLION (AO105), and USS PICTOR (AF27).

5-5-53: Air operations commenced with the launching of a combined strike of propeller and jet planes aimed at coastal defense guns in the Wonsan area and on Hodo-Pando. Propeller planes also flew Naval Gunfire spot for the USS NEW JERSEY (BB62) and USS BREMERTON (CA130). Dusk hecklers flew ECM missions and hit targets of opportunity on their recco routes. A total of 121 sorties were flown.

5-6-53: Panther jets on a Cherokee mission hit personnel and supply shelters north of the I ROK Corps area, made road cuts on Green 3, the main supply route running west from Wonsan and strafed coastal defenses on Hodo-Pando. Propeller planes flew Close Air Support for the IX U.S. Corps, Cherokee strikes north of the X U.S. Corps, bombed coastal defense positions on Hodo-Pando and made road cuts on Green 3. Low ceilings caused cancellation of the dusk heckler missions. A total of 96 sorties were flown.

5-7-53: Low ceilings over North Korea curtailed air operations. Both propeller and jet planes hit targets in the Hamhung area, bombing and strafing troop billeting and military supplies. A total of 46 sorties were flown. The USS NEW JERSEY (BB62) joined the Task Force. Forty-seven students from the National War College were transferred by helicopters from the USS NEW JERSEY (BB62) to witness flight operations in the afternoon and were returned to the USS NEW JERSEY (BB62) upon completion of air operations. The USS NEW JERSEY (BB62) departed the Task Force. The USS BREMERTON (CA130) joined the Task Force.

5-8-53: No air operations were conducted, as the Task Force replenished at sea. This ship replenished from the USS MISPILLION (AO105) and the USS FIREDRAKE (AE14). The USS BREMERTON (CA130) departed the Task Force.

5-9-53: Air operations commenced at 0315. Pre-dawn hecklers bombed and strafed buildings and trains between Sinch'ang-ni and Hungnam. Panther jets rocketed and strafed supply and billeting area at Hamhung north and bombed a large warehouse south of Hamhung and a large storage area south of Wonsan. Skyraiders and Corsairs teamed up to hit a military area at P'ungsang-ni, north of Hamhung and supply buildings west of Hamhung. A total of 65 sorties were flown.

5-10-53: Pre-dawn hecklers bombed and strafed storage buildings and a railroad tunnel in the vicinity of Hungnam. Low ceilings and poor visibility limited the remainder of the days air operations to CAS, ASP, and Weather Recco. A total of 23 sorties were flown. The USS BREMERTON (CA130) joined the Task Force.

5-11-53: Non-operational weather caused cancellation of all missions except ASP and CAP. A total of 14 sorties were flown.

5-12-53: No air operations were conducted, as the Task Force replenished at sea. This ship replenished from the USS RAINIER (AE5) and the USS CIMARRON (AO22). Commander, Carrier Division THREE and staff were transferred, via helicopter and the USS RAINIER (AE5) to the USS PRINCETON (CVA37). The USS BOXER (CVA21), with RADM W. D. JOHNSON, Commander, Carrier Division ONE, embarked, joined the Task Force. The USS BREMERTON (CA130) departed the Task Force.

5-13-53: Non-operational weather caused cancellation of early morning missions. Air operations commenced at 0815. Panther jets hit storage and supply buildings northwest of Tanch'on, south of Wonsan, at Hamhung, Sinch'ang-ni and at Sanso-ri, northwest of Mayang-do, railroad cars at Kowon and flew flak suppression for the propeller planes and Cherokee strikes north of II ROK Corps area. Propeller planes flew ECM missions, Naval Gunfire spot for the USS BREMERTON (CA130), Close Air Support and Cherokee missions for the IX and X U.S. Corps and bombed a military village south of Wonsan. A total of 78 sorties were flown.

5-14-53: Pre-dawn hecklers bombed and strafed boxcars at Hongwon and storage buildings in the vicinity of Hungnam. Panther jets hit a warehouse at Chigyong, west of Hungnam, supply buildings west of Kowon, on Hodo-Pando and in the coastal towns south of Wonsan, flew flak suppression for the propeller planes and a Cherokee strike north of the X U.S. Corps area. Propeller planes bombed coastal defense positions on Hodo-Pando, flew Close Air Support for the II ROK and X U.S. Corps and Cherokee missions for the IX and X U.S. Corps. A total of 65 sorties were flown. At 1011I, the USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA45) was detached from the Task Force and departed for Yokosuka, Japan in company with the USS IRWIN (DD794). At 1350I, rendezvoused with the USS RAINIER (AE5) in area Sugar to take on ammunition. Completed replenishing at 1503I and enroute to Yokosuka.

5-15-53: Enroute Yokosuka, Japan. Launched one HRS and two HO5S-1 for Pohang from the vicinity of Tsushima Straits. AA firing practice was held in area George. The USS IRWIN (DD794) was detached.

5-16-53: Enroute Yokosuka, Japan.

5-17-53: Arrived Yokosuka, Japan.

PART III

ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

The following ordnance was expended during this operating period.

	Ship
5"/38 Caliber	48
40mm	1,630
Bombs	**Aircraft**
2000# GP	92
1000# GP	392
1000# SAP	3
500# GP	505
500# SAP	5
250# GP	2,613
100# GP	310
220/260# Frag.	162
100# Incendiary	541
Rockets	
3.5" Solid	47
3.5" Smoke	44
5" HVAR	254
5" ATAR	270
A/C Parachute Flares	291
Napalm	101
Gun Ammunition	
20mm	162,366
50 Cal.	115,965

The data on hung ordnance experienced during this period is included in enclosure (1).

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

The ship was not attacked during this period and sustained no battle damage.

Damage inflicted on Communist forces by Air Group FIVE is included in enclosure (1) of this report.

Damage inflicted on Air Group FIVE by Communist forces is included in enclosure (1) of this report.

PART V

PERFORMANCE OF PERSONNEL AND CASUALTIES

The morale and performance of the ship and air group personnel has been excellent during this period.

The results of a continous "on the job" training program was reflected in the excellent teamwork displayed by all personnel. An average of 1963 ship's company enlisted personnel was embarked of which 608 were petty officers, 1355 non-rated men.

During the operating period, 5 men were received; 11 transferred. 41 men were absent on temporary additional duty at the commencement of the period. 8 men returned and 9 others departed on TAD during the period.

With an average of 608 petty officers and 1355 non-rated men, the overall on-board count proved adequate. A critical shortage still exists, however, in the ET ratings, as well as a shortage of FT ratings. A Ground Camera Repairman (PH-3992) is still urgently required.

Morale was very good and showed no appreciable decline despite the short extension of the ship's tour in the WesPac Area. During the period, 6 men submitted requests for emergency leave. Only 1 request was disapproved as a result of not fulfilling the criteria established by COMNAVFE. Two men were granted annual leave to the Philippine Islands.

There was a total of 112 ship's company officers on board during this period, 32 of whom are ensigns. Of that total figure 10 Lieutenants (junior grade), 3 Lieutenants and 1 Lieutenant Commander have orders for detachment. In view of these impending detachments of experienced officers, responsible positions have, of necessity, been assigned to senior ensigns; several of which are Division Officers.

Twenty-two wardroom guests from the Air Force and Army were on board during this operating period. The duration of their stay varied between 3 and 9 days.

8

LT Harry W. ENGEL, 417784/1315, USNR, experienced power failure in his F4U-4 after being launched from the USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA45) on 27 April 1953. He accomplished a good water landing and was rescued uninjured by helicopter.

PART VI

GENERAL COMMENTS

OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

CIC

Operations within CIC have been normal throughout this period on the line. A three section watch schedule has been maintained with a total of forty-nine men. This has necessitated reducing the number of stations manned under conditions other than general quarters. The over-all efficiency of the CIC team is considered to be better with this schedule in effect than with a two-section watch because of a reduction in the fatigue factor.

All officers attached to CIC are qualified air controllers with the exception of three recent CIC school graduates, who will be qualified prior to the end of this cruise. One RD3 has been recently qualified as an air controller and has proved very competent in all phases of air controlling.

A training program is in effect to qualify all CIC officer personnel as OOD underway, with an estimated completion date of 1 July 1953.

All radars operated normally throughout the period with the exception of the SPS-6B which suffered a high power transformer failure. Maximum ranges on the air search radars varied throughout the period due to atmospheric conditions. The maximum range received on the SPS-6B without use of IFF was sixty miles with four jets at 15,000 feet. Surface targets were detected on both SX and SPS-6B radars at one-hundred miles on frequent occasions.

COMMUNICATIONS

Considerable difficulty was experienced in obtaining replies to service messages. Frequently, even requested retransmissions of important operational messages of high precedence were dangerously slow. The greatest delays in obtaining repetitions

of messages were experienced when ships in company could not service such messages satisfactorily and it was thus necessary to obtain such retransmissions from the originator, Radio Guam, or Radio Yokosuka.

Experience reveals that uneconomical and unnecessary losses of time occur in the decryption of messages in Category Baker systems. An outstanding example is provided in the case of Hydro messages addressed to all naval units in the Pacific Ocean Areas. Originators of general messages transmitted by Radio Washington follow the commendable practice of reencrypting such messages in Category Able systems for the convenience of holders of Class 3 crypto systems. Emulation of this practice by other originators of messages to multiple addressees, when practicable, is recommended.

PHOTOGRAPHIC LABORATORY

Nineteen (19) men are assigned to the photographic laboratory, of which seven (7) are petty officers and two (2) designated PHAN. The proficiency and efficiency of all personnel has shown a great deal of improvement since an intensive training program was initiated. This program is on a competitive, rather than a required basis, the effect of which is to instill greater interest on the part of the personnel.

The following number and type of negatives and prints have been processed by the ship's photographic laboratory during this period:

Negatives		Prints	
9"x18"	5,519	9"x18"	30,428
9"x9"	415	9"x9"	2,454
7"x7"	200	7"x7"	200
8"x10"	730	8"x10"	4,225

No unusual difficulties were encountered during this period of operation.

AIR INTELLIGENCE

The Air Intelligence Office functioned with exceptional smoothness during this tour. With the standardization of operations and the constant use of time saving aids, this office found it possible to have the greater part of the intelligence data ready for the pilots by 1930 each night.

/0

This enabled the pilots to study their targets thoroughly the night before.

Flak - The following system was found to be most satisfactory for carrier type operations: All flak is plotted on 1:50,000 charts which are divided into convenient size sections (36"x30") and mounted on heavy cardboard. The standard flak symbols are used denoting flak confirmed by photo interpretation while special burst type symbols are used denoting flak taken from pilot reports. All recco routes and the bombline are superimposed on the charts. This system not only enables the squadron air intelligence officers to brief directly from the charts by taking them to their ready rooms, but eliminates the necessity of having each squadron A.I.O. keep a seqarate plot for flak, bombline and recco routes. At the end of each squadron briefing each air intelligence officer returns the charts to the A.I.O. Office. These charts have the very latest flak, recco, and bombline information plotted at all times.

PHOTO INTREPRETATION

Forty-one photographic sorties were flown during this period on the line. An Image Motion Compensator, similar to the compensator developed by VC61 Unit Mike, aboard the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA47), was constructed and used by the VC61 Unit aboard this ship with excellent results. The Image Motion Compensator serves to reduce the relative motion of the camera over the earth's surface. This enables the photo pilot to fly at increased speeds and lower altitudes and continue to maintain a maximum circle of confusion of 1/250".

Photographic sorties previously flown at 15,000 feet with the K-38 36" lens camera and at a speed of approximately 180 knots indicated because of equipment limitations are now being flown using the Image Motion Compensator at approximately 260 knots indicated without enlarging the circle of confusion and in most cases reducing it. The speed of 260 knots indicated was chosen for maximum jet range. Higher speeds can be used if desired.

It should be pointed out that the Image Motion Compensator in use by VC61 Unit Baker was constructed aboard the VALLEY FORGE at sea as a combined ship-air group project.

AIR DEPARTMENT

VALLEY FORGE was forced to replace an Oilgear Type DR 15035 Mod 1 pump on the starboard catapult during this period. This experience leads to the conclusion that ship's force can replace any such pump in an overnight period. In this case, easiest access from the hangar deck to the pump room was through a trunk in the No. 1 elevator pit. Using hoisting tackle rigged to the underside of the elevator, the pump was lowered, using the elevator itself for most of the drop and the hoisting tackle for the critical last few inches. The catapult crew has constructed a timber skid, level with the pump base, onto which the old pump was slid and then easily moved by means of chain falls and Yale pul-lift chain jacks. The new pump was slid into position using the reverse of this process. Corner braces and dowel pins had to be removed due to slight differences in pump cases. Proper alignment was checked by using a straight edge across the flats ground on both parts of the couplings. Instructions on valves to be closed and other details were found in the Pump Manual (Bulletin #91521A). The installation proved very satisfactory.

A second pump of the same type failed during the period, and lacking a second spare, the ship effected emergency repairs and successfully reactivated the pump at sea. Installed in January 1952, the pump log showed 3420 catapult shots or an estimated 220 hours running time. It was rendered inoperative by bearing failure. The pump was completely disassembled, checked, and new bearings installed. Difficulties were encountered due to lack of satisfactory equipment for removing and installing bearings and for handling the heavy parts in the restricted area of the pump room. The pump is again operating satisfactorily.

In an emergency, a pump can be repaired at sea if the failure is such that available replacement parts and tools can do the job. This is at best a difficult undertaking. It is gratifying to know that catapult crews possess sufficient talent and skill to accomplish this bearing replacement. However, it is an arduous task while the ship is rolling and still conducting full scale Task Force operations.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

A total of eighteen (18) patients were admitted to the sick list on the medical service. Significant in these are two

additional cases of hypersensitivity to sulfadiazine. In one case the manifestations were in the nature of a generalized urticaria and was thought to be due to a true hypersensitivity to the sulfonamide, while the other patient complained of renal colic and sulfadiazine crystals were demonstrated in the urine. This was probably due to insolubility in the urine despite adequate alkalinization and fluid intake. In view of the considerable number of cases receiving sulfonamides in the treatment of venereal disease, these incidences of hypersensitivity to the preparation assume added importance. The use of one of the triple sulfonamide compounds or Gantrisin is highly recommended.

The following is a tabulation of the medical admissions during the period covered by this report:

EENT	8
SKIN	4
Miscellaneous	6

The following is a tabulation of the work accomplished in the sick bay laboratory during the month of April 1953:

Bateriology	681
Serology	141
Urinalysis	55
Hematology	44
Special examinations	13

Venereal Disease - The following is a tabulation of venereal disease incidence for the period 9 April 1953, through 10 May 1953:

Syphilis	0
Chancroid	9
Urethritis, acute, due to gonococcus	13
Urethritis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec	67
Prostatitis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec	4
Total, all venereal diseases	93

For comparative purposes, venereal incidence during the three periods previously reported on was:

	1st Period	2nd Period	3rd Period
Syphilis	0	0	0
Chancroid	2	15	3

	1st Period	2nd Period	3rd Period
Urethritis, acute, due to gonococcus	7	16	11
Urethritis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec	46	124	53
Prostatitis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec	3	7	8
Total, all venereal diseases	58	162	75

Venereal disease incidence aboard the VALLEY FORGE as compared with venereal disease incidence given for ships of the Pacific Fleet (Statistics of Navy Medicine, April 1953, Vol. 9, No. 4) is as follows:

	Ships of Pacific Fleet	USS VALLEY FORGE
Urethritis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec	4.7%	4.1%
All other VD (Syphilis, GC, Chancroid)	8.9%	1.7%
Total incidence of VD	13.6%	5.8%

It is felt that low incidence of syphilis, gonorrhea and chancroid is due to:

Good participation by ship's personnel in the penicillin tablet prophylaxis program following sexual exposure.

The practice by exposed persons of thoroughly washing the genitalia following intercourse.

Abstention.

Difficulty in further reducing the incidents of urethrities, acute, non-gonococcic appears to be the failure to use a condon despite repeated instructions and lectures.

Air Group - The general health of the air group has been good. Five (5) pilots and one crewman were grounded for periods of two to three days due to upper respiratory infections. One pilot was grounded this entire cruise due to a fractured hand.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

TRAINING

During this period, the ship's education program maintained the pace it has kept throughout the tour. The training room was used extensively for divisional classes, guidance lectures, religious gatherings (evenings), and group study. The I & E program flourished at all hours; 124 sections of the GED High School Test, USAFI End of Course tests were administered. 20 new men enrolled in Enlisted Correspondence Courses.

13

RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES

Protestant-Daily Devotions were conducted at 0700 and 2100. On Monday, Wednesday and Friday Bible Class was taught, and a Latter Day Saints Service was held at 2000 on Thursday. Sunday Services were held at 0815 for Communion and at 0900 and 1430 regular Divine Services were conducted. Sunday School was held at 1000 and Protestant Fellowship services at 2030. An Evangelistic Service was held at 2100.

Catholic-Daily Mass was offered at 0630, the Rosary was recited at 1830 and confessions were held on Saturday at 1900. Sunday Masses were offered at 0630, 0900, and 1430 with benediction following the 0900 Mass.

The two Chaplains on board alternated in delivering prayer over the communication system at taps each evening. They also conducted Character Guidance Lectures, concentrating on the lecture, "MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE", which has now been given to 75 percent of the crew and will be continued until all of the crew has heard the lecture.

RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Movies were shown nightly in the Wardroom, Warrant Officer's Lounge, CPO Lounge, First Class PO Mess and at two locations on the Mess Decks. The night before replenishment, two movies were shown on the Hangar Deck.

The Library and Crew's Lounge were open from 0615 to 2100 daily. Library books and magazines were available and adequately distributed.

Hobby Shop materials were offered for sale and there was a good demand for them.

The ship's internal radio station maintained continuous daily broadcasting on two channels from 0615 until 2100. One channel of this facility used exclusively for radio-received broadcasts and the other was used to broadcast locally produced programs.

PUBLIC INFORMATION

Material released:

6 news feature stories and layouts (by mail).
14 news photo releases.
31 hometown news stories (to FHTNC).
356 hometown news stories by roster.

19 hometown photographs (to FHTNC).

Additional events of public information importance:

Alfred P. Rochester, Chairman of the City Council of Seattle, embarked for transportation from Yokosuka, Japan, to the operating area from 20 April to 22 April 1953. While aboard, he interviewed men from Seattle and surrounding area for material for his guest column in the "Seattle Times."

Howard L. Beaufait, correspondent for the "Cleveland News", was on board from 9 May to 11 May 1953. While aboard, he interviewed men from the Cleveland area for home-town news stories.

DISCIPLINE

During this period 32 personnel were taken to Captain's Mast, of this total 2 were assigned Summary Courts-Martial and 12 Special Courts-Martial.

GUNNERY DEPARTMENT

Deck Evolutions - Seven (7) replenishments were conducted during this period. A brief summary of replenishment data follows:

Fuel Oil and Aviation Gasoline

Date	Ship	Quantity	
4-22-53	USS MANATEE (A058)	4,518	Bbls Oil
		51,260	Gals Gasoline
4-26-53	USS MANATEE (A058)	8,038	Bbls Oil
		206,070	Gals Gasoline
4-30-53	USS NOVASOTA (A0106)	6,036	Bbls Oil
		98,200	Gals Gasoline
5-4-53	USS MISPILLION (A0105)	7,949	Bbls Oil
		72,160	Gals Gasoline
5-8-53	USS MISPILLION (A0105)	7,135	Bbls Oil
		139,560	Gals Gasoline
5-12-53	USS CIMARRON (A022)	5,695	Bbls Oil
		63,330	Gals Gasoline

15

Ammunition

Date	Ship	Quantity	Transfer Rate
4-22-53	USS MOUNT BAKER (AE4)	47 tons	128.18 tons
4-26-53	USS RAINIER (AE5)	282 tons	143.39 tons
4-30-53	USS VIRGO (AKA20)	136 tons	85.89 tons
5-4-53	USS VIRGO (AKA20)	229 tons	85.34 tons
5-8-53	USS FIREDRAKE (AE14)	223 tons	121.64 tons
5-12-53	USS RAINIER (AE5)	62 tons	37.58 tons
5-14-53	USS RAINIER (AE5)	80 tons	126.32 tons

Provisions

Date	Ship	Quantity	Transfer Rate
4-22-53	USS ALSTEDE (AF48)	67.5 tons	5.79 tons
5-4-53	USS PICTOR (AF27)	76.25 tons	35.23 tons

A total of eighty-four (84) personnel were transferred between the VALLEY FORGE and various replenishment ships and destroyers while alongside by means of the highline and burtoning whips rigged with Bos'ns chair and with Salmon board.

On sixteen (16) occasions, destroyers came alongside for highline transfers of personnel, light freight, and guard mail.

PART VII

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are contained in this report:

The use of Category Able system for messages to multiple addressees, paragraph 2, page 10.

The use of the triple sulfonamide or compounds of gantrisin in the treatment of venereal disease, paragraph 1, page 13.

R. E. DIXON



CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

ORIGINAL

DECLASSIFIED

U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE CVA-45
AND AIR GROUP FIVE

ACTION REPORT

25 MAY 1953 TO 9 JUNE 1953

AND

SUMMARY REPORT

31 DEC. 1952 TO 9 JUNE 1953

U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA45)
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CVA45/A16-13
Ser 0177
14 Jun 1953

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA45)
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Op-55)
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces FAR EAST
(4) Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 25 May 1953 through 9 June 1953 and Summary Report for period 31 December 1952 through 9 June 1953; submission of

Ref: (a) OPNAV Inst 3480.4 of July 1951

Encl: (1) Carrier Air Group FIVE Action Report

1. In compliance with reference (a), the Action Report for this command for the period 25 May 1953 through 9 June 1953 is submitted herewith. In addition, comments relative to the experiences of this command during the entire cruise are included in Part VI of this report and in enclosure (1).

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

On 27 May 1953, the USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA45) Commanded by Captain Robert E. DIXON, USN, with Carrier Air Group FIVE, embarked; joined Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in accordance with CTF 77 dispatch 220240Z of May 1953. Upon joining, Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN was composed of the USS BOXER (CVA21), USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA47), and various ships of the Screening Force.

The mission of this Force in general terms was to conduct air and surface operations off the coast of Korea in order to support U.N. forces in Korea, and to support the policy of the United States in the Far East.

6-1-53: The Task Force replenished in the morning. This ship replenished from the USS CHIKASKIA (AO54). Air operations commenced at 1315. Panther jets flew Cherokee strikes north of the II ROK area, while propeller planes flew Close Air Support for the II ROK and X U.S. Corps. A total of 50 sorties were flown. The USS MANCHESTER (CL83) departed the Task Force.

6-2-53: Air operations commenced at 0200. Pre-dawn hecklers hit trains in the Tanch'on area and storage buildings at Sinch'ang-ni and Kokku, south of Tanch'on. Panther jets bombed supply buildings at Kojo and Pukch'ong and flew Cherokee strikes north of the II ROK and X U.S. Corps area. Corsairs flew Naval Gunfire Spot for the USS MANCHESTER (CL83) and teamed up with the Skyraiders to fly Close Air Support for the I, IX, and X U.S. and II ROK Corps. A total of 123 sorties were flown. The USS MANCHESTER (CL83) joined the Task Force.

6-3-53: Pre-dawn hecklers bombed a power sub-station and trains at Hungnam and storage buildings north of Sinch'ang-ni. Panther jets hit gun positions at Wonsan, a locomotive and boxcars at Hungnam, storage buildings west of the Pujon'gang Reservoir, northeast of Hungnam and southeast of Kilchu. Propeller planes bombed caves and gun positions at Wonsan and flew Close Air Support for the II ROK Corp. While on a strike at Wonsan, Ensign T. Y. KORSGREN's (VF54) Skyraider was hit by enemy fire. He bailed out over Wonsan Harbor and was picked up by helicopter, uninjured, southwest of Yodo Island. A total of 122 sorties were flown.

6-4-53: No air operations were conducted as the Task Force replenished. This ship replenished from the USS CHIKASKIA (AO54), USS MOUNT BAKER (AE4), and USS POLARIS (AF11). The USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA47), COMCARDIV THREE embarked, joined the Task Force. The USS MANCHESTER (CL83) departed the Task Force. RADM R. E. BLICK, USN, COMCARDIV THREE relieved RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, COMCARDIV ONE as Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

6-5-53: Air operations commenced at 0915. Panther jets rocketed Chosen #1 power plant, bombed a mining area south of the Changjin-gang Reservoir and a billeting area north of the I Corps. Propeller planes flew Close Air Support for the

I, IX, and X U.S. and II ROK Corps. A total of 75 sorties were flown. During the afternoon, RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, COMCARDIV ONE and his staff were transferred from the USS BOXER (CVA21) to the USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA45) via helicopters and destroyers.

6-6-53: VADM J. CLARK, USN, COM7THFLT presented awards to officers and enlisted personnel of the VALLEY FORGE and Air Group FIVE for their outstanding performance during the past cruise. During the afternoon, aircraft were transferred to the USS BOXER (CVA21), King 6, and NAS, Atsugi, Japan. The USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA45) and USS OBANNON (DDE450) were detached from the Task Force.

6-7-53: Enroute Yokosuka, Japan.

6-8-53: Enroute Yokosuka, Japan. Typhoon "Judy" necessitated a change in voyage routing and introduced necessary delays enroute. The USS OBANNON (DDE45) was detached.

6-9-53: The remainder of the aircraft to be delivered to NAS, Atsugi were launched. Arrived Yokosuka, Japan.

6-10-53: RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, COMCARDIV ONE and his staff were transferred from the USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA45) to the USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA39).

PART III

ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

The following ordnance was expended during this period:

	Ship
5"/38 Caliber	0
40mm	0
Bombs	**Aircraft**
2000# GP	78
1000# GP	112
1000# SAP	9
500# GP	252
500# SAP	10

250# GP	962
100# GP	268
220/260# Frag	448

Rockets

3.5" Solid	26
5" ATAR	265
A/C Parachute Flares	174
Napalm	16

Gun Ammunition

20mm	82,495
50 Caliber	33,735

The data on hung ordnance experienced during this period is included in enclosure (1). (Also, see page 29, on Rocket Barrier).

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

The ship was not attacked during this period and sustained no battle damage.

Damage inflicted on Communist forces by Air Group FIVE is included in enclosure (1) of this report.

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PART V

PERFORMANCE OF PERSONNEL AND CASUALTIES

Personnel performance during this last tour of operations in the forward area was excellent.

The shortage of petty officers in some ratings was alleviated with the advancement in ratings on 16 May 1953. A shortage still exists however, in the ET and FT ratings. The ship is still somewhat under-complemented in the stewardsman ratings which causes some difficulties in the wardroom.

Morale continued to be excellent, spurred by the large number of advancements in ratings in May and proximity of the tour's end.

Ensign Theodore Y. KORSGREN, JR., 554621/1325, USNR, bailed out of his AD4NA over Wonsan Harbor as a result of his plane being hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire. He was rescued uninjured by helicopter from LST 1138. An afternoon flight picked Ensign KORSGREN up at Yodo Island and he was back aboard the VALLEY FORGE the same day.

On 6 June 1953, the last day of operations, 4 rounds of 20mm ammunition were accidentally fired from the number 4 gun of F9F BuNo 126058 damaging F9F BuNo 126132 and injuring ODIAN, Robert (n), 460 71 91, ADAN, VF53. He sustained serious missile wounds involving the left ankle, left leg, right leg, left groin, left arm and left hand, plus various small lacerations of the chest wall and face. His wounds and fractures were repaired in surgery, and his condition, while serious, is satisfactory. The cause of the firing is undetermined and is the subject of a Board of Investigation convened by this command. A full report of the incident will be forwarded when completed by the board.

PART VI

GENERAL COMMENTS

OPERATIONS

Air Intelligence

The fifth and final period of operations on the line presented no unusual problems or developments in intelligence. The smoothness and efficiency with which the A.I. office had been functioning continued at its high level.

An improvement to the intelligence program was introduced by COMCARDIV ONE Intelligence Office. This was the issuance of 1/30,000 scale photos of the Cherokee target area. These photos instead of the previously used target charts are highly recommended especially for carriers for the first time on the line. It enables the new pilot to better familiarize himself with the terrain and insure a quicker and more positive identification of the target. Although Air Group FIVE pilots

were experienced, use of the area photos was well received and proved to be a help in quicker orientation.

Communications

Communications in general were improved during this period. The primary reason being the reduced traffic load which resulted from not having a flag embarked.

It was noted that the net control station on CW circuits often used the operating signal ZBM2 (place a competant operator on watch) when an operator could not copy a speed key. Frequently it appeared that traffic conditions did not warrant use of a speed key. It is considered that with the lack of qualified speed key operators usually on board, traffic would usually be delivered as expeditously if the transmitting station used a standard key at the speed of the slowest operator on the circuit.

CW circuit discipline could be improved for the most part. There were numerous instances of improper usage of break-in procedure on the JOC Korea CW circuit, which thereby resulted in delays and confusion.

During this period on the line a total of 5,301 messages were handled by Radio Central with 306 sent and 4,995 received.

Photographic Laboratory

Eighteen photographic sorties were flown during this operating period and the following work performed:

Negatives		Prints	
9x18"	1,620	9x18"	6,700
9x9"	230	9x9"	473
7x7"	25	7x7"	25
8x10"	10	8x10"	1,821

GUNNERY

Refueling

During the period, the VALLEY FORGE went alongside 3 ships for refueling. Dates, ships, and pertinent data are shown in the summary part of this report.

Re-Arming

In the same period, the VALLEY FORGE went alongside 2 ships for ammunition. Dates, ships, and pertinent data are shown in the summary part of this report.

Supplies

During the same period, the VALLEY FORGE went alongside 1 ship for provisions. Date, ship, and pertinent data are shown in the summary part of this report.

Miscellaneous

Highline transfers of personnel and light freight were made on 3 occasions.

EXECUTIVE

Recreation

The crew's library has been open daily from 0615 to 2100, and the crew's lounge has been open daily after working hours. A weekly newspaper "Take-off" has been published and distributed each Sunday with the morning press and from 27 May to 2 June 1953 copies of "Stars and Stripes" obtained by COD flight, have been distributed on board.

Religious Activities

Protestant Divine Services were conducted twice on Sundays and Devotions were conducted twice on week days. Sunday school was held every Sunday and a week-day Bible Class met on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday while the ship was at sea. The Protestant Fellowship met each Sunday evening followed by an Evangelistic Service. Latter Day Saints Services were held each Sunday and a Latter Day Saints Training Class was held on Thursday of each week. The series of lectures on "Marriage and Family Life" were completed and a new series on "Moral Responsibilities" were started.

Catholic Mass and Rosary were held daily in the Training Room. Confessions were heard on Saturday evening in the Chaplain's Office. Masses were offered on Sundays at 0630, 0900, and 1430 with Benediction following the second Mass.

The second annual Pontifical Mass of Thanksgiving and Communion Breakfast were held at the Naval Base, Yokosuka, Japan, on 21 May 1953.

The daily prayer at taps was offered by both Chaplains on alternate nights. Daily visits were made to the Sick Bay and occasional visits to the Brig.

Training

Shipboard training went along with regularity on the last lap of the cruise. Most of the training continued to be on-the-job training. The training room was utilized extensively for lectures, training films, group study classes, and in the evenings, religious services. The Algebra class completed its course of study at the end of the period. The testing center remained active in giving GED examinations and USAFI end-of-course tests.

Public Information

With the ship's arrival in the U.S. imminent, concentration of effort has been on material to be presented to the press relative to the ship's homecoming. This material included recapitulations of highlights of the news features occurring during the deployment period and biographies and rosters of the ship's officers and crew. In addition, the following material was prepared for release during the period 27 April to 6 June 1953:

10	Navy news dispatches, by radio.
2	news photographs releases.
2	news feature stories and layouts.
15	hometown feature stories (to FHTNC).
1534	hometown stories by roster (to FHTNC).
12	hometown photographs (to FHTNC).
1	magazine article submitted.

MEDICAL

A total of eighteen patients were admitted to the sick list on the medical service. There were two cases of hepatitis, acute, infectious, with jaundice. Following is a tabulation of medical admissions:

EENT	11
GI	3

SKIN	1
MISCELLANEOUS	3
Total	18

Venereal Disease

The following is a tabulation of venereal disease incidence for the period 11 May 1953 through 6 June 1953:

Syphilis	0
Chancroid	3
Urethritis, acute, due to gonococcus	13
Urethritis, acute, non-gonococcis, nec	42
Prostatitis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec	0
Total	58

Air Group

The morale and health of the air group has been good. Two pilots were grounded for a period of two days, and two pilots for longer periods due to appendicitis and bursitis.

CRUISE SUMMARY
31 December 1952 through 9 June 1953

OPERATIONS

The assignment of a two day enroute period between Yokosuka and the Task Force should be recognized as a marginal operation. With a 25 knot SOA authorized the trip is feasible, but a very small margin remains in order to accomplish other required or desirable operations. The uncertain currents encountered enroute quite often require 27 knots through the water to make 25 knots good over the ground. Before joining the Task Force, it is highly desirable to refresh the air group and air department personnel and to fly all aircraft at least once in order to correct all mechanical deficiencies incurred during the in port period. It is mandatory to conduct an ECM exercise at least once during a tour with the Task Force (COMNAVFE requirement) and desirable to conduct a joint exercise with the JADF. Further, a gunnery firing exercise should be conducted enroute if possible. Refueling of the escort destroyer is sometimes directed. The two day enroute period with the other requirements obviously permits

flight operations only when weather and wind conditions are ideal, and these must of a necessity be held to a minimum. It is recommended that a three day enroute period with an appropriate SOA be authorized whenever possible.

Air Intelligence

During the past six months of combat operations, the organization and scope of the intelligence office improved with the experience gained during its previous tours on the line. Flak studies still continue to be one of the most important functions of the intelligence office. A concentrated effort was made to insure that the latest flak positions were positively presented to the pilots. Flak summaries and indices followed one another frequently and changes to the flak charts were made daily. The effectiveness of the flak analysis program on the ship is at least partly reflected in the low number of casualties and aircraft lost during the cruise by Air Group FIVE.

The organization of the ship-air group intelligence team remained unchanged throughout the entire cruise. At the commencement of the cruise all but one of the officers and half of the enlisted men assigned to the team were inexperienced in the combat phase of air intelligence.

The Air Group AIO was assigned to work as an assistant Air Intelligence Officer in the ship's office. In addition to augmenting the complement of the office, he was able to gain experience in other phases of intelligence. This arrangement has proved highly satisfactory for the past two cruises by the VALLEY FORGE. It is recommended that the Air Group AIO be given temporary additional duty to the ship for carriers deploying to the Far East.

The enlisted complement of 4 men in the Intelligence Office was reduced by the loss of one during the cruise, and this proved to be somewhat of a handicap. It is recommended that 4 enlisted personnel be the minimum assigned to the ship's office if a 24-hour watch is to be maintained. All non-rated men were rated during the cruise and were assigned the Air Intelligence Specialist Job Code Number 9936. When practicable, all enlisted personnel should be a graduate of the enlisted AirPac Intelligence School. It is recommended that an Air

Intelligence Specialist rating be originated, since the time available while working on the line makes study and training for advancement in other rates very difficult. Further, no time is readily available for any practical application of knowledge gained in the rate earned. Separate correspondence is being originated on this subject.

The stowage spaces in the Intelligence Office fail to allow adequate room for properly caring for security information, confidential and above. In order to make available space in the safe and other stowage spaces, periodic burning of material was held. All pertinent and operational information was removed from periodicals, etc., put in special folders and retained. Only a limited number of operational charts could be kept in the office. All other charts were stowed in a fan room or other convenient space available. The photo interpreters continued to work in the Intelligence Office. Although this presented a hardship, the benefits gained by the ship and squadron AIOs working in the same space more than offset the disadvantages of close quarters.

CIC

The general installation design of the Combat Information Center on the CVA class ship is functional and adequate for the type of operations conducted in the Task Force at present. Since major emphasis is placed on the air phase of CIC, the CIC watch officer has ready access to all information necessary for fulfilling his mission. However, in a general situation wherein the surface phase must be given more consideration (i.e. HUK Operations), the present design presents a problem. The air and surface pictures are so widely separated that the CIC watch officer has considerable difficulty in adequately supervising both operations. This requires the designation of a surface watch officer in addition to the CIC watch officer thereby increasing the officer requirements for CIC.

This problem can be resolved by re-designing the CIC with both the air and surface pictures grouped around the CIC watch officer's station in a semi-circular fashion, thereby enabling him to supervise and coordinate the two operations.

The ECM equipment location is unsatisfactory from the standpoint of adequate supervision with a minimum of personnel assigned to CIC, a situation which prevailed throughout the cruise. The relocation of this equipment within the CIC, or

adjacent thereto will serve as a palliative in this respect. Present ship alteration plans include this change.

The number of CIC school trained officers available was adequate for filling all CIC billets. However, the enlisted personnel problem was critical throughout the cruise. The greatest number of men available to the O-I Division at any one time was fifty-four. This included eight men in Class "A" School on a returnable quota and those assigned from the division to mess cooking, MAA force, etc. This situation, aggravated by the supplemental functions of a flagship, necessitated a two-section watch schedule during the first two tours on the line. The fatigue factor, which rapidly increased under this schedule required internal adjustments, accepting otherwise undersirable compounding of duties, to permit a three-section watch schedule.

Subsequent to the return of the Class "A" School graduates, a directive was received to transfer to COMAIRPAC four RD3s because of an over-complement in that rate. At that time, there existed an under-complement of 12 RDCs, RD1s, and RD2s. The transfer of the four RD3s worked a serious hardship at a time when the services of trained men were at a premium.

The radar and allied equipment functioned satisfactorily throughout the cruise. The failures experienced were those normally to be expected in prolonged periods of operations. These were kept to a minimum by a continued and vigorous preventive maintenance program prosecuted by the electronics technicians.

The IFF equipment proved of inestimable value in the aircraft control function, the integral antennas proving generally more reliable than the slave antenna.

An experiment with two colors on the vertical plot was conducted and proved highly satisfactory from an evaluator's point of view. All unidentified air contacts were plotted in dark red with friendly air contacts being plotted in yellow. The proper symbols were used with the only deviation being in the colors employed. As air contacts became identified, the color was shifted from red to yellow. The initial reaction to change and ineptness of the vertical plotters in coordinating the proper use of two colors was overcome with practice. The two color presentation allowed the air situation

to be immediately apparent to the evaluator, the CIC officer, and such staff CIC and gunnery liason officers as are required to divide their attention among several simultaneous duties.

The need for a general understanding of the CIC functions on the part of all personnel concerned in operating a fighting ship was self-evident, and was largely satisfied by an exchange of personnel and a general indoctrination program between bridge, air group, and CIC personnel.

The value of having the URD-2 direction finder located convenient to the air controller was proved many times, as it is indispensable to him in discharging his responsibilities.

The lack of frequency separation in the FAD net channels caused feed-over and reduced the flexibility intended by the establishment of the several channels within the net. This lack of separation also hampered, and in many cases, precluded the use of middleman, a feature sorely needed to gain over-target data, particularly during marginal weather.

The re-establishment of the AC net would materially reduce the often prohibitive traffic on the presently used combined CI-AC net. The establishment, within Task Force 77 of the Air Ops net helped relieve the situation somewhat. The implementation of project SHAMROCK presents an excellent opportunity for rectification of this discrepancy.

Communications

In a period of 97 days with the Task Force a total of 78,177 messages were handled by radio for an average of 805.9 messages a day. Of the total figure 13,116 were transmitted and 65,061 received.

It is recommended that Signal Bridge personnel exercise greater care in assigning relay instructions for messages addressed to the Task Force or all ships present. Instances occurred in which screen group ships have had station indicators close up and were in the process of changing stations when relay instructions were assigned. If the screening ship moved to a station distant from the ship assigned to relay the message, delay in delivery and excessive transmissions resulted.

In the readdressal of messages, readdressal headings should be made in accordance with effective publications rather than using the operating signal ZFH1 followed by the call signs of the readdressal addees. This procedure results in an erroneous change of heading rather than a readdressal, and causes confusion as to the correct originator.

Radio equipment has been subjected to severe usage and wear in four combat tours. Equipment outages were successfully kept to a minimum by a strenuous preventive maintenance program employed by the electronics technicians.

Photographic Interpretation

During the first three tours on the line, the personnel assigned to the photo interpretation section were one officer, photo interpreter, (LT), and two enlisted photo readers (PH3). After the third tour an additional photo interpreter (ENS) reported for duty. It is believed that two photo interpretation officers and two enlisted assistants are an adequate allowance for all photographic interpretation requirements under the present operating conditions. The photo interpretation spaces are located in the Air Intelligence Office, compartment B-201-1L. Although there are definite space limitations, the convenience afforded pilots and squadron Air Intelligence Officers in respect to photographic information and materials far outweighed the advantages of using separate spaces.

The K-38 36" focal length camera was used on practically all photographic interpretation missions. It proved to be satisfactory in all respects. The K-25 capsule externally carried produced few satisfactory photographs. The F-56 externally carried capsule camera is far superior to the K-25. For strike photographs, an externally carried camera with a longer focal length is highly recommended.

Photographic Laboratory

Upon our departure from San Diego, nineteen men were attached to the Photographic Laboratory, of which seven were petty officers and two designated PHAN. Ten men had been selected from the ship's company and an intensive program of training was set up to qualify these men for photographic work. During the first tour on the line, much difficulty was experienced trying to keep the cameras and equipment in an operating condition, but this problem was solved when a rated camera repairman reported aboard.

The A10-A dryers proved too slow for normal operation and two 1000 watt heating elements, normally used in a Pako print dryer, were installed increasing the speed of drying to approximately twenty feet per minute. After the winter season was over, aerial negatives had a tendancy to lose contrast, due to weather conditions, but this was eliminated by the use of an A-25 (red) filter in place of the minus blue filter.

One hundred fifty-eight photographic sorties were flown during the entire tour and following number and types of negatives and prints have been processed by the ship's photographic laboratory during the entire period in the forward area.

Negatives		Prints	
9x18"	14,272	9x18"	82,192
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EXECUTIVE

At the beginning of the tour on 31 December 1952, there were 2,052 enlisted personnel attached to ship's company, 92 of whom were away on temporary additional duty and 4 on emergency leave, leaving a total of 1,956 on board.

A total of 113 men were received on board for duty during the cruise; 36 petty officers, 77 non-rated men. 184 men were transferred to other duty, of whom 103 were petty officers and 81 non-rated men. The assignment of personnel with sufficient obligated service to serve out the entire tour in the forward area proved to be invaluable in the resulting teamwork evidenced in many departments.

During the cruise, 59 requests for emergency leave were submitted of which 29 were approved. Those rejected presented a morale problem because of their failure to understand the fine line of distinction set forth in the Area Commander's policy directive.

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During the cruise, 59 requests for emergency leave were submitted of which 29 were approved. Those rejected presented a morale problem because of their failure to understand the fine line of distinction set forth in the Area Commander's policy directive.

Officer personnel rotation continued at a high rate in that 33 ship's company officers reported for duty, relieving a like number during the entire period in the forward area.

During the cruise, there were 124 wardroom guests representing all U.S. military services, the navies of the Netherlands, Canada, and England. Of the 124 guests, 35 visited the embarked Flag and his staff. The duration of all visits varied from one day to 30, a total representation of 684 man-days.

Recreation

The Special Services Officer arranged boxing shows, rest and recuperation leave, conducted tours, and stage shows. Boxing matches were set up during the interval between departure from the line and arrival in port. 1009 men took advantage of the facilities at rest hotels during in-port periods. 406 men went on conducted tours of Tokyo sponsored by the COMNAVFE Special Services Tourist Bureau. 600 men went on conducted tours of Hong Kong while the ship visited that port.

Training

During the course of this cruise, classes were held in Beginning and Advanced Algebra, and in Beginning German, as well as in the ratings of Aviation Boatswain's Mate, Storekeeper and Coxswain. All divisions used the training room for divisional lectures and training films during working hours. On-the-job training was found to be the most profitable, as well as the most practicable method of training during extensive operations. Interest in educational advancement by means of correspondence courses was very high. Over 500 sections of GED tests were administered. Over 200 USAFI correspondence courses were issued. There was an extremely large number of enlisted correspondence courses issued for advancement in rating studies.

Training is considered to have been carried out to a maximum degree in conjuction with the long hours and extensive duties required by the operations of the Task Force.

Public Information

With the staff public information officer of COMARDIV 3 and his journalists on board until the last month of the deployment period, the ship's public information officer concentrated on material for the Fleet Home Town News Center and most of the ship's tour in Western Pacific. For the period from 1 January 1953 to 6 June 1953, the material submitted totaled:

15 navy news dispatches, by radio.
32 news feature stories and layouts, by mail.
67 news photo releases.
189 hometown news stories (to FHTNC).
2413 hometown news stories by roster (to FHTNC).
105 hometown photographs (to FHTNC).
992 letters home.

Two newspaper correspondents were embarked for short periods during the cruise and they interviewed men from the cities and vicinities of the papers they represented.

Commanding Officer's Comment

The Commanding Officer's Sea Cabin, as provided in the VALLEY FORGE, is a source of discomfort to the Captain rather than relaxation. In operations such as are conducted in Task Force 77 this small, poorly arranged room is the Commanding Officer's home for weeks. In this case, the encroachment of space required for habitability has reached the limit. It can almost be said that the Captain must either stand up or pull down his bunk and go to sleep. It is recommended that future construction provide as a minimum for the commanding officer's sea cabin, space sufficient for a comfortable chair, a bunk and minimum head facilities.

During the numerous occasions when this ship was required to go alongside replenishment ships (total of 60 approaches) all of the senior officers and a few of OODs were permitted to make approaches. It was discovered that the most expeditious and surest procedure was as follows:

When released for approach go to plus 10 knots above Base speed.

At 1700 yards range cut to plus 3 knots above Base speed.

At overlap cut to Base speed.

When proceeding from one line or from waiting line to next ahead, modify the above as required depending on distance.

DENTAL

A continuous program of oral hygiene has been carried out which included lectures to personnel. Starting in April, evening

appointments were made for oral prophylaxis thus providing treatments for an additional one hundred patients a month.

This resulted in a low incidence of periodontal conditions and provided clean mouths for the Dental Officers to operate in.

A dental prosthetic laboratory has been authorized. When this is accomplished, a complete dental service will be rendered to personnel aboarda CVA as well as services to other ships in the Task Force.

It is recommended that space be provided for an additional operating room which will be utilized for combined services in the following manner:

Oral prophylaxis: This would enable a full time continuous program during the day as well as an evening program. This would result in the Dental Department carrying out its mission of providing oral hygiene for all personnel.

Prosthodontics: The prosthetic laboratory work can be accomplished without interfering with the oral prophylaxis unit.

Radiodontics: The X-ray unit could be transferred to this room thus permitting radiodontics without interruption of the Dental Officers operating under the present set up. Separate correspondence is being originated on this subject.

MEDICAL

For comparative purposes, venereal disease incidence during the four periods previously reported was:

	1st Period	2nd Period	3rd Period	4th Period
Syphilis	0	0	0	0
Chancroid	2	15	3	9
Urethritis, acute, due to gonococcus	7	16	11	13
Urethritis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec	46	124	53	67
Prostatitis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec	3	7	8	4
Total	58	162	75	93

Venereal incidence aboard the VALLEY FORGE continues to be a problem. However, the rate during the present operating period equals the rate for January 1953, and these two reported periods form the low points in venereal disease. Incidence declined during this period because there were fewer sexual exposures during our last in-port period prior to returning to the CONUS.

ENGINEERING

Maintenance

Since departure from San Diego, 20 November 1952, a total of 44 days has been available for maintenance. This was divided into five periods; one of fourteen days, two of eight days each (one of which was for emergency repairs to strut bearing), and two of seven days each. The excellent facilities of SRF Yokosuka were available for assistance in every case except for one seven-day period in Hong Kong.

For adequate maintenance, availability periods of seven or eight days are not worth while; no major repair can be undertaken with any assurance of completion. All vital repairs were accomplished, but only because of excellent spirit and much round-the-clock work at sea and during normal liberty hours in port on the part of ship's force. Under these conditions fatigue will inevitably lead to poor performance, and improper short-cuts will be taken which will sooner or later invite serious mechanical derangement.

Had operational commitments permitted, it is considered that four upkeep periods of ten to twelve days each would have paid far higher dividends in useful maintenance and rest for the crew in the same number of total upkeep days.

Logistics

For period 29 December 1952 through 6 June 1953:

Miles steamed:	50,095	
Fuel used:	8,645,415	gallons
Received from tankers at 60° F.	7,648,288	gallons
Refueling time:	43.9	hours
Receiving Rate (average)	174,000	gallons per hour
Fuel transferred to DDs at 60° F.	117,134	gallons
Time to fuel DDs	95	minutes
Average transfer rate to DDs:	1,233	gallons per hour
Water distilled:	8,694,370	gallons

GUNNERY

The primary concern of the VALLEY FORGE in replenishment evolutions has been to combine efficiency with maximum safety. During the entire cruise, no casualties occured while the tons per hour averages demonstrate an acceptable high degree of efficiency and training.

Refueling

During this cruise the VALLEY FORGE went alongside 25 ships for refueling and regassing. Dates, ships, and pertinent data are presented in tabular form:

Date	Ship	Quantity	
1-4-53	USS CHEMUNG (A030)	9;472.7 134,800	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
1-10-53	USS MISPILLION (A0105)	6,773.00 46,000	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
1-11-53	USS MISPILLION (A0105)	27,000	Gals Gasoline
1-19-53	USS GUADALUPE (A032)	12,709.74 158,046	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
2-11-53	USS MISPILLION (A0105)	8,281.85 45,000	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
2-15-53	USS GUADALUPE (A032)	5,647.15 107,000	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
2-19-53	USS KASKASKIA (A027)	4,497.83 203,660	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
2-23-53	USS MISPILLION (A0105)	6,605.28 96,030	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
2-27-53	USS MISPILLION (A0105)	7,123.60 159,700	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
3-3-53	USS GUADALUPE (A032)	5,588.31 104,000	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline

Date	Ship	Quantity	
3-7-53	USS GUADALUPE (A032)	5,608.83 186,130	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
3-11-53	USS MANATEE (A053)	4,690.19 111,000	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
3-29-53	USS GUADALUPE (A032)	11,951 20,370	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
4-2-53	USS NAVASOTA (A0106)	9,567.7 161,430	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
4-6-53	USS KASKASKIA (A027)	7,362.4 142,560	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
4-10-53	USS TALUGA (A062)	7,446.52 159,830	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
4-22-53	USS MANATEE (A053)	4,518.35 51,260	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
4-26-53	USS MANATEE (A053)	8,038.34 206,070	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
4-30-53	USS NAVASOTA (A0106)	6,036.83 98,200	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
5-4-53	USS MISPILLION (A0105)	7,949.31 172,160	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
5-8-53	USS MISPILLION (A0105)	7,135.42 139,560	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
5-12-53	USS CIMARRON (A022)	5,695.69 63,330	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
5-26-53	USS CIMARRON (A022)	11, 044 116, 900	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
6-1-53	USS CHIKASKIA (A054)	6,442.62 82,200	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline
6-4-53	USS CHIKASKIA (A054)	5,771.9 176,500	Bbls Oil Gals Gasoline

Re-Arming

In the same period the VALLEY FORGE went alongside ammunition ships on 23 occasions. Data for re-arming is given below. It is significant that there is a steady rise in tonnage received per hour, indicating that improvement in efficiency and dispatch was steady and continuous. Of course, this improvement cannot be graphed as a straight line, since weather conditions and other variables (such as type of load) constitute definite limiting factors.

Date	Ship	Tons	Tons per Hour
1-4-53	USS MT. KATMAI (AE16)	75	100.
1-10-53	USS VIRGO (AKA20)	170	45.7
1-19-53	USS CHARA (AKA58)	205	91.1
2-11-53	USS RAINIER (AE5)	80	66.6
2-15-53	USS RAINIER (AE5)	140	118.7
2-19-53	USS VIRGO (AKA20)	298	119.2
2-23-53	USS CHARA (AKA58)	130	111.1
2-27-53	USS RAINIER (AE5)	165	97.1
3-3-53	USS RAINIER (AE5)	153	136.3
3-7-53	USS VIRGO (AKA20)	130	113.4
3-11-53	USS CHARA (AKA58)	203	116.
4-2-53	USS MT. BAKER (AE4)	233	116.4
4-6-53	USS CHARA (AKA58)	238	142.8
4-10-53	USS RAINIER (AE5)	201	134.
4-22-53	USS MT. BAKER (AE4)	47	128.18
4-26-53	USS RAINIER (AE5)	282	143.39

Date	Ship	Tons	Tons per Hour
4-30-53	USS VIRGO (AKA20)	136	85.89
5-4-53	USS VIRGO (AKA20)	229	85.34
5-8-53	USS FIREDRAKE (AE14)	223	121.64
5-12-53	USS RAINIER (AE5)	62	37.58
5-14-53	USS RAINIER (AE5)	80	126.32
5-28-53	USS VESUVIUS (AE15)	85	106.24
6-4-53	USS MT. BAKER (AE4)	305	124.92

Supplies

The VALLEY FORGE received provisions nine times and aviation stores three times during the reporting period. The below summarizes these evolutions.

Date	Ship	Tons	Tons per Hour
1-10-53	USS GRAFFIAS (AF29)	99	79.2
1-19-53	USS GRAFFIAS (AF29)	88	66.
1-19-53	USS CHOURRE (ARV11)	12	40.
2-11-53	USS ALADURA (AF55)	51.5	60.
2-15-53	USS CHOURRE (ARV11)	15	33.3
2-19-53	USS ALADURA (AF55)	47	56.
3-3-53	USS ALADURA (AF55)	39	78.
3-29-53	USS ALADURA (AF55)	60.5	124.6
3-29-53	USS JUPITER (AVS8)	15.5	29.04
4-22-53	USS ALSTEDE (AF48)	67.5	5.79
5-8-53	USS PICTOR (AF54)	76.25	35.23
6-4-53	USS POLARIS (AF11)	140.5	43.8

Highline transfers of personnel and light freight were made on 62 different occasions during the cruise.

Gunnery

Eleven successful firing exercises were conducted during the reporting period. Ammunition expenditures were as follows: 623 rounds of 5"/38 and 8,134 rounds of 40mm. The majority of these exercises were conducted enroute Yokosuka or in the operating area. It has been the experience of this ship that firing exercises conducted while on the line are not completely satisfactory for carriers because the replenishment schedule is usually so restricting that in the greater number of cases it is impossible to participate.

The following ordnance was expended during the entire cruise:

	Ship
5"/38 Caliber	623
40mm	8,134
Bombs	**Aircraft**
2000# GP	264
1000# GP	1,333
1000# SAP	27
500# GP	2,701
500# SAP	24
250# GP	9,886
100# GP	3,443
220/260# Frag	1,896
100# Incendiary	743
350# Depth Bomb	4
Leaflet Bomb	241
Rockets	
11.75" Tiny Tim	2
3.5" Solid	139
3.5" Smoke	66
5" HVAR	878
5" ATAR	1,016
A/C Parachute Flares	967
Napalm	156

Gun Ammunition

20mm	680,141
50 Caliber	544,995

AIR

Personnel

The allowance of 12 officers and 469 men has proved adequate for the 78 plane embarked air group of two jet and two propeller squadrons plus detachments. For an embarked air group of three jet and one propeller squadrons, it is considered that the enlisted allowance should be increased to 525. This increase would permit the forming of four more plane handling crews and three more gassing crews. The required additional handling of jet aircraft makes this increase of crews almost mandatory.

Aircraft Handling

There is no satisfactory training substitute for actual air operations aboard a carrier. The first opportunity of VALLEY FORGE to operate with the full air group embarked occurred 1½ days prior to the ORI. The ORI served as additional opportunity for ship and air group to train together. This is insufficient to properly prepare a ship-air group team for the intensive operations required by Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

To permit maximum flight deck flexibility VALLEY FORGE resorted to a deck spot with the jets aft of the propeller planes when the schedule required a jet launch 45 minutes or less after the propeller launch. This spot admittedly reduced the amount of deck run available to the propeller planes and required catapulting until there was sufficient deck space. However, with the 4,500 - 5,000 pound ordnance loading on the AD4NA aircraft, and the light and variable winds experienced during the latter portions of the deployment, catapulting of the AD aircraft was almost a necessity. The catapulting of the loaded ADs did not materially increase the launching time. Dead Packing of the jets afforded several advantages in jet handling:

No respotting of the jets was conducted in a turn because of the attendant danger of turning over.

Fuzing of bombs and the winding-in of ammunition on the hangar deck was completely avoided, and bombing was reduced to a minimum. The ordnancemen were also not rushed in their arming of aircraft.

The overloading of the deckedge elevator was held to a minimum and limited for the most part to the striking below of duds which developed during a launch.

VALLEY FORGE has been unable to obtain sufficient hardware for the fabrication of nylon tie-downs. This type of tie-down has proved to be extremely satisfactory and it is hoped that an adequate number of parachute friction "V" rings or satisfactory substitutes will become available. The manufacture of hooks presents no problem and was easily accomplished by SRF, Yokosuka. Care must be used in obtaining hooks which are properly heat-treated so that they do not fail when subjected to a load.

The deckedge elevator performed satisfactorily (with careful treatment) and survived the cruise. The minimum diameter of the cables is now 1".006, a decrease of 0".059 since January 1953, and a decrease of 0".144 from original installation.

Catapults and Arresting Gear

During the deployment, which consisted of 78 air operating days, the following usage of catapults and arresting gear was made:

Catapults	Port	Starboard
Total Jet Shots	1,604	1,473
4,000# Jet Shots	814	731
Total propeller shots (average pressure 2,525#)	279	436
Total	1,885	1,914
Shots prior to 31 December 1952	7,172	7,952
Grand Total	9,057	9,866

Catapult Pumps	Total Shots Since Installation	Date and Place of Installation	Date and Place of Installation of Replaced Pump
#1	627	4-26-53 Cat Crew at sea.	9-20-51, Yokosuka 4,441 when failed
#2	236	5-28-53 Cat Crew at sea.	Original pump 9,630 when failed

Catapult Pumps	Total Shots Since Installation	Date and Place of Installation	Date and Place of Installation of Replaced Pump
#3	9,866	Original	-
#4	9,866	Original	-
#5	463	Overhauled 5-4-53. Cat Crew at sea.	1-25-52, Yokosuka 3,521 when failed.
#6	1,029	3-3-53 Cat Crew at sea.	1-25-52, Yokosuka 7,175 when failed.
#7	2,846	5-16-52 Yokosuka replaced	1-25-52, Yokosuka 1,281 when failed.
#8	4,127	1-25-52 Yokosuka replaced	Original Pump 4,930 when failed.

Three pumps were replaced during the deployment, and one required substantial repair. All work was accomplished by ship's force. A pump can be replaced by a spare in about 16 hours. Normal operations can continue during the replacement. With the exception of the replacement of the cable tensioning piston on the starboard machine, no maintenance of other than routine nature was required. The crosshead sheaves show heavy wear. The throats are worn to a depth of 3/16" and will require replacement when next in the Navy yard.

Arresting Gear

Average runout, jets 132
Average runout, propeller planes 125

Engagements

Pennant #1	1,283	Pennant #10	11
Pennant #2	1,613	Pennant #11	4
Pennant #3	1,392	Pennant #12	4
Pennant #4	785	Barrier #1 (Conventional)	16
Pennant #5	571	Barrier #3 (Conventional)	7
Pennant #6	234	Barrier #5 (Conventional)	0
Pennant #7	100	Barrier #2 (Jet)	6
Pennant #8	43	Barrier #4 (Jet)	15
Pennant #9	17	Barricade (maximum runout 90)	14

Total Landings, Jet	3,089
Total Landings, Propeller Planes	2,968
Non-engagements	12
Grand Total	6,069

There were seven hook point failures which resulted in seven jet barricade engagements. Six sockets on arresting gear cables were poured. Only one purchase cable (#1 engine) required replacement and this engine was **removed** overnight. No casualties to arresting gear occurred on this deployment.

The frequent return of hung rockets necessitated the development of a "jury" rocket barrier (photographs attached). The barrier was fabricated from used nylon barricade webbing which was interwoven and then secured with bolts and light aluminum washers. Fortunately, or unfortunately, the barrier was never subjected to an actual rocket engagement.

Aircraft Maintenance

The installed generators for starting jets have been used to a maximum during this deployment, with the aim of utilizing the jeep starting units as auxiliary sources rather than the primary sources of power. The aim has not been completely realized in that jumper cords cannot reach all jets on deck. The installation of additional generators would be desirable if sufficient topside weight compensation could be found.

The towing tractors have been subjected to severe usage. The tractors cannot pull a loaded aircraft in high gear which consequently requires much operation in low gear at high RPM. This high RPM combined with the use of aviation gas for fuel creates the need for constant heavy maintenance.

Turnups of F9F-5 aircraft have been a constant headache, requiring much respotting of aircraft. Since 21 February 1953, there were 355 turnups made on the hangar deck alone.

Aircraft Service

The metal-lined plywood shipping boxes of 100# AN-M12 incendiary clusters created a problem not only on breakout but also in disposition. Most of the assembly bolts were so badly corroded that the nuts could not be removed and it was necessary

to drive the bolts out. The manner of securing the metal lining to the plywood box prohibited burning and hindered preparation for jettisoning. The cylindrical containers are quite satisfactory.

In compliance with COMAIRPAC conf disp 221845Z of May, issue-operational tests on the 36 Mark 25 Mod 2 mines aboard were performed. No discrepancies were found except the minor adjustments normally expected when preparing the mines for issue.

Since 22 April 1953 operational evaluation tests of the Aero 13B bomb hoists have been conducted. The evaluation proved that the hoist is generally unsatisfactory, primarily because of its weight and poor handling characteristics. A report of the evaluation was submitted to COMFAIRJAPAN in VALLEY FORGE rest ltr ser 1806 of 10 Jun 1953.

During this deployment, 3,074,165 gallons of aviation gasoline and 17,642 gallons of aviation lube oil were used. No particular servicing problems existed except the desirability of a higher avgas pumping rate when fueling jets and the well-known need for a greater storage capacity. On one occasion the returning strike aircraft could not be refueled after recovery because of lack of avgas aboard.

F9F-5 Aircraft

The operation and handling of the F9F-5 aircraft aboard the unconverted CVA 9 type carrier taxes the carrier to its maximum capabilities.

The replacement of propeller aircraft in an Air Group by jets, places a requirement for utilizing at least a portion of the jets aboard as fighter-bombers. Disregarding any decrease or increase of bombing accuracy by substitution of jets for propeller driven aircraft, the inescapable fact remains that the loaded jet aircraft must get airborne. The F9F-5 with a strike load of 1200 pounds external ordnance grosses 19000 pounds. The normal temperature experienced by VALLEY FORGE in the latter stages of deployment was about 70° F. Operating the H4B catapult at top accumulator pressure requires at this air temperature, a wind over the deck of 38 knots. Experience has proven that this can be shaded to 37 knots when the pilots are well experienced in the aircraft. In its CAP

configuration, 31 - 32 knots of wind are necessary. It is obvious then that the deployment of the carrier in areas of high temperature and little or no wind such as normally expected near the equator would preclude F9F-5 operations with an H4B catapult. If substantually lower airborne endurance could be accepted for CAP, the aircraft could be launched with empty tip tanks. However, the carrier may be faced with the fact that she can lauhch neither strike nor CAP in certain areas, even though the weather may be CAVU.

The most frequent strike loading of the F9F-5 has been with an external ordnance load of 1200 pounds. The aircraft then grosses 19000 pounds. As has been pointed out in previous VALLEY FORGE Action Report and VALLEY FORGE Alteration Request 4-53 of 7 February 1953, the capacity of the deckedge elevator is not sufficient for easy handling of the loaded F9F-5. It is desirable that a loaded aircraft of 19000 pounds plus a tractor of 5700 pounds be capable of operation on the elevator. Further, there are occasions when loaded ADs at 21000 pounds should be capable of being struck below during a catapult launch of propeller aircraft. Obviously the difficulty of aircraft handling is increased by the low capacity elevator.

The Mark 5 arresting gear has given no indication of being over extended.

SUPPLY

Aviation Spare Parts and Material

During the first half of the current tour the USS CHOURRE (ARV11) furnished support which included two replenishments at sea. The overall efficiency for furnishing material was approximately 58%. During the latter half of the tour the USS JUPITER (AVS8) furnished support. One replenishment at sea and one in port replenishment was made with the efficiency again approximately 58%. Irrespective of this limited efficiency, the finest cooperation was received from the USS CHOURRE (ARV11) and USS JUPITER (AVS8). It is believed that this limited efficiency was a result of stock capacity. It is felt that the present system of passing NIS items is a major improvement over the former one of obligating and holding requisitions until receipt of the material from CONUS. A high percentage of passed items were furnished by ASB, NSD, Yokosuka and ASA, NSD, Guam.

The following is a breakdown of delivery time for material under the various priorities:

Priority A (AOG)	8 days
Priority A	3 weeks
Priority B	3-7 weeks
Priority C	9-16 weeks

At the direction of COMFAIRJAPAN, a 90 day allowance of F9F-5 spares was off-loaded at NSD Yokosuka for the USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA39) and some selected items for the USS JUPITER (AVS8), also some material to fill shortages on the USS BOXER (CVA21).

Number of individual requests from squadrons per month	approximately	1,460
Number of such requests filled from stock on board per month	approximately	1,390
Number of such requests passed to other sources of supply	approximately	20
Allowance list items	approximately	20
Non-allowance list items	approximately	50
% efficiency, over-all	approximately	95.2
% efficiency for allowance list items	approximately	98.5

General Stores and Non-Aviation Repair Parts

GSM - While in the area this vessel received General Stores Material from the USS POLLUX (AKS4), USS CASTOR (AKS1), and NSD, Yokosuka. The USS POLLUX (AKS4) gave outstanding service, completing 98% of the requisitions submitted. The USS CASTOR (AKS1) completed 66% of the requisitions submitted. NSD Yokosuka gave excellent service whenever this vessel was allowed to submit requisitions to that activity.

The current policy of COMSERVPAC in regard to requisitions for material not available in the WESTPAC area is to cancel requisitions bearing priority indicator "C" instead of holding them as an obligation or passing them to a continental source

of supply for action. While this policy provides an opportunity for the service force to gain valuable experience in mobile supply support, it creates, at the same time, an undesirable situation for carrier type vessels currently rotating between CONUS and WESTPAC.

Experience gained by this ship in four WESTPAC deployments has proven that the scope of operating schedules and storage space limitations preclude the stowage of 180 day stock levels of all items on departure from CONUS. Therefore, it becomes necessary to replenish stock periodically on the basis of currently generated usage data or established high and low stock limits. However, this is not possible with COMSERVRON THREE's policy of cancelling priority "C" requisitions for items which are not available.

The justifications stated as acceptable by COMSERVRON THREE for allowing priority "C" requisitions to be passed to CONUS were, "Essential for operating in NAVFE", "Essential for health and comfort of crew", and "To be held for ship's return to CONUS", normally this type requisition would be assigned priority "A". The third case is of little value to vessels operating for extended periods in WESTPAC. These restrictions either require and/or invite the misuse of priority indicators.

Electronics Spare Parts (BUSHIPS)

Electronics material was obtained from the USS PROTON (AKS28) and the USS ELECTRON (AKS27) during in port periods. Both vessels provided adequate services.

Repair Spare Parts (BUORD)

Ordnance repair parts were obtained from the USS CHIMON (AKS31) and the USS LEAGUE ISLAND (AKS30) during in port periods. Both ships provided adequate services.

Ships Repair Spare Parts (BUSHIPS)

Ship's repair parts were obtained from the USS CHIMON (AKS31) and the USS LEAGUE ISLAND (AKS30) during in port periods. Both ships provided adequate services.

Automotive Spare Parts

Procurement of spare parts for tow tractors and fork lifts usually proved very difficult due to non-availability. Procurement was made through NSD Yokosuka. However, that activity's maintenance shop was exceedingly cooperative in making repairs to inoperative equipment.

Individual issues of General Stores per month 1,231

Monthly average of items received aboard from all sources:

General Stores	850
Ship's Repair Parts	500
Electronics Parts	240

Commissary

Provisions - while in the area provisions were supplied by the following ships: USS GRAFFIAS (AF29), USS ALSTEDE (AF48), USS ALUDRA (AF55), USS PICTOR (AF54), and USS POLARIS (AF11).

The services rendered by the USS ALSTEDE (AF48), USS POLARIS (AF11), and USS PICTOR (AF54) were considered good. The quality of provisions and small amount of breakage was considered noteworthy. The services rendered by the USS GRAFFIAS (AF29) and USS ALUDRA (AF54) were considered adequate; however, shortages and breakage were always experienced on delivery.

Receipts at Sea	864.9 tons
Receipts in Port	187.9 tons

Ration Data:

Rations Served	487,650
Value Stores Consumed	$581,365.31
Average Cost of Ration	$1.1967

Ship's Store Retail Facilities

The USS POLLUX (AKS4) and USS CASTOR (AKS1) gave adequate service in supplying both ship's store stock and clothing and small stores items:

Average ship's store monthly sales	35,000
Average % profit	10%
C&SS average monthly sales	9,500

PART VII

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are contained in this report:

That 1/30,000 scale photos of the Cherokee target area be used, page 6.

That Air Group AIO be assigned as Assistant Ship's AIO for carriers deploying to the Far East, page 11.

That four enlisted personnel be the minimum assignment to the ship's Air Intelligence Office, page 11.

That an Air Intelligence Specialist Rating be originated, page 12.

That for strike photographs, an externally carried camera with a longer focal length be used, page 15.

That a three day trip to and from Yokosuka and the Task Force be authorized when conditions permit, page 11.

That in future construction, the commanding officer's sea cabin be provided with sufficient space for a comfortable chair, a bunk, and minimum head facilities, page 18.

That space be provided for the combined services in oral prophylaxis, prosthodontics, and radiodontics, page 19.

That communication personnel exercise greater care in assigning relay instructions for messages addressed to the Task Force or all ships present, page 14.

That immediate steps be taken to improve the design of arrangement of aircraft rocket pigtails on existing rockets provided existing stocks on hand warrant. Entirely too many rockets are returned aboard with cut or broken pigtails. This is particularly true of jet aircraft. The percentage of rockets returned due to above cause was 4% for 1,616 rockets loaded.

MISCELLANEOUS

The following quoted dispatch is the departure message from Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN:

> "YOU LEAVE OUR TASK FORCE WITH THE DESERVED WELL WISHES OF EVERYONE AND OUR GREAT ADMIRATION FOR THE MAGNIFICENT ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE VALLEY FORGE AND HER EMBARKED AIR GROUP X WELL DONE TO ALL CONCERNED."

R. E. DIXON